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ABSTRACT	  
Polychlorinated  biphenyls  (PCBs)  have  been  globally  classified  as  a  chemical  
substance  of  harm  to  flora  and  fauna.  By  virtue  of  this  classification,  PCBs  have  become  
an  issue  among  well-­‐‑meaning  governments,  non-­‐‑government  organizations,  media,  
academics,  and  societal  groups  in  the  policy  network.  This  is  especially  so  within  the  
discourse  of  industrial  development  and  environmental  justice,  environmental  policy  
frameworks,  and  public  participation  in  policymaking  process.    
In  Ghana,  research  shows  that  PCBs  have  become  ubiquitous.  However,  the  
country’s  existing  environmental  protection  policy  framework  does  not  adequately  
address  the  problem,  unlike  in  the  U.S.  This  inadequacy  is  considered  a  policy  failure,  
which  has  led  to  large-­‐‑scale  environmental  injustice  from  an  historical  point  of  view.  
There  are  underlying  factors  leading  to  this  policy  failure,  which  merit  researching.  The  
policy  process  leading  to  the  ban  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  in  1979  provides  a  unique  case  to  
contrast  the  PCBs  case  in  Ghana,  while  at  the  same  time  underscoring  how  the  U.S.  
policy  facilitated  conditions  of  environmental  injustice  in  Ghana.  
The  paper  is  divided  into  four  main  themes:  Introduction;  The  PCBs  cases  in  the  
U.S.  and  in  Ghana;  Fieldwork  and  Analysis;  Conclusion.  In  my  introductory  theme,  I  
will  look  at  industrialization  and  the  environment  justice  frame  that  emerges  as  a  result  
of  a  hegemonic  order  that  exists  between  developed  and  developing  nations.  I  will  also  
look  at  environmental  policy  frameworks  and  the  discourse  on  the  dynamics  of  policy  
networks  and  processes.  The  section  also  reviews  literature  on  public  engagement  with  a  
focus  on  public  participation  as  a  modest  way  of  expanding  the  policy  network.  Finally,  
I  review  the  polity  and  policy  frameworks  in  Ghana  from  an  historical  perspective  to  
underscore  the  basis  of  environmental  policy  in  the  country.  In  the  PCBs  cases  in  the  
U.S.  and  Ghana  theme,  I  foremost  provide  a  brief  about  the  history  of  PCBs  and  then  
proceed  to  the  historical  problematization  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.,  and  the  policy  process  
that  ensued  afterwards.  I  then  look  at  the  PCBs  case  in  Ghana  from  a  historical  
perspective  through  the  lenses  of  Ghana’s  quest  to  expand  access  to  electricity  as  a  
catalyst  for  socioeconomic  growth.  My  fieldwork  and  analysis  theme  points  to  the  
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methodology  and  the  tools  and  techniques  that  were  utilized  in  my  research.  Interviews  
and  questionnaires  responses,  literature,  court,  policy,  and  institutional  documents  
formed  the  backbone  of  my  analysis.  The  last  theme,  which  is  the  concluding  part  of  my  
paper,  discusses  my  summary  and  understanding  of  the  policy  process  for  the  two  
countries  and  points  out  my  observations.  The  chapter  also  offers  recommendations  as  
part  of  my  contributions  to  the  policy  process,  particularly  in  Ghana.  Overall,  this  
process  provides  a  better  comparative  picture  of  the  environmental  policy  process  in  the  
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FOREWORD	  
This  paper  is  directly  connected  to  my  Plan  of  Study,  which  aims  to  explore  the  
environmental  policy  dynamics  leading  to  policy  failures  in  Ghana  through  my  core  
components.  This  exploration  is  conducted  by  analyzing  the  environmental  policy  
process  in  Ghana  and  in  the  U.S.  through  a  comparative  study  of  the  policy  networks  of  
the  two  countries,  using  the  case  of  PCBs  in  both  countries  as  the  problem  barometer.  
To  make  my  case  concrete,  I  conducted  fieldwork  in  Ghana  and  directly  
connected  my  findings  to  the  literature  position  of  the  three  core  components  of  my  Plan  
of  Study:  Industrial  Development  and  Environmental  Justice;  Electricity  Industries  in  
Ghana  and  the  PCBs  Crisis;  Participatory  Governance  and  Environmental  Policy  
Process.  This  connectivity  provided  the  platform  for  me  to  review  the  PCBs  case  in  the  
U.S.  and  the  policy  process  leading  to  its  ban  in  1979;  and  the  case  of  PCBs  ubiquity  in  
Ghana  as  a  result  of  a  national  quest  to  industrialize  through  electrification  projects.  The  
review  of  the  two  cases  together  with  a  literature  review  of  the  core  components  in  my  
Plan  of  Study  provided  a  framework  upon  which  I  juxtaposed  my  fieldwork  analysis.  It  
offered  me  the  opportunity  to  analyze  the  policy  network  in  Ghana  and  the  policy  
process  by  pointing  out  the  causes  of  policy  failures  in  Ghana  while  making  meaningful  
comparison  to  the  case  in  the  U.S.  This  also  gave  me  insight  into  how  policy  analysis  is  
conducted  using  different  approaches  and  how  to  actively  involve  the  public  in  
participatory  governance  in  government  decision-­‐‑making  processes.  Importantly,  it  
helped  me  to  accomplish  my  learning  objectives  on  Participatory  Governance  and  
Environmental  Policy.  
The  fieldwork  helped  me  to  gain  an  inside  understanding  of  how  the  electricity  
companies  in  Ghana  influence  environmental  policy  and  contribute  to  environmental  
injustice.  This  satisfactorily  accomplished  my  learning  objectives  under  Industrial  
Development  and  Environmental  Justice  and  Electricity  Industries  in  Ghana  and  the  
PCBs  Crisis,  as  stated  in  my  Plan  of  Study.  It  also  allowed  me  to  achieve  my  learning  
objectives  of  understanding  the  role  of  government  institutions  in  permitting  industries  
to  pollute  the  environment.    
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EDF  
EHS  
Environmental  Defense  Fund    
Environment, Health and Safety  
EEI   Edison  Electric  Institute  
EPA   Environmental  Protection  Agency  (emphasis  on  the  U.S.)  
Ghana  EPA   Ghana  Environmental  Protection  Agency    
EPC   Environmental  Protection  Council  
ERP   Economic  Recovery  Plan  
FDA   Food  and  Drug  Administration    
GBC   Ghana  Broadcasting  Corporation    
GCS   Ghana  Chemical  Society  
GEF   Global  Environmental  Facility    
GNAFF   Ghana  National  Association  of  Farmers  and  Fishermen    
GRIDCO   Ghana  Grid  Company  
GSCS   Ghana  Students’  Chemical  Society    
IMF   International  Monetary  Fund  
LDCs   Least  Developing  Countries  
MEST   Ministry  of  Environment,  Science  and  Technology  
MESTI   Ministry  of  Environment,  Science,  Technology  and  Innovation  
NEAP  
NED  
National  Environmental  Action  Plan  
Northern Electricity Department   
NEF   National  Electrification  Fund    
NEP   National  Environmental  Policy  
NEPA   National  Environmental  Policy  Act    
NEPS   National  Electrification  Planning  Study    
NES   National  Electrification  Scheme    
NESRP   Northern  Electrification  and  System  Reinforcement  Project    
NGO   Non-­‐‑Governmental  Organization  
NRC   National  Redemption  Council    
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OAU   Organization  of  African  Unity    




  Polychlorinated  dibenzofurans  
PIA   Pesticide  Industry  Associations    
POPs   Persistent  Organic  Pollutants  
SHEP   Self-­‐‑Help  Electrification  Program    
TSCA   Toxic  Substance  Control  Act  
TUC   Trade  Union  Congress  
UNDP   United  Nations  Development  Program    
UNEP   United  Nations  Environmental  Program    
UNIDO   United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization    
UNITAR  
The  U.S.  
United  Nations  Institute  for  Training  and  Research  
  United  States  
UPS   Uninterrupted  Power  Supply    
USWAG   Utility  Solid  Waste  Activity  Group    
VALCO   Volta  Aluminum  Company  
VRA   Volta  River  Authority  
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INTRODUCTION	  	  
INDUSTRIAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  AND	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  JUSTICE	  	  
Overview	  
This  chapter  looks  at  the  role  of  industrialization  and  hegemony  and  their  
contribution  to  environmental  injustice,  particularly  in  developing  nations.  The  chapter  
reviews  the  regime  of  stringent  environmental  laws  in  developed  nations  and  how  these  
measures  facilitated  the  problem  of  dumping  toxic  substances  in  the  developing  nations  
that  were  desperate  to  modernize.  Finally  the  underlying  factors  leading  to  the  strongly  
knit  toxic  substance  trading  relationship  between  developed  and  developing  nations  is  
pointed  out.  This  is  important  towards  understanding  the  case  of  PCBs  ubiquity  in  
Ghana.  
Industrialization	  and	  the	  power	  differentials	  among	  nations	  
Ulrich  Beck  has  argued  in  his  book  “Risk  Society:  Towards  a  New  Modernity”  that  
modernity  has  revolutionize  and  made  better  the  way  social  life  is  organized  but  at  the  
same  created  the  conditions  for  pollution  particularly  through  industrial  development  
(1992).  Shrivastava  similarly  argued  that  industrial  development  of  the  past  200  years  
has  led  to  increased  prosperity,  however  with  costly  degradation  to  the  environment  
and  human  life  (1996).  The  global  demand  for  chemical  use  after  the  Post  World  War  (II)  
led  to  an  unprecedented  increase  in  the  levels  of  Persistent  Organic  Pollutants  (POPs)  
such  as  PCBs  in  the  environment  with  dire  consequences.  Rachel  Carson’s  
groundbreaking  book  “Silent  Spring”  which  raised  significant  awareness  during  the  
early  rise  of  the  chemical  industry  vividly  pointed  out  the  high  cost  of  chemical  toxicity  
to  human  life  and  the  environment  (1962).  With  the  PCBs  ban  in  the  U.S.  and  similar  
bans  in  other  developed  nations  in  the  1970s,  an  era  of  increased  exportation  of  PCBs-­‐‑
tainted  equipment  to  many  developing  nations  ensued.  These  developing  nations  were  
desperate  to  modernize  through  various  development  projects  in  the  post-­‐‑colonial  era  of  
the  1970s  and  early  1980s  (Hoogvelt,  2001).    
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The  postcolonial  era  became  an  era  of  immerse  dependency  of  the  developing  
nations  on  the  developed  nations  for  economic  advancement,  with  the  vision  to  
modernize.  The  characterization  of  this  dependency  dynamics  introduced  an  established  
long-­‐‑term  bilateral  and  multilateral  relationship,  which  was  rooted  in  the  ideology  of  
trade  liberalization  and  globalization.  While  the  developing  nations  saw  this  
relationship  as  the  motor  for  their  economic  development,  it  was  quickly  exploited  by  
the  developed  nations  to  their  advantage  in  a  manner  that  enhance  their  economic,  
social,  and  environmental  good.  It  is  this  relationship  that  created  a  conduit  for  Africa  
and  other  developing  nations  to  eventually  serve  as  host  to  millions  of  tons  of  toxic  
waste;  many  of  which  came  packaged  in  the  name  of  development  inputs  (Vir,  1989;  
Wynne,  1989).  While  corporations  in  the  developed  nations  like  the  U.S.  pushed  out  
tainted  electric  transformers  and  other  PCBs  contaminated  substances  to  the  developing  
nations  in  order  to  meet  stricter  regulatory  requirement,  the  process  quickly  
overburdened  the  developing  nations  with  PCBs.  Thus,  a  situation  whereby  the  
developing  nations  became  the  dumping  ground  for  the  developed  nations  was  created.  
This  phenomenon  became  known  among  some  African  scholars  and  well-­‐‑meaning  
African  politicians  as  “toxic  terrorism”  and  “environmental  imperialism”  (Montgomery,  
1995,  p.  1).  
According  to  Foster  and  Clark,  the  capitalist  ideology  has  divided  nations  into  
core  and  periphery,  which  has  created  a  world  system  of  “dominance  and  dependency,”  
such  as  “the  dumping  of  ecological  waste  in  ways  that  widen  the  chasm  between  [core]  
and  periphery”  (2009,  p.187).  Andre  Gunder  Frank  has  equally  pointed  out  that  this  
relationship  between  what  he  called  the  “satellite  underdeveloped”  and  “metropolitan  
developed”  countries  has  created  the  condition  of  ‘underdevelopment’  of  the  satellite;  
thus  creating  the  structures  necessary  for  the  capitalist  system  to  thrive  on  a  global  scale  
(1966,  pp.  18  and  24).  
Finding	  a	  Dumping	  Ground:	  The	  Environmental	  Justice	  Perspective	  
During  the  latter  part  of  the  1970s  and  1980s,  environmental  regulations  in  the  
developed  nations  became  increasingly  stringent  due  to  increased  public  opposition  to  
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toxic  waste  disposal  to  safeguard  the  environment  and  human  health.  As  a  result  of  this,  
the  cost  of  toxic  waste  disposal  became  increasingly  expensive,  which  undoubtedly  
continued  to  impact  the  profit  margins  of  corporations.  This  led  to  an  increased  search  
for  dumping  grounds  in  areas  where  the  cost  was  cheap,  resistance  was  least,  and  the  
laws  were  lax  (Mpanya,  1992;  Clapp,  1994;  Park  1998;  Tesi,  2000;  Mohai  et  al,  2009).    
Park  points  out  that  in  1983,  it  was  estimated  that  toxic  chemical  waste  crossed  a  
national  frontier  more  than  once  every  five  seconds  within  Western  Europe  and  North  
America  (1998).  However,  by  1986  the  trading  route  had  changed  to  the  developing  
world  with  about  400  shipment  notices  per  year  from  30  shipment  notices  in  the  1980  
(ibid).  A  Greenpeace  report  similarly  shows  that  between  1989  and  1994,  the  
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries  exported  
2,611,677  metric  tons  of  toxic  wastes  to  non-­‐‑OECD  countries  (1994).  Currently,  it  is  
estimated  that  about  440  million  tons  of  toxic  waste  are  produced  each  year  globally  
(Gilman  et  al,  2011),  with  about  10  percent  from  the  United  States  and  other  
industrialized  countries  crossing  international  borders  each  year  (Gilman  et  al,  2011;  
Pellow,  2007;  Hilz,  1992).  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  toxic  waste  trade  is  not  very  
lucrative  and  appealing  among  developed  nations  because  such  trade  thrives  on  strict  
regulatory  differences  and  high  cost  of  disposal  amongst  them  (Clapp,  2002).  The  
developing  nations  have  therefore  become  a  target  for  toxic  waste  dumping  because  of  
nonexistent  or  weak  environmental  regulations  and  enforcement  regimes,  and  also  the  
desperate  desire  by  governments  in  poor  nations  to  accept  toxic  dumping  in  exchange  
for  financial  returns.  For  instance,  it  is  recorded  that  in  1989  toxic  waste  disposal  in  
Africa  cost  only  40  dollars  per  ton,  whereas  the  cost  of  disposal  in  Europe  or  United  
States  was  four  to  twenty-­‐‑five  times  that  figure  (Park,  1998).  In  fact,  Clapp  points  out  
that  in  the  U.S.  cost  for  dumping  such  waste  was  $15  per  ton  in  1980,  which  quickly  rose  
to  $250  in  1988  per  ton  (Clapp,  2007).  Ironically,  some  African  countries  were  even  
willing  to  accept  far  cheaper  rates  for  toxic  waste  disposal  in  return  for  economic  gains  
(Vir,  1989).    
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Disappointingly,    toxic  waste  dumping  in  developing  nations  has  even  been  
encouraged  by  World  Bank  officals.  On  December  1991,  then  World  Bank  Chief  
Economist,  Lawrence  Summers,  is  reported  to  have  written  a  memorandum  to  a  
colleague  in  which  they  discussed  how  to  cement  what  they  termed  the  “economic  
logic”  of  dumping  toxic  substances  in  developing  countries  (Summers,  1992:  in  The  
Economist,  8).  Summers  pointed  out  to  his  colleague  that  “…the  economic  logic  behind  
dumping  a  load  of  toxic  waste  in  the  lowest  wage  country  is  impeccable  and  [they]  
should  face  up  to  that”  (ibid).    
Summers  advocated  for  more  migration  of  what  he  termed  “dirty  industries”  and  
pollution  in  the  “Least  Developing  Countries”  (LDCs),  with  no  regard  to  human  life  or  
the  environment  of  these  regions  (Johnson  et  al,  2007;  Pellow,  2007).      
For  the  past  30  years,  Africa  has  been  playing  host  to  millions  of  tons  of  toxic  
waste  from  the  developed  nations  in  exchange  for  financial  benefits.  It  is  reported  that  in  
some  cases  the  fees  paid  by  corporations  to  dump  toxic  waste  in  some  African  nations  
was  greater  than  those  nations  annual  Gross  National  Product  (Abu,  1988).    The  vastness  
of  Africa’s  entrenchment  came  to  light  in  the  latter  part  of  the  1980s  when  an  Italian-­‐‑
Swiss  firm  attempted  to  negotiate  contracts  with  Guinea  Bissau,  Djibouti  and  Senegal  to  
trade  in  hazardous  waste  (ibid).  In  the  case  of  Guinea  Bissau,  it  was  calculated  that  the  
deal  would  have  earned  the  country  $600  million  if  it  had  permitted  fifteen  million  tons  
of  industrial  waste  for  a  period  of  five-­‐‑years  (Okaru,  1992,  Wynne,  1989).  Wynne  argues  
that  this  was  “more  than  four  times  the  country’s  gross  national  product  and  twice  its  
national  debts”  (1989,  p.121).    
In  “The  Dumping  of  Toxic  Waste  in  African  Countries;  a  Case  of  Poverty  and  Racism,”  
Mpanya  (1992)  argues  that  one  of  the  biggest  international  environmental  injustice  is  the  
exportation  of  hazardous  wastes  to  Third  World  countries.  Citing  the  most  prominent  
case  of  hazardous  dumping  in  Africa  is  the  1987  case  in  the  small  town  of  Koko  in  
Nigeria.  Five  ships  loaded  with  18000  barrels  of  hazardous  waste  weighing  about  3800  
tons,  consisting  of  about  150  tons  of  PCBs  were  described  as  building  materials  and  
dumped  in  the  backyard  of  Sunday  Nana,  a  local  farmer  and  businessman  for  a  rental  
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fee  of  $100  per  month  for  almost  eighteen  month  (Vir,  1989;  Ehwarieme  and  Cocodia,  
2011;  Okaru,  1992).  Whereas  the  dumping  in  Nigeria  fetched  the  importer  $4.3  million  
dollars  in  profit,  it  led  to  the  death  of  nineteen  people  (Okaru,  1992).    When  the  illegal  
dumping  was  discovered,  an  agreement  was  reached  between  the  Nigerian  and  Italian  
government  to  ship  back  the  cargo  to  Italy  after  some  bureaucratic  tussle  between  the  
two  nations  (Vir,  1989).  However,  the  citizens  of  Italy  refused  to  allow  entry  of  the  
hazardous  waste  cargo  into  their  land  by  protesting  in  all  the  ports  the  ship  had  
attempted  to  dock,  to  prevent  it  from  offloading  into  their  country  (ibid).  Another  case  
of  environmental  injustice  that  emerged  in  Africa  is  the  case  of  Benin,  a  neighboring  
country  to  Nigeria.  In  the  mid  to  late  1980s,  out  of  poverty  Benin  was  coerced  by  
western  nations  to  submerge  itself  in  the  toxic  trade  for  economic  gains  (Vir,  1989).  Vir  
succinctly  pointed  out  how  Benin  offered  to  receive  about  five  million  tons  of  toxic  
waste  from  Europe  and  North  America  at  a  meager  fee  of  $2.50  per  ton  as  a  result  of  a  
contract  it  had  signed  with  a  company  called  Sesco  Ltd  (ibid).  A  similar  agreement  it  
had  had  with  France  was  to  fetch  the  country  $18  million  (ibid).    
This  pattern  of  irresponsible  leadership  is  no  different  to  the  most  recent  case  in  
Côte  d’Ivoire.  On  August  20  2006,  Trafigura,  the  world’s  third  largest  independent  oil  
trader  clandestinely  dumped  toxic  waste  in  numerous  places  in  Abidjan,  Côte  d’Ivoire.  
This  led  to  17  fatalities  and  about  30,000  people  sustaining  severe  injuries  from  the  
exposure  to  the  waste  (Greenpeace,  2010;  Gilman  et  al,  2011).    A  three-­‐‑year  investigation  
into  the  incident  by  Amnesty  International  and  Greenpeace  revealed  that  the  absence  of  
effective  law  enforcement  was  a  loophole  Trafigura  exploited  to  maximize  corporate  
profit,  without  regard  for  human  life  and  the  environment.  The  harshest  reality  of  the  
incident  to  the  victims  was  that,  the  government  of  Côte  d’Ivoire  gave  Trafigura  legal  
immunity  from  prosecution  in  exchange  of  financial  settlement  (Greenpeace,  2010).  
Wole  Soyinka,  the  Nigerian  Nobel  Prize  Winner  has  referred  to  such  act  as  "ʺthe  
poisoning  of  the  continent"ʺ  and  an  expression  of  global  inequality  (Abu,  1988,  Case  
number  52).    
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The  rampant  dumping  of  toxic  substance  in  Africa  in  the  1980s,  especially  the  
sub-­‐‑Sahara  region,  became  a  concern  to  the  then  Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU),  
which  is  now  Africa  Union  (AU),  and  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  
(ECOWAS),  to  call  for  stiffer  punishment  for  culpable  toxic  waste  traders  in  the  region.  
It  is  of  interest  to  know  that  Côte  d’Ivoire  was  one  of  the  first  nations  to  institute  laws  
that  was  supposed  to  impose  hefty  fines  ($1.6  million)  and  a  prison  sentence  of  up  to  20  
years  for  toxic  waste  dumpers  (Vir,  1989).  
  The  Trafigura  case  clearly  shows  how  governments  and  corporations  could  
collude  for  economic  gains  without  regard  for  human  life,  the  environment,  or  
international  and  domestic  laws.  It  also  point  to  the  fact  that  instituting  the  most  
stringent  laws  does  not  necessarily  guarantee  successful  abidance,  until  it  can  be  
adequately  enforced.  This  shows  that  one  of  the  weaknesses  in  environmental  
governance  in  developing  nations  that  are  exploited  by  the  developed  nations  is  the  
weak  regime  of  regulatory  enforcement,  and  may  not  necessarily  be  the  absence  or  laxity  
of  existing  regulations,  as  proposed  by  popular  literature.  This  assertion  has  been  
pointed  out  by  Clapp  who  notes  that  “[toxic  substance]  are  transported  with  relative  
ease  from  one  country  to  another,  regardless  of  international  regulations”(Clapp  2002,  
p.141).  In  the  case  of  developing  nations,  it  is  important  to  note  that  poverty,  
indebtedness,  and  the  quest  to  gain  economic  freedom  further  reinforces  the  toxic  
substance  trade  (2007).    
When  poverty  and  indebtedness  overwhelmingly  clouds  a  nation,  rule  of  law  
become  ineffective  and  is  violated  by  citizens  and  government  institutions  alike.  
Stringent  laws  gain  their  potency  when  people  can  satisfactorily  meet  their  basic  needs  
and  nations  can  adequately  service  their  debts.  The  conditions  of  poverty  and  
indebtedness  simultaneously  provided  reasons  for  individuals  and  governments  to  
break  the  laws  for  economic  gains.  The  process  sets  the  grounds  for  economically  related  
environmental  injustice  paradigm  in  developing  nations.  Clapp  argues  that  this  
paradigm  “only  compromise  economic  development  prospects  in  the  future,  and  thus  
fuels  a  vicious  circle  of  poverty  and  environmental  damage”(2007,  p.  508).  It  is  in  light  of  
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this  that  developing  nations  like  Ghana  need  to  restructure  their  environmental  policies  
from  front-­‐‑end  to  ensure  adequate  enforcement  regime,  which  simultaneously  promotes  
socioeconomic  development.    
ENVIRONMENTAL	  POLICY	  AND	  POLICY	  NETWORK	  DYNAMICS	  
Overview	  
This  chapter  cursorily  explains  public  policy  and  the  dynamics  of  policy  failure  
and  success  through  the  lenses  of  the  policy  process  and  actors.  The  chapter  also  reviews  
in  brief  terms,  the  copious  literature  on  policy  networks  and  its  relevance  as  an  
analytical  tool  in  understanding  how  policy  actors  behave  during  policymaking  process.  
This  chapter  gives  the  prelude  to  understanding  the  policy  dynamics  in  the  U.S.  and  in  
Ghana  with  regards  to  the  PCBs  case.  
Public	  Policy	  	  
There  continues  to  be  varied  views  and  explanation  to  what  public  policy  means.  
Turgeon  and  Savard  in  their  writing,  “Public  Policy,”  have  effectively  shed  light  on  this  
variety  (2012).  Whereas  government  actors  may  consider  their  actions  to  be  public  
policy,  researchers  may  regard  public  policy  as  “whatever  government  chooses  to  do  or  
not  to  do”  (Dye,  1995,  p.4).  Thus,  action  and  inaction  on  the  part  of  government  
constitutes  public  policy.  Brooks  and  Miljan  equally  argue  that  once  an  issue  has  been  
framed  in  problematic  terms,  inactions  by  policymakers  become  a  deliberate  policy  
choice  in  itself  (1998).  Jenkins  placed  emphasis  on  the  interdependent  relationship  of  
government  actor’s  decisions  and  the  means  to  achieving  the  decision  outcomes  (1978).  
To  others,  public  policy  may  be  set  of  rules  enshrine  in  a  document  by  government  
authorities  (Brooks  and  Miljan,  1998;  Ostrom,  2007).  In  the  1950s,  Lasswell  first  proposed  
a  framework  consisting  of  seven  steps  by  which  public  policy  can  be  made  (1956).    His  
framework  has  served  as  the  bedrock  for  more  refined  models  in  public  policy  analysis  
(Jones,  1970;  Brewer  and  DeLeon,  1983).  The  policymaking  process  helps  actors  to  
understand  the  dynamics  of  their  decisions  (See  appendix  1  for  fuller  description  of  the  
policy  process/cycle).    
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Policy	  Failure	  and	  Success	  
McConnell  asserts  that  policy  has  multiple  dimensions,  often  succeeding  in  some  
areas  and  failing  in  others  with  severity  of  failure  dependent  on  outcomes  of  the  policy  
(2010).  However,  based  on  political  inclination,  policies  framed  as  successful  by  some  
actors  may  be  framed  as  unsuccessful  by  others,  especially  political  opponents  
(McConnell,  2010;  Fischer,  2002).    
When  current  policy  fails  to  address  important  public  problems  because  it  is  either  
insufficient  or  virtually  nonexistent  (McConnell,  2010;  Bachrach  and  Baratz,  1970;  Kerr,  
1976),  or  no  longer  achieve  the  political  and  program  goals  they  proffer  or  are  preferred  
by  responsible  decision-­‐‑makers  (Walsh,  2006),  then  policy  failure  is  acknowledged.  
On  the  converse,  McConnell1  attempts  to  define  a  successful  policy  as  one  that  
“achieves  the  goals  that  proponents  set  to  achieve  and  attracts  no  criticism  of  any  
significance  and  /or  support  is  virtually  universal”  (2010,  p.  356).  There  is  difficulty  
however,  in  measuring  these  attributes  of  policy  since  interpretations  of  policy  success  
or  failure  depends  on  which  end  of  the  policy  one  is  standing.  The  subjectivity  of  
positioning  a  policy  outcome  makes  its  measurement  problematic  and  somewhat  
metaphoric.  Generally  when  the  public  becomes  distrustful,  disgruntled,  and  feels  
disjointed  from  the  policy  process,  prescribed  policy  by  government  actors’  encounters  
resistance  and  may  be  violated.  This  potentially  leads  to  policy  failure.  
The	  Policy	  Networks	  
Pioneered  in  the  U.S.  in  the  1950s,  the  policy  network  framework  was  noted  as  a  
structured  system  within  which  “interest  groups,  congressional  committees,  and  
government  agencies  mutually  interacted  over  legislative  and  regulatory  matters”  
(Hessing  and  Howlett,  1997,  p.75).  The  centrality  of  government  actors2  within  the  policy  
network  has  been  well  recognized  by  scholars.  Hessing  and  Howlett  argue  that  the  
normative  position  of  government  actors  to  directly  influence  policy  is  pitched  on  their  
“structural  location  at  the  center  of  the  policy  network”  (1997,  p.  85).  This  positional  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Allan  McConnell  is  of  the  view  policy  succeed  or  fail  along  a  continuum  of  “[consented]  success,  resilient  
success,  conflicted  success,  precarious  success,  and  failure	  2	  Government  actors  are  considered  as  the  political  powers  and  institutions  that  participate  in  policy  
formulations  and  expend  greater  resources  and  authority  in  the  policy  network	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advantage  of  government  actors  enables  them  to  promote  or  discourage  environmental  
policy  options  through  the  “development  of  bills,  their  public  presence,  media  skills,  
and  engagement  in  policy  discourse”  (Hessing  and  Howlett,  pp.85-­‐‑86).  Besides,  
government  actors  possess  executive  powers,  which  can  be  exercised  through  the  court  
to  influence  a  policy  over  options  presented  by  the  policy  community.    
The  extensive  literature  on  policy  networks  reveals  that  there  is  no  single  policy  
network  approach  to  public  policy  (Skogstad,  2005:  Rhodes,  1997;  Adam  and  Friesi,  
2007).    This  means  to  understand  the  policy  network,  an  array  of  factors  must  be  
considered  to  be  able  to  conceptualize  the  behavior  of  actors  in  the  policy  network  for  
contextualization.  Hessing  and  Howlett  set  out  that  in  order  to  understand  actor  
behavior  within  the  policy  process,  it  is  important  to  know  the  key  actors,  the  resources  
and  environmental  interest  of  actors,  and  their  accessibility  to  the  policy  process  (1997).    
Policy  networks  identify  who  makes  decision  and  why  those  decisions  have  the  content  
they  do  (Rhodes,  1997;  Skogstad,  2005).  It  also  shows  the  governing  structures  of  society    
(Daugbjerg  and  Marsh,  1998).    Peterson  and  Bomberg  have  also  pointed  to  policy  
network  as  “clusters  of  actors,  ‘or  stakeholders’  each  with  an  interest  in  a  given  
[government]  policy  sector  and  the  capacity  to  help  determine  policy  success  or  failure”  
(2000,  p.  9).    
According  to  R.A.W  Rhodes,  whose  definition  I  find  more  heuristic  to  the  study  of  
policy  networks;  “policy  networks  are  sets  of  formal  institutional  and  informal  linkages  
between  governmental  and  other  actors  structured  around  shared  if  endlessly  
negotiated  beliefs  and  interests  in  public  policymaking  and  implementation”(2006,  p.  2).  
In  essence,  the  close  interaction  among  actors  over  commonly  held  substantive  interest  
in  the  policy  network  generates  the  basis  for  policy  decision-­‐‑making.  As  such,  the  
kneading  together  of  ideas  from  actors  constructively  and  consensually  is  important  
towards  developing  policies  with  the  capacity  to  reform  society.    
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Within  the  continuum  of  policy  network  are  the  policy  communities3  and  issue  
networks.  The  policy  communities  are  actors  with  common  interest,  values,  largely  
autonomous,  and  may  coalesce  around  an  issue  to  develop  policy  (Hessing  and  Howlett,  
1997).  The  issue  networks  or  groups  usually  have  large  but  unstable  participants,  are  
less  integrative,  have  alternative  to  policy  and  may  have  divergent  views  to  issues  due  
to  individual  actor  interest  and  preferences  (Bressers  and  O’Toole,  1998;  Hessing  and  
Howlett,  1997).  Hessing  and  Howlett  have  observed  that  government  actors,  who  are  
forerunners  of  the  policy  community,  may  suggest  (recruit)  actors  into  the  network  with  
a  parochially  directed  economic  interest  to  tighten  the  monopoly  of  the  policy  
community  (1997).  Even  though  issue  networks  have  attempted  to  break  such  
monopoly,  which  is  usually  implicitly  expressed  by  policy  communities,  the  
disjointedness,  lack  of  resources  and  their  incoherent  integration  to  constructively  push  
through  the  policy  networks  weakens  their  effective  participation  and  influence  in  the  
policy  process  (Rhodes,  2006).  As  pointed  out  by  Adam  and  Kiesi,  the  inability  of  issue  
networks  to  mobilize  to  “destabilize”  the  monopoly  by  “exogenous  shocks”  (given  as  
new  ideas,  values  and  knowledge)  keeps  the  policy  monopoly  intact  with  its  configured  
powers  (2007).  Adam  and  Kiesi  note  that  destabilization  may  lead  to  power  
fragmentation,  which  favors  coalition  of  issue  networks  for  power  (2007).  On  the  other  
hand  when  power  is  concentrated,  policy  monopoly  may  persist  because  issue  networks  
may  not  have  the  resources  to  break  into  it  (ibid).  Policy  scholars  are  of  the  view  that  
policy  networks  have  regularized  patterns  of  social  interaction  among  actors  whose  
interaction  and  interdependence  is  ‘supposedly’  stable  over  time  in  routine  decision-­‐‑
making  (Adam  and  Kriesi,  2007;  Skogstad,  2005).  However,  the  policy  network  structure  
become  unstable  when  new  ideas  and  new  actors  thrust  into  the  network,  or  when  
policy  communities’  experiences  change  in  believes  systems  (Atkinson  and  Coleman,  
1992;  Coleman  and  Perl,  1999),  thus  causing  “incremental  or  paradigmatic  change”  
(Skogstad,  2005,  p.  8).    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Hessing  and  Howlett  (1997)  have  identified  four  types  of  policy  communities:  hegemonic  community,  
chaotic  community,  fractious  community,  and  bifurcated  community,  p.  88.  
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The  internationalization  of  global  environmental  issues  have  created  a  
transnational  corpus  of  policy  networks  with  the  potential  to  link  actors  of  policy  
network  through  the  sharing  of  ideas  to  legitimate  a  national  or  international  policy  
interest  (Bernstein  and  Cashore,  2000;  Sikkink  1993).  According  to  Rhodes,  transnational  
networks  are  “knowledge-­‐‑based  experts  with  an  authoritative  claim  to  relevant  
knowledge  within  their  domain  of  expertise”  (2006,  p.  15).  As  a  result  of  this  they  exhibit  
greater  level  of  hegemony  and  professionalism  in  their  relation  with  other  actors  within  
the  policy  network.  Adam  and  Kriesi  posit  that  the  dynamics  of  transnational  actors  
opens  up  new  policy  opportunities  for  domestic  actors  (2007).    However,  this  
relationship  between  transnational  actors  and  domestic  actors  discourage  the  
participation  of  civil  groups  in  the  policymaking  process  and  skew  policy  goals  to  merit  
their  vested  interests.  This  can  be  easily  pointed  out  in  the  Ghanaian  policymaking  
dynamics  which  acceptingly  incorporated  international  experts  yet  discourage  the  active  
participation  of  civil  groups  in  the  policy  making  process.  	  
PUBLIC	  ENGAGEMENT	  IN	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  POLICY	  PROCESS	  
Overview	  
I  begin  this  chapter  by  pointing  out  some  of  the  approaches  to  public  
engagements,  with  greater  emphasis  on  the  evolving  dynamics  of  public  participation  
and  its  ability  to  effectively  influence  decision-­‐‑making  processes.    
The  chapter  pulls  together  the  positional  narratives  relating  to  the  role  of  the  
public  in  the  public  policymaking  process.  I  make  an  attempt  to  point  out  some  of  the  
factors  that  have  reduced  or  relegated  the  influence  of  marginalized  citizens  from  
participating  in  the  environmental  policymaking  process  especially  in  burgeoning  
democratic  nations  like  Ghana.  While  continuing  to  draw  from  scholarly  positions  on  
the  subject,  I  focus  on  public  participation  as  being  a  modest  approach  for  effectively  
expanding  the  policy  network  that  have  previously  supported  corporations  and  their  
activities.  
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What	  really	  is	  public	  participation?	  
Rowe  and  Frewer  define  public  participation  as  “the  practice  of  involving  
members  of  the  public  in  the  agenda  setting,  policy  development,  and  decision-­‐‑making,  
and  policy  forming  activities  of  organizations  or  institutions  responsible  for  policy  
development”  (2005,  p.254).  According  to  Rowe  and  Frewer,  public  participation  is  a  
dynamic  activity  that  takes  place  through  “instruments,  techniques,  methods,  tools,  etc”  
(referred  to  as  mechanisms),  which  enables  the  process  of  involvement  (2005,  p.  275).  
Public  participation  takes  different  forms  and  approaches  for  different  circumstances.  
These  are  influenced  by  geopolitical  settings,  demographic  classification,  situational  
dynamics,  historical  participatory  challenges,  etc.  The  bottom-­‐‑line  is,  the  ‘mechanisms’  
adopted  become  assistive  handrails  that  enables  the  inclusivity  of  the  public  in  the  
decision-­‐‑making  process.  
In  public  communication,  what  Blumler  et  al.  referred  to  as  ‘mass  democracy’  in  
their  book  “the  crisis  of  public  communication,”  information  is  transmitted  from  
government  institutions  and  its  allies  such  as  parastatals,  consultants,  or  even  the  media,  
to  the  public  (1995).  Rowe  and  Frewer  affirm  this  “one-­‐‑way”  information  flow  by  
referring  to  “communication  proponents”  as  the  policy-­‐‑setting  organization,  whose  
main  agenda  is  to  acquaint  the  public  thus,  “public  feedback  is  not  required  or  
specifically  sought”  (2005,  p.  255).    
Public  deliberation  on  the  other  hand  gives  the  public  the  opportunity  to  discuss  
public  policies  and  issues  in  many  informal  and  formal  ways  that  may  be  highly  
engaging,  and  not  necessarily  rewarding  (Levine  et  al,  2005).  According  to  Levine  et  al.,  
public  deliberation  even  though  can  prove  deeply  fulfilling  for  participants;  it  has  had  
low  stakes  for  participants  since  views  expressed  don’t  necessarily  get  unto  the  policy  
agenda  (2005).  They  point  out  that  “the  goal  of  a  meeting  is  to  build  networks  of  citizens,  
to  develop  new  ideas,  to  teach  people  skills  and  knowledge,  to  change  attitudes—rather  
than  to  influence  government”  (Levine  et  al,  2005,  p.  8).  Bohman  argue  that  public  
deliberation  “seems  to  be  [for]  elitist”  rather  than  for  the  general  public  (2000,  p.  3).    
In  the  case  of  public  consultation,  policy  proponents  seek  the  opinions  of  the  
public  through  referenda,  sift  through  choices  propose  by  public  and  choose  to  use  or  
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discard  public  choices  (Fishkin,  2009).  Information  in  this  case  flows  from  the  public  to  
policy  proponents,  and  is  “believed  to  represent  currently  held  opinions  on  the  [policy  
issue]  in  question”  (Rowe  and  Frewer,  2005,  p.  255).  Pierre  et  al.  argue  that  the  role  of  the  
public  in  this  case  is  not  to  “put  new  issues  on  the  agenda  but  rather  to  provide  
assessments  of  different  alternatives  to  alleviate  policy  problems”  (1998).  These  
assertions  point  to  the  fact  that  the  consultative  process  limits  the  role  of  the  public  in  
decision-­‐‑making  process,  and  at  the  same  time  legitimate  the  policy  choice  that  policy  
proponents  chose  to  make  (Pierre  et  al,  1998,  p.  138).    
The  limitations  of  public  communication,  public  deliberation,  and  public  
consultation  in  allowing  for  full  integration  of  the  public  in  the  policy  process  makes  
public  participation  a  preferred  choice  in  the  engagement  of  society  in  policymaking  
processes.  While  public  participation  encourages  active  involvement  of  the  public  in  the  
policy  process,  public  communication,  deliberation,  and  consultation  inherently  
promotes  passivity.  These  typologies  see  the  public  as  recipients  of  policy,  as  such  keeps  
the  public  on  the  fringe  of  the  policy  network.  In  the  case  of  Ghana  for  instance,  public  
communication,  deliberation,  and  consultation  are  normalized,  and  wrongly  taken  to  be  
public  participation.  Conversely,  In  the  case  of  the  U.S.,  scholarly  evidence  is  supportive  
of  the  fact  that  public  participation  continues  to  change  the  dynamics  of  the  policy  
process  (Shapiro  1982).  For  instance,  Page  et  al.  argue  that  the  U.S.  public  does  have  
significant  impact  during  policymaking  process  (1987).  The  pattern  of  inclusivity  of  the  
public  in  governance  issues  in  the  U.S.  can  be  attributed  to  its  mature  democracy  
developed  over  centuries,  and  its  Constitution  and  Bill  of  Rights  (Burstein,  1988).    
Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  there  have  been  cases  of  deliberate  
exclusivity  of  people  of  color  in  the  policy  process  in  the  U.S.  resulting  in  environmental  
and  social  injustices  (Bullard  and  Johnson,  2000;  Harrell,  2000;  Pulido,  1996;  Brulle,  
1996).  This  situation  of  excluding  marginalized  people  in  the  policy  process  in  the  U.S.  is  
no  different  to  the  case  in  Ghana  where  public  participation  is  in  its  embryonic  stages.  
The  lack  of  active  public  participation  in  the  policy  process,  as  Carson  points  out,  
“accurately  [describes]  (un)representative  systems  of  government”  (2009,  p.  1636).    
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Pierre  et  al.  however  argue  that,  when  the  public  is  allowed  to  penetrate  the  policy  
process  through  new  ways  that  influences  the  political  system,  the  powers  vested  in  
government  institutions  to  legitimate  public  policy  is  reduced,  hence  allowing  for  
representative  government  (1998).  This  perspective  explains  the  dynamics  of  power,  
which  have  historically  undercut  full  integration  of  the  public  in  decision-­‐‑making  
processes,  especially  in  burgeoning  democratic  nations  like  Ghana.  
Public	  Inclusivity:	  Mirage,	  Reality	  or	  façade?	  
Increasingly  but  tactically,  governments  seems  to  be  accepting  the  intrusion  of  
non-­‐‑government  actors  in  its  environmental  decision  making  process.  This  is  especially  
true  in  developed  nations.    According  to  Beierle  et  al.  the  increased  attention  for  non-­‐‑
government  actors  is  fueled  by  optimism  about  how  public  involvement  can  increase  the  
effectiveness  of  environmental  management  (1999).  Provided  it  is  not  bureaucratically  
maligned  or  undermined  by  government  institutions,  the  power  of  the  public  has  been  
found  to  be  enormous  in  changing  the  dynamics  of  environmental  policy  process.  This  is  
strongly  reflected  in  the  case  of  the  U.S.  policy  process  in  the  1970s,  during  the  peak  of  
the  PCBs  crisis,  where  the  public  more  or  less  became  the  mainstay  of  the  polity.  
Whereas  the  U.S.  case  shows  an  effective  public  role-­‐‑playing  in  the  policy  process,  the  
same  cannot  be  said  of  the  Ghana  case  due  to  a  strongly  formed  bureaucratic  policy  
network  that  has  traditionally  relegated  the  public  as  policy  recipient.  Rowe  and  Frewer  
in  their  lucid  work  “Pubic  Participation  Methods:  a  Framework  for  Evaluation”  point  out  
how  legislations  in  some  developed  nations  “made  it  necessary  to  gain  public  input  and  
comments  prior  to  decision  making  in  a  number  of  risk  arenas”  (2000,  p.  4).      
For  nations  where  the  public  exercises  enormous  political  power  to  vote  a  
political  party  out  of  power,  it  is  politically  prudent  for  incumbent  government  to  
include  the  public  in  policy  decisions  that  affect  them.  Whereas  this  is  the  case  for  
mature  democratic  nations  like  the  U.S.,  developing  nations  that  are  in  burgeoning  
stages  of  democracy  like  Ghana  continue  to  sideline  the  interest  of  the  public  in  
environmental  decision-­‐‑making  process.  My  fieldwork  in  Ghana  and  communications  
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with  officials  in  government  institutions,  corporations,  and  a  section  of  the  public  to  get  
a  firsthand  understanding  of  the  policy  networks  and  process  reveals  this  position.    
Sabatier  in  his  analysis  “Towards  Better  Theory  of  the  Policy  Process”  effectively  
established  the  abundant  evidence  policy  scholars  have  shown;  that  the  general  public  
can  play  a  “more  modest”  part  in  policy  formulation  and  implementation  (2007).    
Sabatier  builds  his  argument  on  the  modesty  of  public  influence  in  government  policy  
by  pointing  to  the  greater  influence  exerted  by  the  public  when  citizen  complaints  
increases,  and  grass  root  movements  mushrooms  to  perturb  the  politics  of  government  
policy  decision-­‐‑making  process  (ibid).  Rosenau  and  Czempiel  equally  argue  that  citizens  
have  gained  much  greater  legitimacy  to  challenge  government  decisions  through  
ideational  and  socially  sourced  authority,  thereby  possessing  some  power  to  weaken  the  
full  authority  of  state  autonomy  over  policy  decision-­‐‑making  processes  (1992).  
Towards  the  path  of  applicability  of  public  participation  in  environmental  policy,  
Beierle  et  al.  have  pointed  out  five  criteria  as  indicators  to  measure  the  success  of  public  
participation  (1999).  They  point  to  educating  participants,  improving  the  substantive  
quality  of  decisions,  incorporating  public  values  into  decision-­‐‑making,  reducing  conflict,  
and  building  trust  (ibid).  Smith  et  al.  have  reinforced  this  assertion;  however,  they  also  
argue  that  descriptions  of  procedures  for  fostering  public  input  have  dominated  the  
literature  with  little  attention  paid  to  fundamental  concepts  ((1997).  Macnaghten  and  
Jacobs  have  also  prescribed  public  education  as  remedy  for  information  deficit  in  the  
policy  process  (1997).  Reed  point  out  that  through  “comprehensive  information  input”  
public  participation  could  be  enriched  with  what  he  terms  “normative  and  pragmatic  
benefits”  (2008,  p.  2420).  According  to  Reed,  normative  benefits  places  emphasis  on  
“democratic  society,  citizenship,  and  equity”  whereby  ‘marginalized’  citizens  are  
actively  included  in  the  making  of  decisions  on  issues  that  affect  them  (2008,  p.  2420).  
Reed  points  to  pragmatic  benefits  as  citizen  participation  in  the  decision-­‐‑making  process  
that  emphasis  on  “quality  and  durability  of  environmental  decisions”  (2008,  p.  2419).  
Irvin  and  Stansbury  also  argue  that  citizens  are  critical  to  reaching  consensus  that  leads  
to  positive  social  and  environmental  change  (2004).  The  activity  of  the  public  in  policy  
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decisions  that  affects  their  lives  has  the  singular  effect  of  ensuring  a  greater  policy  
success  rate.    
When  the  public  remains  silent  and  passive,  not  showing  the  willingness  to  be  
part  of  the  decisions  that  affect  them,  policy  outcome  diminishes  into  failure  mode.    The  
public  participation  literature  continues  to  be  filled  with  the  concept  that  by  actively  
encouraging  citizen  participation  in  the  governance  process,  they  tend  to  understand  the  
position  of  government  decision  and  are  highly  likely  to  support  tough  decisions  (Irvin  
and  Stansbury,  2004).  Constructively,  when  citizens  are  empowered  to  play  an  active  
role  in  policy  decisions,  the  policy  process  and  policy  outcome  benefits  in  diverse  ways;  
process  effectiveness  (Reed,  2008;  Newig  and  Fritsch,  2009;  Beierle,  1999;  Thomas,  1995),  
alternative  solution  provided  (Scheer,  1996),  public  corporation  (Irvin  and  Stansbury,  
2004),  acceptance  of  government  decision  (Newig  and  Fritsch,  2009;  Howard  et  al,  1994)  
flow  of  trusted  quality  information  (Rowe  and  Frewer,  2000),  clear  consensual  outcome  
(Warner,  1997),  win-­‐‑win  potential  (Newig  and  Fritsch,  2009).  Unfortunately,  however,  
this  is  largely  not  the  case  as  governments  are  not  always  in  favor  of  allowing  the  public  
to  have  a  direct  say  in  its  decision  making  process  (Innes  and  Booher,  2004).  In  the  views  
of  Innes  and  Booher,  public  participation  in  democratic  decision  making  process  fails  
because  in  reality  government  actors  don’t  want  to  listen  (and  act)  to  external  voices  
(such  as  environmental  groups)  whose  interest  are  outside  its  domain  (ibid).  
Governments  may  seek  to  include  the  public  in  its  decision-­‐‑making  process  only  to  
avoid  resistance,  gain  support  and  agreement  (legitimation)  for  the  choices  it  makes,  and  
because  of  matters  of  democracy  and  procedural  justice  (Newig  and  Fritsch,  2009;  Innes  
and  Booher,  2004).    
The  maneuverability  of  government  to  foist  decisions  on  the  public  in  the  
pretense  of  engaging  them  in  the  policy  process  may  build  mistrust  and  anarchy  during  
the  public  participation  process.  Walters  et  al.  have  pointed  out  how  democratic  
institutions  subtly  undermine  the  public  by  replacing  the  public  with  so-­‐‑called  “public  
experts”  (2000).    Ascher  and  Steelman  made  reference  to  these  experts  as  “expert  
valuation”  and  argue  that  these  experts  who  are  preferred  by  governments  to  represent  
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public  opinion  succeed  in  “supplant[ing]  democratic  expression,”  thus  limiting  the  
actual  views  and  opinion  of  the  public  (2006,  p.  73).  They  explain  further  that,  
  
Expert  valuation,  clearly  the  most  “technocratic”  vehicle  for  conveying  public  
preferences,  may  preempt  more  robust  forms  of  public  participation  in  
environmental  policymaking  and  present  policymakers  with  a  particularly  
narrow  sense  of  the  public  interest  and  what  the  public  wants.  (Ascher  And  
Steelman,  2006,  p.73).  
  
The  relegation  of  the  public  to  the  periphery  of  the  public  policy  process  by  
powerful  actors  such  as  governments  and  corporations  is  hinged  on:  the  promotion  of  
actors  self-­‐‑interest  (Walter  et  al,  2000;  Hessing  and  Howlett,  1997;  Fischer,  1995),  
unappealing  power  sharing-­‐‑‘power  dynamics’    (Mostert,  2003;  Thomas  1995;Arnstein,  
1969),  time-­‐‑constraint  (Creighton,  1981),  contentious  problems  (Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  
Susskind  and  Cruikshank,  1987),  perceived  public  ignorance  (Bulkeley  and  Mol,  2003),  
trust  problem  (Renn,  2006).  It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  some  of  these  characteristics  
can  be  easily  pointed  out  in  my  analysis  of  the  policy  networks  on  the  PCBs  issue  in  
Ghana.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  strongly  formed  issue  networks  are  necessary  to  
ensure  that  the  policy  monopoly  of  core  actors  are  broken  to  allow  inclusion  of  the  
public  in  the  making  of  policies  that  directly  or  indirectly  affects  them.  This  should  be  
especially  the  case  in  burgeoning  democracies  like  Ghana  where  citizens  are  highly  
marginalized.  
	  
POLITICS,	  PUBLIC	  AND	  POLICY	  FRAMEWORKS	  IN	  GHANA	  
Overview	  
This  chapter  reviews  the  policy  actors  and  political  environment  of  Ghana  and  
their  influences  on  the  public  from  a  historical  standpoint.  The  chapter  also  looks  at  the  
legal  systems  and  the  historical  background  of  Ghana’s  environmental  policy  
framework.  It  point  out  the  government’s  ambivalent  position  on  environmental  issues,  
which  is  directly  linked  to  its  prevailing  quest  for  socioeconomic  development.  Finally  
the  chapter  provides  a  brief  review  of  environmental  policy  challenges  in  Ghana.    
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The	  Political	  Environment	  and	  Legislative	  Framework	  in	  Ghana	  
After  Ghana’s  independence  from  British  rule  in  1957  and  some  few  years  of  
political  stability,  which  lasted  till  1966,  the  nation  quickly  drifted  into  a  state  of  political  
instability  with  inundated  coup  d’états  for  almost  two  decades.  During  this  period,  the  
public  and  the  media  were  critically  restricted  in  matters  of  freedom  of  speech  and  
expression.  It  was  not  until  1993  when  the  nation  returned  to  democratic  rule  leading  to  
a  relatively  stable  political  climate.  As  Marci  Hoffman  put  it,  “the  Ghanaian  
governmental  and  political  system  has  been  involved  in  a  long,  slow  and  almost  
torturous  process  of  democratization  that  commenced  with  a  decisive  shift  towards  
constitutional  reform…”(Hoffman,  2014,  p.  1).    
Even  though  this  period  of  democratization  was  a  testing  moment,  it  ushered  in  an  aura  
of  relative  political  stability  that  opened  up  an  avenue  for  the  public  and  media  to  enjoy  
the  constitutional  human  rights  and  freedom  required  to  express  themselves  either  
collectively  or  independently.    
The  legal  framework  in  Ghana  hinges  on  the  1876  Gold  Coast  Supreme  Court  
Ordinance,  which  was  instituted  by  the  British.  The  Ordinance  embraces  “the  common  
law,  doctrines  of  equity  and  the  statutes  of  general  application…”(Essien,  2005,  p.  1).    
Similarly,  Marci  Hoffman  point  out  that  “[t]he  Ghanaian  legal  system  has  always  been  
influenced  (sometimes  subtly)  by  the  presence  of  a  long  tradition  of  sophisticated  and  
developed  customary  law  which  recognizes  such  western  concepts  as  corporate  
personality…”  (Hoffman,  2014,  p.  1).    The  legal  system  in  Ghana  has  gone  through  a  
great  deal  of  change  especially  under  military  regimes.  For  instance,  the  regimes  of  the  
National  Liberation  Council  (NLC),  and  the  National  Redemption  Council  (N.R.C.)  
abolished  the  Supreme  Court  structure  (Judicial  Service  of  Ghana,  2013).  However,  the  
Supreme  Court  was  reestablished  during  the  third  Republic  but  under  a  Superior  Court.  
The  legal  framework  in  Ghana  has  been  rather  unstable  especially  during  the  military  
regimes,  with  incumbent  regimes  changing  the  laws  to  suite  their  political  ideology  and  
personal  indemnity.  As  pointed  out  on  the  website  of  the  Judiciary  Service  of  Ghana,  
“…revolutionary  enactments  added  enormously  to  the  body  of  laws  which  relegate[d]  
the  relations[hip]  between  the  citizens  and  the  State”(2013).  Hens  and  Boon  point  out  
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that  while  environmental  issues  were  recognized  and  legislations  were  passed,  
“environment  protection  is  not  the  central  target  of  legislation”  (1999,p.  27).  Thus  
legislations  were  based  on  the  colonial  approach  of  “use  oriented”  rather  than  “resource  
oriented”  which  has  formed  the  nation’s  environmental  policy  framework  until  quite  
recently  (ibid).  James  Read  also  point  to  this  by  arguing  that  environmental  regulation  in  
Ghana  for  centuries  were  applied  under  unwritten  customary  laws,  which  allows  for  the  
exploitation  of  the  environment  for  livelihood  (2007).    
Background	  of	  Environmental	  Policy	  Frameworks	  in	  Ghana	  
In  1972,  during  the  United  Nation’s  Conference  on  Human  Environment  and  
Development  in  Stockholm-­‐‑Sweden,  which  also  set  the  foundation  for  the  United  
Nations  Environment  Program  (UNEP)  to  be  born;  Ghana,  like  many  other  nations  at  
the  time,  realized  the  need  for  a  formalized  environmental  framework.  This  was  to  
enable  the  nation  to  address  the  environmental  issues  it  was  then  facing,  and  also  to  
tackle  emerging  ones,  as  part  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Stockholm  Conference  
(Yeboah  and  Tutuah-­‐‑Mensah,  2014).  
In  1973,  the  leadership  of  the  then  military  government  of  Ghana,  the  National  
Redemption  Council  (NRC),  set  the  backbone  structures  for  the  establishment  of  the  
Environmental  Protection  Council  (EPC).  This  was  to  affirm  Ghana’s  commitment  made  
at  the  Stockholm  Conference,  and  also  to  reinforce  the  country’s  new  role  as  a  member  
of  the  Governing  Council  of  the  newly  formed  UNEP.  In  January  1974,  the  EPC  was  
signed  by  the  Head  of  State  under  NRC  Decree  239,  and  was  later  inaugurated  on  June  4  
1974,  to  oversee  the  environmental  protection  of  the  nation  (Hens  and  Boon,  1999).  The  
newly  formed  EPC  was  put  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  Planning  
(Yeboah  and  Tutuah-­‐‑Mensah,  2014).  It  was  to  serve  as  a  consultative,  advisory  and  
research  body,  and  to  co-­‐‑ordinate  the  activities  of  other  agencies,  however,  the  agency  
lacked  enforcement  mandates  right  from  it  very  beginning  (Read,  2007;  Hens  and  Boon,  
1999).  In  1981,  the  EPC  was  moved  to  be  under  the  Ministry  of  Health,  and  in  1982,  the  
Ministry  of  Local  Government  and  Rural  Development  took  over  administrative  charge  
of  the  EPC  (Yeboah  and  Tutuah-­‐‑Mensah,  2014).    
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The  early  period  of  the  1980s  however,  was  an  economically  difficult  time  for  
Ghana.  This  was  made  worse  by  a  severe  draught  in  1983  in  the  country.  The  economic  
crisis  in  the  1980s  increased  citizens’  dependence  on  the  environment  in  meeting  their  
socioeconomic  needs.  The  situation  quickly  sidelined  environmental  issues  from  the  
governmental  agenda  to  make  way  for  economic  strategies  and  programs.  For  instance,  
the  country  launched  an  IMF-­‐‑World  Bank  supported  Economic  Recovery  Program  (ERP)  
in  1983  to  stabilize  and  liberalize  the  economy,  which  unfortunately  contributed  to  more  
environmental  issues  (Younger,  1989).  The  Bruntland  Commission  Report,  “Our  
Common  Future”  by  the  World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development  
(WCED)  in  1987,  and  the  need  for  human  and  environmental  sustainability,  which  the  
report  emphasized,  created  a  deeper  awareness  among  governments  globally.  This  
awareness,  again,  led  the  government  of  Ghana  at  the  time  to  bring  environmental  
concerns  to  the  fore  of  its  agenda  settings.  It  prompted  the  government  to  initiate  an  
Environmental  Action  Plan  (EAP)  in  1988  with  the  purpose  of  developing  policies  that  
will  promote  the  ideals  of  sustainable  development  (The  World  Bank,  1988).  The  United  
Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and  Development  (a.k.a.  Rio  Summit)  held  in  June  
1992  in  Brazil,  also  brought  about  a  new  assurance  to  the  international  community,  
particularly  the  developing  nations  that  effective  environmental  management  can  lead  
to  economic  growth.  This  assurance  reframed  the  perception  of  many  governments  in  
developing  nations.  In  the  case  of  Ghana,  the  weight  of  influence  the  Rio  Summit  
exerted  on  the  nation’s  environmental  policy  reform  was  phenomenal.  Hens  and  Boon  
pointed  out  that  prior  to  the  1992  Rio  Summit,  environmental  policy  in  Ghana  was  “ad  
hoc  and  cosmetic”,  thus  lacking  the  institutional  framework  required  to  deal  holistically  
with  environmental  problems  from  “front-­‐‑end”  (1999,  p.  21).  
In  1993  when  Ghana  returned  to  democratic  rule,  the  Ministry  of  Environment,  
Science  and  Technology  (MEST4)  was  created  by  the  newly  elected  government  to  
implement  the  Agenda  21  of  the  Rio  Summit.  The  new  ministry  absorbed  the  EPC,  
which  was  tasked  to  provide  a  framework  for  the  implementation  of  a  National  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  Ministry  of  Environment,  Science  and  Technology  (MEST)  is  now  Ministry  of  Environment,  Science,  
Technology  and  Innovation  (MESTI).	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Environmental  Action  Plan  (NEAP).  The  NEAP  replaced  the  EAP,  which  was  earlier  
prescribed  in  1988.  The  NEAP  eventually  led  to  a  National  Environmental  Policy  (NEP),  
which  aimed  to  interconnect  the  environment  to  social  and  economic  growth  for  the  
nation’s  socioeconomic  development  (Hens  and  Boon,  1999).  In  order  to  give  the  EPC  
some  clarity  to  its  mandate  to  regulate  the  environment  and  to  ensure  the  
implementation  of  government  policies,  the  government  deemed  it  necessary  to  migrate  
the  EPC  to  what  is  now  the  Ghana  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA),  through  the  
Environmental  Protection  Agency  Act  490  of  1994  (Yeboah  and  Tutuah-­‐‑Mensah,  2014).  
The  transitioning  of  EPC  to  EPA  however  did  not  give  the  EPA  the  autonomy  it  
deserved  to  operate  as  it  continued  to  remain  under  the  administrative  leadership  of  the  
Ministry  of  Environment,  Science  and  Technology  (MEST).  
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  government’s  indecisiveness  to  properly  situate  the  
EPC  under  one  ministerial  body  over  the  years  showed  a  lack  of  clarity  as  to  what  the  
EPC  was  instituted  to  do.  It  also  showed  the  lack  of  importance  the  government  places  
on  the  environment.  This  is  reflected  in  the  deprivation  of  autonomous  powers  to  the  
agency  to  adequately  perform  its  duties  in  a  manner  that  is  devoid  of  external  interest  
and  interferences.    
Existing	  Environmental	  Policy	  Framework	  in	  Ghana	  and	  its	  Challenges	  
The  1994  Environmental  Protection  Agency  Act  490  sets  out  the  vested  powers  of  
the  EPA  and  its  core  functionalities.  It  mandates  the  agency  to  regulate,  coordinate  and  
manage  the  environment.  The  Act  is  loaded  with  responsibilities,  some  of  which  
requires  specialized  skills  to  execute,  and  adequate  staffing  size  to  accomplish.  Read  
pointed  out  that  the  functions  of  the  Ghana  EPA  are  listed  in  not  less  than  18  legislative  
paragraphs  (2007).    
Due  to  the  long  list  of  responsibilities  enshrined  in  the  Act,  I  limited  my  review  
to  only  the  portion  of  the  Act  that  closely  relates  to  the  control  of  toxic  chemicals  such  as  
PCBs  in  Ghana.    Section2  lists  the  functions  of  the  agency,  which  are  discharged  under  
the  governing  authority  of  a  board,  and  may  also  receive  directives  from  the  Minister  to  
perform  functions  that  it  deems  necessary  in  the  interest  of  the  public.  
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Section10  of  the  Act  ensures  that  a  committee  called  the  “Hazardous  Chemical  
Committee”  is  created  from  the  Board.  This  committee  inadvertently  becomes  the  ad  hoc  
body  with  the  responsibility  of  determining  the  regulatory  framework  on  how  chemicals  
in  Ghana  should  be  managed.  According  to  section10  (1)  of  the  Act,  the  function  of  the  
committee  will  be  to;    
  
a. Monitor  the  use  of  hazardous  chemicals  by  collecting  information  on  the  
importation,  exportation,  manufacture,  distribution,  sale,  use  and  disposal  of  
such  chemicals;  
b. Advise  the  Board  and  the  Executive  Director  on  the  regulation  and  management  
of  hazardous  chemicals;  
c. Perform  such  other  functions  relating  to  such  chemicals  as  the  Board  or  the  
Executive  Director  may  determine.  (Environmental  Protection  Agency  Act  490  of  
1994,  pp.7-­‐‑8).  
  
By  section12  (1)  of  the  Act,  the  Agency  is  empowered  to  request  in  writing  for  an  
environmental  impact  assessment  report  from  any  person  (corporations)  whose  
undertaking  in  the  opinion  of  the  Agency  has  the  potential  to  have  adverse  effects  on  the  
environment.  In  the  event  that  the  Agency  finds  the  undertaking  to  be  of  serious  threat  
to  the  environment,  by  section13  (3)  of  the  Act,  “[t]he  Agency  may  in  an  enforcement  
notice  direct  the  immediate  cessation  of  the  offending  activity  where  it  considers  that  the  
circumstances  so  demand”  (Environmental  Protection  Agency  Act,  490  1994).  In  effect,  
the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  Act  (490)  1994  is  not  specific  in  terms  of  
addressing  toxic  substances  from  a  holistic  perspective;  what  Hens  and  Boon  call  “front-­‐‑
end”  approach  (1999).  The  Act  is  generic  in  context.  As  a  result  of  this  it  does  not  
adequately  address  specific  issues  raised  by  international  conventions  such  as  the  
Stockholm  Convention  on  Persistent  Organic  Pollutants  (POPs).    
The  closest  environmental  policy  that  may  be  regarded  as  specific  to  source  is  the  
Pesticide  Control  and  Management  Act  (528)  of  1996.  This  Act  “provides  for  the  control,  
management  and  regulation  of  pesticides  in  Ghana  and  [also]  for  related  matters.”5  Even  
though  Act  528  addresses  the  importation,  manufacture,  formulation,  distribution,  use  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Pesticide  Control  and  Management  Act  (528)  1996  of  the  Parliament  of  Ghana	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and  the  transportation  of  pesticides  in  Ghana,  it  lacks  a  strong  compliance  regime,  as  
well  as  structured  framework  to  regulate  POPs.  In  order  to  address  these  inadequacies,  a  
“Draft  Policy  on  Contaminated  Sites  in  Ghana6”  with  the  aim  to  specifically  target  
certain  hazardous  chemicals  especially  POPs  such  as  PCBs  has  been  developed.  This  
Draft  Policy  will  be  reviewed  in  my  analysis  section  to  provide  an  input  into  the  policy  













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The  “Draft  Policy  on  Contaminated  Sites  in  Ghana”  is  interchangeable  refer  to  as  just  “Draft  Policy”.	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THE	  PCBs	  CASES	  IN	  THE	  U.S.	  AND	  IN	  GHANA	  
	  
THE	  PROCESS	  TOWARDS	  THE	  BAN	  OF	  PCBs	  IN	  THE	  U.S.	  	  
Overview	  
This  chapter  provides  a  brief  history  of  PCBs  and  the  emergence  of  the  PCBs  
crisis  in  the  U.S.  The  chapter  provides  a  systematic  pathway  leading  to  the  PCBs  case  in  
the  U.S.  and  the  relational  dynamics  between  the  policy  networks  that  developed.  I  
review  the  process  of  PCBs  problematization  and  how  the  issue  was  handled  within  the  
policy  network.  The  behavior  of  the  actors,  the  adopted  strategies  used,  and  how  the  
policy  community  converged  to  formulate  the  policy  is  also  reviewed.  My  review  brings  
to  the  fore  the  economic,  political,  social,  and  environmental  dynamics  of  the  PCBs  crisis  
and  how  this  dynamics  played  out  to  set  a  policy  ban  on  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  The  Chapter  
also  underscores  the  power  relationship  that  exists  among  the  actors  and  how  actors  
within  the  policy  network  framed  issues  of  environmental  quality  and  socioeconomic  
values.  The  resultant  of  the  policy  is  also  highlighted  and  points  out  the  environmental  
injustice  perspective  that  it  presents  globally.  
Brief	  History	  of	  PCBs	  	  
Literature  shows  Polychlorinated  biphenyls  (PCBs)  were  first  synthesized  in  
1881,  however  commercial  manufacturing  begun  in  1929.  PCBs  are  man-­‐‑made  organic  
chemicals  that  have  about  209  congeners  (types).  These  congeners  differ  by  the  position  
of  the  chlorine  attachment  to  the  benzene  compound.    However,  the  congeners  are  
structurally  (isomeric)  related.  
  
Figure  1  Chemical  Structure  of  PCBs  
PCBs  have  been  extensively  used  in  electric  transformers  and  capacitors  as  
coolants  because  of  their  high  chemical  stability  and  resistant  to  high  temperature  and  
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pressure  (EPA,  2012;  Head,  2005).  They  have  also  been  used  in  other  applications  such  
as  fluorescent  light  ballasts,  inks,  adhesives,  and  carbonless  copy  paper  (Head,  2005).  
It  is  estimated  that  bigger  electric  transformers  can  be  filled  with  over  1000kg  of  
dielectric  fluid  (Canadian  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Environment,  1986).  Prior  to  the  
use  of  PCBs  in  electric  transformers,  mineral  oil  was  the  only  fluid  used  (ibid).  However,  
mineral  oil  posed  a  higher  risk  to  ignite,  causing  fire.  This  necessitated  its  replacement  
with  a  more  durable  resistant  fluid  such  as  PCBs.  PCBs  discovery  and  usefulness  
revolutionized  the  chemical  industries  in  the  U.S.  during  the  early  years  of  its  
manufacture.  This  led  to  it  being  nicknamed  the  ‘Miracle  Chemicals’  (Head,  2005).  It  has  
equally  been  described  as  the  embodiment  of  the  “great  industrial  adventure  of  the  
nineteenth  century”  (Robin  2010,  p.  11).    
Ironically,  it  is  the  very  ideality  of  PCBs  in  industrial  application,  such  as  its  
chemical  stability,  that  inadvertently  led  to  environmental  and  health  problems  in  global  
proportion  (Geiser  and  Waneck,  1983).    The  environmental  and  health  problems  that  
PCBs  caused  provided  grounds  for  transforming  the  U.S.  environmental  policy  system.      
The	  Rise	  of	  the	  PCBs	  Crisis:	  The	  U.S.	  Case	  and	  the	  Policy	  Process	  
A  few  years  after  the  commercial  production  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  in  1929  by  Swan  
Research  Inc,  which  later  became  Monsanto,  evidence  of  acne-­‐‑like  pustules,  what  will  
become  known  as  one  of  the  landmark  signs  of  PCBs  contamination  in  humans  began  to  
show  up  on  the  faces  and  bodies  of  PCBs  manufacturing  workers.  By  1935,  the  demand  
for  PCBs  by  companies  such  as  General  Electric,  Westinghouse  and  Halowax  helped  to  
increase  the  quantity  of  PCBs  in  the  environment  (Stelzer,  1994).    
In  1937,  scientific  evidence  published  in  the  Journal  of  Industrial  Hygiene  and  
Toxicology  showed  that,  there  was  a  striking  link  between  PCBs  and  liver  disease  
(Drinker,  1937).  Cecil  Drinker  led  a  research  team  to  test  PCBs  on  rats  and  presented  the  
evidence  at  a  meeting  at  Harvard  University,  which  was  attended  by  Monsanto,  General  
Electric,  Halowax,  the  U.S.  Public  Health  Service,  and  State  Health  Officials  from  
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut.  Drinker  pointed  out  “[there  was  no]  doubt  as  to  the  
possibility  of  systemic  effects  from  the  chlorinated  naphthalene  and  chlorinated  
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[biphenyls]”  (Drinker,  1937,  p.  283).  Drinker  and  his  team  were  motivated  to  conduct  
this  experiment  after  many  workers  of  Halowax  had  contracted  the  acne  like  pustules  
and  three  of  them  had  died,  with  two  of  the  dead’s  autopsy  revealing  liver  damage  
(Drinker,  1937).    The  acne-­‐‑like  postules  were  first  called  “halowax  acne”,  which  was  
later  referred  to  as  chloracne  (Pfaffin  and  Ziegler,  2010).  Despite  the  increasing  evidence  
of  problems  posed  by  PCBs  around  this  period,  Monsanto,  General  Electric  and  
Westinghouse  continued  to  argue  that  PCBs  posed  no  threat  to  the  health  of  workers  or  
the  environment  (Chemical  Industrial  Archives,  2009,  Beiles,  2000).  
In  the  1940s  and  1950s,  widespread  toxicity  of  the  chemical  had  reached  alarming  
levels  among  workers.    Besides  chloracne,  further  studies  of  workers  exposed  to  PCBs  
showed  symptoms  of  “epidermal  disorders,  digestive  disturbances,  jaundice,  impotence,  
throat  and  respiratory  irritations  and  severe  headaches”  (National  Service  Center  for  
Environmental  Publications,  1980).  Dumping  of  PCBs  had  also  become  a  huge  
environmental  issue  around  this  period.  General  Electric  for  instance  is  on  record  for  
dumping  about  1.3  million  pounds  of  PCBs  into  the  Hudson  River  from  1947  to  1977  
(EPA  2012).  In  1954,  the  Appleton  Paper  Company  was  also  culpable  for  dumping  PCBs  
contaminated  wastewater  into  the  Fox  River  (Patterson,  1998).  Hesse  pointed  out  cases  
of  ‘waste  haulers’  disposing  of  PCBs  as  “dust  control  on  roads”  and  the  “selling  of  [PCBs  
contaminated]  oil  as  fuels  in  low  temperature  boilers…”  during  this  period  (1976,  p.  
127).  In  a  declassified  court  document  (exhibit  26)  of  the  case,  “United  States  v.  
Pharmacia  Corporation  (f/k/a  Monsanto  Company)  and  Solutia”,  it  is  reported  that  
between  1929  to  1971,  Monsanto  produced  about  680  million  pounds  of  Aroclor7,  
wastewater  discharge  of  about  1.8  million  pounds  of  PCBs,  with  at  least  87  million  
pounds  of  other  PCB-­‐‑containing  waste,  and  an  estimated  60,000  pounds  of  PCBs  air  
emissions,  (Beihoffer,  2005).    
In  1966,  Soren  Jensen,  a  Swedish  Chemist  serendipitously  found  enormous  
quantities  of  unknown  substances  that  were  later  identified  as  PCB  compounds  while  he  
was  researching  on  the  accumulations  of  DDT  and  its  metabolites  present  in  human  fat  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Trade  name  for  PCBs	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tissue  and  in  nature  (Jansen,  1966,  1972).  Jensen’s  accidental  discovery  set  the  grounds  
for  worldwide  PCBs  research  leading  to  enormous  scholarly  literature  and  scientific  
confirmation  of  PCBs  toxicity.  Despite  all  the  evidences  of  PCBs  toxicity,  Monsanto  in  
1967  went  ahead  to  invest  “$2.9  million  [for]  further  developments  of  Aroclor  products”  
(Robin,  2010,  p.  19).  In  1968  in  the  United  States,  Dr.  Robert  Riseborough  who  was  
researching  on  peregrine  falcons  accidently  chanced  upon  PCBs  (Risebrough,  1969).  
Riseborough’s  research  pointed  to  the  fact  that  PCBs  were  widespread  in  the  food  chain  
(ibid).  For  instance,  fish  stock  in  the  Great  Lakes  and  other  rivers  were  reportedly  
contaminated  with  PCBs  during  this  period  of  rising  PCBs  crisis  (Boyles,  1975).    
Similarly,  in  1970,  the  U.S.  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)  reported  cases  of  PCBs  
contamination  in  milk  in  Ohio,  Georgia  and  Florida  (Hesse,  1976).  
Around  the  period  of  Jensen  and  Riceborough’s  findings,  an  incident  occurred  in  
Japan  in  which  approximately  1,300  people  fell  ill  after  ingesting  rice  contaminated  with  
PCBs  in  1968  (Kunita  et  al,  1984).  The  Japan  incident  became  known  as  Yusho,  which  
literally  means  ‘oil  disease’  in  Japanese.  Investigation  by  a  “Study  Group  for  Yusho”  in  
Kyushu  University,  Japan,  confirmed  that  the  rice  bran  oil  was  indeed  contaminated  
with  PCBs,  and  PCDFs  (Yoshimura,  2003).  The  patients  in  the  Yusho  incident  suffered  a  
range  of  symptoms,  including  “acneiform  eruptions,  pigmentation  of  the  skin,  nails,  and  
conjunctiva,  increased  discharge  from  the  eyes,  and  numbness  of  the  limbs”  (Onozuka  et  
al,  2009).  These  incidents  set  the  grounds  for  national  and  international  actions  against  
PCBs.  Japan  and  Sweden  quickly  took  a  bold  step  to  ban  the  manufacture  and  use  of  
PCBs  in  their  countries  (Jensen,  1972).  The  initiatives  taken  by  these  two  countries  at  the  
time  became  the  precursor  for  the  American  public  to  advocate  for  policy  on  PCBs.      
To  avoid  public  and  government  criticism  for  contaminating  the  environment  
with  PCBs  and  also  to  continue  the  production  of  the  chemical,  Monsanto  in  1969  
formed  an  "ʺAroclor  Ad-­‐‑hoc  Committee"ʺ  to  redefine  the  image  of  the  company  (Chemical  
Industrial  Archives,  2009).  This  was  done  to  protect  the  marketing  of  PCBs,  which  was  
bringing  Monsanto  a  gross  profit  of  about  $10  million  per  annum,  and  to  permit  new  
product  development  from  PCBs  (ibid).  In  a  concluding  sentence  of  a  February  16  1970  
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memo,  N.T.  Johnson  of  Monsanto  stated,  “we  can'ʹt  afford  to  lose  one  dollar  of  business.  
Our  attitude  in  discussing  this  subject  with  our  customers  will  be  the  deciding  factor  in  
our  success  or  failure  in  retaining  all  our  present  business”  (Monsanto  Memo  dated  
February  16,  1970  archived  by  Chemical  Industrial  Archives,  2009).    
The  economic  gains  of  manufacturing  PCBs  around  this  period  were  too  
lucrative  to  abandon.  Hesse  pointed  out  that  in  1968  alone,  sales  of  PCBs  containing  
capacitors  was  30  million  pounds,  while  that  of  electric  transformers  was  16.8  million  
pounds  (1976).    Historically,  the  1960s  and  1970s  were  eras  of  increased  chemical  
revolution  in  the  developed  nations  especially  in  the  United  States  (Carson,  1962;  
Gottlieb,  1995).  According  to  Gottlieb,  around  this  period,  about  60,000  different  
chemicals  were  on  the  U.S.  market  with  little  or  no  “tracking,  testing,  or  premarket  
clearing  mechanism”  (1995,  p.  60).  Correspondingly,  the  impact  of  these  chemicals  on  
the  environment  and  human  life  also  reached  alarming  proportions  with  varied  
implications.    Increasing  concern  from  manufacturing  workers,  communities  and  
environmental  advocacy  groups  had  also  begun  to  mount  and  putting  pressure  on  
policy  makers  to  safeguard  human  health  and  the  environment  from  hazardous  
chemicals  like  PCBs.  This  was  exacerbated  by  global  scientific  evidence  and  awareness  
of  the  hazardous  chemicals  around  the  time.  For  instance,  Jansen’s  accidental  findings  in  
1966;  the  Yusho  incident  in  Japan  in  1968  (Onozuka  et  al,  2009);  Rachel  Carson’s  
expository  book,  “Silent  Spring,”  which  had  elicited  a  widespread  public  outcry  for  
direct  government  action  on  chemicals  to  protect  human  health  and  the  environment  
(Carson,  1962);  the  ‘Valley  of  the  Drums’  incident  in  Kentucky  in  1966  (Hamilton  and  
Viscusi,  1999);  the  Love  Canal  incident  in  1976  (Levine,  1982).  These  and  many  more  
similar  cases  became  compelling  force  that  pushed  towards  public  resistance  to  PCBs  
and  other  toxic  chemicals  in  the  U.S.    
The  problem  of  toxic  chemicals  around  this  time  undeniably  threatened  the  U.S.  
environment  and  human  communities  at  large.  It  became  a  situation  that  was  often  
described  as  the  “single  most  threatening  issue  facing  [the  U.S.]”  at  the  time  (Lester  et  al,  
1983,  p.  254),  while  others  described  it  as  the  environmental  problem  of  the  century  
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(Epstein  et  al,  1982).  Around  this  same  period,  the  civil  rights  movement  was  also  at  its  
peak  in  the  U.S.,  giving  voice  to  disadvantaged  poor  people  who  bore  most  of  the  
environmental  burdens.  The  ideology  and  tactics  of  the  civil  rights  movement  became  
the  backbone  for  the  environmental  movement  in  the  U.S.,  to  push  for  environmental  
equity  in  the  late  1960s  and  1970s  (Roberts,  1998;  Heinz,  2005).  Heinz,  who  reviewed  
three  African  American  newspapers  (The  Los  Angeles  Sentinel,  The  Chicago  Defender,  
and  Detroit’s  Michigan  Chronicle),  which  covered  issues  of  environmental  quality  and  
equity  around  this  period,  pointed  out  that  environmental  issues  were  well  articulated  
in  “politically  problematic  ways”  during  this  period  (2005,  p  .47).  
The	  Role	  of	  the	  Policy	  Networks	  in	  Banning	  PCBs	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
The  scientifically  proven  fact  that  PCBs  were  toxic,  and  the  public  outcry  for  
government  intervention  coupled  with  the  political  twist  the  media  attached  to  this  issue  
stimulated  policy  makers  to  look  into  policies  that  will  protect  people  and  the  
environment.  As  Hessing  and  Howlett  have  acknowledged,  apart  from  effectively  
constructing  issues,  the  media  is  also  effective  in  influencing  the  formation  of  policy  by  
mounting  political  pressure,  which  forces  political  actors  to  respond  to  public  concerns  
(1997).    
Like  many  other  nations  in  the  world  around  this  period,  the  U.S.  did  not  have  
any  existing  law  that  adequately  regulated  toxic  chemicals  from  the  front-­‐‑end  
(Hathaway  et  al,  1994).    Existing  legislation  at  the  time  only  dealt  with  a  problem  after  it  
is  manifested.    Such  regulatory  lapses  allowed  manufacturers  to  produce  chemicals,  
which  may  have  irreversible  adverse  effects  on  humans  and  the  environment.  There  was  
therefore  the  need  to  have  a  regulatory  framework,  which  could  regulate  toxic  chemicals  
before  they  are  manufactured.    
To  press  for  a  more  robust  regulatory  framework  to  manage  the  environment  
and  human  health,  President  Richard  Nixon  set  the  stage  by  passing  the  National  
Environmental  Policy  Act  (NEPA)  of  1969  into  law  in  January  1,  1970  and  proclaimed  
the  1970s  an  “Environmental  Decade”  (NEPA,  2014;  Kraft,  2000).  It  is  important  to  note  
that,  during  the  1968  election,  Nixon  made  the  environment  his  campaign  message.  This  
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was  strategic,  realizing  that  majority  of  the  people  were  drumming  for  environmental  
justice  and  were  looking  for  a  leader  who  will  not  only  solve  socioeconomic  problems  
but  also  address  the  environmental  problems  that  threaten  the  very  lives  of  the  people.  
In  his  special  congressional  message  on  Environmental  quality  on  February  10,  1970,  
Nixon  reemphasized  his  commitment  to  the  environment  when  he  proclaimed  his  
willingness  “to  repair  the  [environmental]  damage  already  done  and  to  establish  new  
criteria  to  guide  [America]  in  the  future”  (Nixon,  1970).    
At  the  91st  Congress  in  the  spring  of  1970,  Senator  Edmund  Muskie  became  one  
of  the  politically  outspoken  senators  in  the  Nixon  Administration  to  steer  policy  toward  
environmental  protection.  Muskie  was  instrumental  in  assisting  to  formulate  a  policy  
escalation  process,  which  laid  the  grounds  for  the  environmental  policymaking  process  
in  the  1970s  (Vig  et  al,  2005).  During  the  92nd  Congress  in  1971,  Nixon  proposed  the  Toxic  
Substance  Control  Act  (TSCA)  as  a  precautionary  measure  to  regulate  toxic  chemicals.  It  
is  important  to  note  that  the  Council  on  Environmental  Quality  (CEQ)8,  which  was  
created  by  the  National  Environmental  Policy  Act  (NEPA)  of  1969  and  a  division  of  the  
executive  office  of  the  president,  had  initially  crafted  the  TSCA  bill  in  1970  (CEQ,  1978).  
The  CEQ,  under  its  first  chairman  Russell  E.  Train,  was  to  aid  in  preparing  an  
environmental  quality  report  for  Congress,  gather  data,  and  advise  on  policy  (EPA  
Historical  Publication-­‐‑1,  1992).  Indeed  the  President  was  not  mincing  words  on  his  
environmental  promises  made  during  his  campaign,  and  was  steadily  working  through  
with  Congress  to  establish  a  grounded  environmental  policy  framework.  
Roy  Ash  (founder  of  Litton  Industries)  was  appointed  by  President  Nixon  to  
head  a  “Advisory  Council  on  Executive  Organization”  which  was  to  provide  
recommendations  that  will  reform  the  U.S.  environmental  protection  (EPA-­‐‑  Historical  
Publication-­‐‑1,  1992).  The  “Ash  Council”  as  it  came  to  be  known,  pointed  out  during  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  The  [Title  42  of  United  State  Code  Chapter  4321]  42  the  U.S.C.  §  4321  congressional  declaration  of  purpose  
to  the  CEQ  was  to;  declare  a  national  policy  which  will  encourage  productive  and  enjoyable  harmony  
between  man  and  his  environment;  to  promote  efforts  which  will  prevent  or  eliminate  damage  to  the  
environment  and  biosphere  and  stimulate  the  health  and  welfare  of  man;  to  enrich  the  understanding  of  the  
ecological  systems  and  natural  resources  important  to  the  Nation;  and  to  establish  a  Council  on  
Environmental  Quality. 
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congressional  hearing  that  there  was  policy  and  regulatory  deficiency  within  the  U.S.  
environmental  protection  system  (ibid).  The  Ash  Council  pointed  out  that,  a  separate  
regulatory  agency  was  necessary  to  ensure  an  effective  approach  to  regulating  chemicals  
and  other  pollutants  in  the  environment  (ibid).  Ash  and  his  team  therefore  proposed  the  
establishment  of  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  as  an  effective  approach  to  
regulating  chemicals  and  other  pollutant  in  the  environment.    
After  going  through  a  very  rigorous  congressional  hearing  and  scrutiny,  the  EPA  came  
into  being  on  December  2,  1970  with  William  Doyle  Ruckelshaus  becoming  its  first  chief  
administrator  (EPA,  2012).  EPA  was  thus  established  as  an  independent  executive  
agency  that  reported  directly  to  the  President.    
During  this  period  on  May  7,  1970,  a  note  from  Monsanto  indicated  that  it  had  
had  a  confidential  meeting  with  Joe  Crockett,  the  Technical  Director  of  the  Alabama  
Water  Improvement  Commission  (AWIC)  to  discuss  issues  of  PCBs  contamination  and  
the  company’s  directives  to  collaborate  “with  government  agencies  to  determine  the  
effects  of  PCBs  on  the  environment”  (Robin,  2010,  p.  20).  The  decision  by  Monsanto  to  
collaborate  with  government  may  have  prompted  Nixon  to  acknowledge  the  U.S.  
industries  willingness  to  be  responsible.  In  his  long  congressional  special  message  on  
environmental  quality,  Nixon  stated  “industry  already  has  begun  moving  swiftly  
toward  a  fuller  recognition  of  its  own  environmental  responsibilities,  and  has  made  
substantial  progress  in  many  areas.  However,  more  must  be  done”  (Nixon,  1970).    
Despite  this  seemingly  positive  commitment  by  Monsanto  to  be  environmentally  
responsible,  it  continued  polluting  water  bodies  at  its  manufacturing  plant  in  Anniston,  
Alabama,  until  it  finally  closed  the  plant  in  1971(Robin,  2010).  This  however  did  not  stop  
Monsanto  from  producing  PCBs.  
  In  1971,  CEQ  presented  a  report  titled  “Toxic  Substance9”  to  government,  
outlining  the  overarching  need  to  streamline  toxic  substance  laws  as  a  precautionary  
measure  to  protecting  people  and  the  environment  (Gotlieb,  1995).  CEQ  pointed  out  that  
toxic  substances  were  entering  the  environment  and  were  posing  serious  dangers  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Toxic  Substance,  Supra  note  28,  at  759-­‐‑  60  
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human  health  hence  the  need  for  regulation10  (Markel,  2010).  Unfortunately,  the  House  
of  Representative  found  the  CEQ  report  unpersuasive  and  felt  the  CEQ  were  unfairly  
antagonizing  the  chemical  industry  with  their  report,  especially  when  that  period  was  a  
time  of  economic  downturn  (Markell,  2010).  This  forced  the  TSCA  bill  to  go  through  the  
93rd  Congress,  which  lasted  from  1973  to  1975.  This  period  was  a  period  of  economic  
difficulty  in  the  U.S.  Congress  therefore  did  not  deem  it  expedient  to  suppress  an  
already  bad  situation.  It  is  worth  noting  that  after  the  Second  World  War,  the  Chemical  
Industry  became  one  of  the  fastest  growing  industries,  generating  about  7%  of  the  U.S.  
GNP  at  the  time  (Markell,  2010).    
During  this  period  of  economic  relapse,  which  led  to  the  shelving  of  the  TSCA  
report,  a  major  incident  occurred  at  Allied  Chemical  Company,  a  small  pesticide  
manufacturing  company  with  about  133  employees,  located  on  the  banks  of  the  James  
River  in  Hopewell,  Virginia.  Allied  Chemical  produced  the  pesticide  called  chlordecone  
(a.k.a  Kepone),  a  chlorinated  hydrocarbon  insecticide,  which  was  in  high  demand  at  the  
time.  To  meet  the  global  demand,  Allied  Chemical  outsourced  the  production  of  Kepone  
to  two  of  its  former  employees,  who  started  Life  Science  Products  (LSP)  and  began  
production  in  1973  (Okun,  2013).    From  March  1974  through  July  1975,  76  (57%)  of  the  
133  employees  had  contracted  a  previously  unrecognized  clinical  illness  characterized  
by  nervousness,  tremor,  weight  loss,  opsoclonus,  pleuritic  and  Joint  pains,  and  
oligospermia  with  production  workers  (Cannon  et  al,  1978).  Outraged  by  the  lack  of  
effective  regulations  to  control  toxic  chemicals,  the  public  and  environmental  
movements  begun  to  pressure  Congress.  This  was  after  the  realization  that  about  10-­‐‑20  
tons  of  Kepone  had  been  discharged  into  the  James  River,  seriously  impacting  birds,  fish  
and  other  wildlife;  and  leading  to  about  4000  job  losses  to  people  who  depended  on  the  
James  River  (Okun,  2013;  Wilson,  2011).  While  the  story  of  Kepone  became  a  lead  story  
in  the  U.S.  at  the  time,  the  governors  of  Virginia  and  Maryland  requested  a  federal  
investigation  into  the  Kepone  incident.  Around  this  same  period  (1975),  a  55-­‐‑gallon  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  CEQ  Toxic  Substance  Supra  note  28,  1971	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drum  of  PCBs  tainted  transformer  oil  in  a  Michigan  Power  Plant  leaked  out  45  gallons  of  
the  oil,  resulting  in  the  contamination  of  soil  around  the  area  (Hesse,  1976).  
The	  Policy	  Making	  Process	  and	  its	  Dynamics	  
The  Kepone  incident,  the  PCBs  oil  leakage  incident,  and  similar  other  incidents  
in  the  U.S.  at  the  time  set  the  premise  for  Congress  to  re-­‐‑look  into  the  TSCA  bill  as  a  way  
of  regulating  chemicals  before  they  become  public  nuisance.    
This  was  the  point  of  intersection  where  the  policy  problem  became  well  defined.  The  
policy  community  had  become  well  informed,  and  the  political  will  of  government  to  act  
affirmed  the  beginning  of  the  policy  process.  This  is  the  moment  of  opportunity  
Kingdon11  refers  to  as  the  “policy  window”  in  his  policy  model  (1995).  A  new  stream  of  
policy  relationship  was  established  between  State  and  Society.  This  State-­‐‑Society  
relationship  was  going  to  be  the  forerunner  to  contest  the  already  formed  State-­‐‑
Corporation  caucus  in  the  policy  network.    
With  the  overblown  notoriety  that  PCBs  had  received  during  this  period  of  toxic  
chemical  warfare,  environmental  groups  and  labor  unions  were  strongly  advocating  for  
a  law  that  will  specifically  regulate  PCBs.  As  a  respond  to  this  clarion  call,  between  1974  
and  1975,  the  CEQ  initiated  series  of  studies  to  identify  regulatory  alternatives  for  
specific  toxic  substances  such  as  PCBs.  On  June  26,  1975,  the  EPA  awarded  Versa  the  
contract  to  look  into  the  role  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  economy,  identifying  and  screening  
alternative  regulatory  and  non-­‐‑regulatory  control  options.  Dr.  Robert  Durfee  of  Versar  
presented  a  paper  on  the  background  of  PCBs  at  a  conference  in  Chicago  on  November  
19th  through  21st  1975,  to  review  PCBs  (Hesse,  1976).    The  conference  generated  
considerable  public  interest.  The  public  outcry  and  need  for  regulating  PCBs  had  
become  overwhelmingly  clear,  calling  for  Congress  to  act  with  urgency.  This  eventually  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  The  Kingdon  model  of  policy  Analysis  proposes  a  three-­‐‑stream  framework  (problem,  politics  and  policy),  
which  operates  independently,  and  once  what  Kingdon  calls  ‘a  policy  window  of  opportunity’  is  created;  all  
three  streams  converge  to  formulate  the  policy.  Kingdon  acknowledges  the  fluidity  of  actor  participation  in  
the  policy  process,  problematization  of  issue  and  its  preference,  and  the  clarification  of  science  and/or  
technology  in  providing  alternative  solutions  (1995).  In  Kingdon’s  view,  the  public  policy  making  is  a  
chaotic  process,  which  coalesces  to  sound  policy  only  when  all  streams  converge  to  rationalize  in  producing  
the  policy.    	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led  to  an  amendment  of  the  TSCA  to  the  1975  Senate  bill.  The  amendment  was  to  
empower  the  EPA  to  regulate  PCBs  in  Section  6(e)  of  the  Act.  The  specificity  of  the  
amendment  in  section  6(e),  which  exclusively  empowered  EPA  to  regulate  PCBs  caused  
its  initial  rejection  by  senate  in  1975.  CEQ  relentlessly  continued  to  indicate  to  Congress  
that  toxic  substances  were  a  menacing  problem  that  Congress  urgently  needed  to  deal  
with.  In  CEQ’s  annual  report  in  1975,  in  its  opening  chapter,  it  pointed  out  that  “…a  
disconcerting,  growing  body  of  evidence  indicates  that  subtle,  manmade  hazards  are  
supplanting  famine  and  infectious  disease  as  significant  determinants  of  life  expectancy  
in  20th  century  developed  nations”  (CEQ,  1975).  
By  1976,  congressional  hearing  of  the  Kepone  incident  was  in  process,  reminding  
Congress  again  of  the  impact  of  chemicals  on  human  health  and  the  environment.  On  
March  26  1976,  Senator  Gaylord  Nelson  of  Wisconsin  re-­‐‑proposed  the  section  6(e)  as  an  
amendment  to  the  1976  TSCA  Senate’s  bill.  During  the  House  debate,  Senator  Nelson  
pointed  out  that  “PCBs  were  widespread  in  the  environment  and  that  they  posed  
significant  potential  dangers  to  human  health  and  to  wildlife.”12  Senator  James  B.  
Pearson  and  Senator  John  Tunney  vigorously  presented  to  Congress  solid  arguments  for  
the  passing  of  the  bill  into  law.  Pearson  reportedly  stated;    
We  can  no  longer  operate  under  the  assumption  that  what  we  do  not  know  about  
a  chemical  substance  cannot  hurt  us.  Tragic  results  associated  with  too  [many  
toxic  substances]  have  taught  us  that  lesson  all  too  well.  Chemicals,  not  people,  
must  be  put  to  the  test  (15  U.S..C.  §  2601(a)-­‐‑(b),  2006).  
  
To  buttress  Senator  Pearson’s  assertion,  Senator  Tunney  brought  to  the  awareness  of  
Congress  that  “the  National  Cancer  Institute  had  estimated  that  [about]  60  to  90  percent  
of  cancers  reported  in  the  U.S.  were  a  result  of  environmental  contaminants”  (Brooks,  
1996).  Ed  Brooks,  of  EPA'ʹs  Chemical  Control  Division,  describes  this  as  the  “drive  for  an  
authority  to  control  existing  chemicals”  (1996).  Tunney,  in  concluding  his  argument  
stated  that;    
Many  doctors  and  scientists  now  believe  that  cancer,  which  has  been  projected  to  
kill  as  many  Americans  in  1975  as  all  the  battle  deaths  in  Vietnam,  Korea,  and  the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  15  U.S.C.  §  2601(a)-­‐‑(b),  2006)  
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Second  World  War  combined,  appears  particularly  susceptible  to  a  preventive  
approach  through  control  of  toxic  substance  (Markell,  2010;  p.  341).  
  
Congressman  John  Dingell,  from  the  House  of  Representatives,  who  recognized  the  
widespread  use  and  dispersal  of  PCBs  called  for  the  amendment  to  be  pushed  through  
quickly.  He  pointed  out  that  "ʺthe  history  of  EPA  is  not  one  of  vigorous  and  quick  
action.”13  Despite  the  strong  argument  that  supported  PCBs  control,  some  policymakers  
conversely  argued  the  elimination  of  PCBs  was  not  possible.  For  instance,  Congressman  
Leggett  noted  that  “PCB'ʹs  cannot  be  removed  from  the  environment”  and  that  even  if  
“PCB'ʹs  were  eliminated  now,  waterways  will  remain  contaminated  for  years.”14  
Congressman  Leggett  was  raising  the  point  that  instituting  specific  laws  to  regulate  
PCBs  will  not  solve  the  problem  of  PCBs  ubiquitous  nature  in  the  U.S.  environment  
(ELR,  1980).  The  chemical  manufacturers  were  not  silent  during  the  legislative  debate  
either.  Dow  Chemicals  for  instance  protested  against  the  passage  of  the  ban  (Gottlieb,  
1995).  Opposition  by  legislators  and  the  chemical  manufactures  who  did  not  support  the  
ban  did  so  because  they  felt  that  the  TSCA  bill  was  aimed  at  ending  the  chemical  
industry  by  drafting  policy  that  did  not  make  economic  sense  (ibid).    
The  CEQ’s  continual  persistence  to  create  a  new  regulatory  framework  along  with  all  the  
toxic  chemical  incidents,  and  the  persistence  public  outcry  for  policy  action  eventually  
led  Congress  to  accept  the  proposed  amendment  during  the  94th  congressional  meeting.  
This  period,  as  Markell  put  it,  was  the  “most  active  phase  of  federal  
environmental  law-­‐‑making”  in  the  history  of  the  U.S.  (2010,  p.  334).  Representative  John  
Dingell  of  Michigan  finally  offered  Section  6(e)  as  an  amendment  to  the  House’  TSCA  
bill,  which  became  a  legislative  requirement.  President  Gerald  Ford  signed  the  bill  into  
law  on  October  11,  197615.    Within  three  years  after  the  passage  of  the  TSCA  bill  into  law,  
CEQ  continuously  reiterated  the  need  for  dealing  with  toxic  substances  
“comprehensively  and  systematically  [by  the  growing]  recognition  of  toxic  chemical’s  
contribution  to  cancer”  (CEQ,  1977;  CEQ,  1978).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  H.R.  Rep.  No.  1341,  94th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  133  (1976)	  14	  Supra  note  7	  15	  Pub.  L.  No.  94-­‐‑469,  90  Stat.  2003  (1976)	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The	  EPA	  and	  Section	  6(e)	  of	  the	  TSCA	  Bill	  	  
After  the  passage  of  the  TSCA  bill,  the  mandate  of  the  EPA  was  tested  when  it  
began  implementing  the  statutes  of  section  6(e).  The  bill  on  PCBs  gave  EPA  the  authority  
to  institute  rules  on  the  Disposal  and  Ban  regulations  of  PCBs.    
Because  Congress  by  itself  lacks  the  scientific  expertise  and  resources  to  make  complex  
technical  decisions,  the  EPA  is  necessarily  permitted  to  set  standards  and  design  
enforcement  procedures  for  compliance  (Vig  et  al,  2005).  This  power  unassumingly  
creates  interpretive  problems  for  interest  groups,  leading  to  battle  over  validity  of  
scientific  evidence,  standards  and  enforcement  procedures  (ibid).    
Section  6(e)  of  the  TSCA  detailed  a  plan  for  the  disposal  of  PCBs  and  banned  the  
manufacture,  processing,  distribution  in  commerce  and  use  of  any  PCBs  other  than  in  a  
totally  enclosed  manner.  It  defines  ‘totally  enclosed  manner’  as  “any  manner  which  will  
ensure  that  any  exposure  to  human  beings  or  the  environment  will  be  insignificant  as  
determined  by  the  [EPA]  administrator”  (TSCA  bill  section  6(e)).  On  May  31  1979,  EPA  
set  rules  which  banned  the  manufacture,  processing,  and  distribution  in  commerce  or  
use  of  most  PCBs.  EPA  however,  used  its  vested  powers  to  allow  the  continued  use  of  
PCBs  in  electric  transformers,  capacitors  and  other  electrical  equipment  since  they  are  
considered  enclosed  (Head,  2005).    By  EPA’s  regulations,  PCBs  of  concentration  of  less  
than  50ppm  (parts  per  million)  were  considered  non-­‐‑toxic.  Meaning  manufacturing,  
processing,  and  distribution  in  commerce  of  PCBs  below  50ppm  was  excluded  from  the  
ban  (Head,  2005;  ELR,  1980).  Prior  to  this  50ppm  rulemaking,  the  EPA  on  February  17  
1978  had  set  the  cutoff  at  a  highly  contentious  500ppm  mark  (EPA-­‐‑National  Service  
Center  for  Environmental  Publications,  1980).      
The  Environmental  Defense  Fund  (EDF)  challenged  EPA’s  regulation  on  the  
50ppm  cutoff  on  grounds  that  it  created  the  window  for  continual  production,  either  
deliberate  or  incidental  (ELR,  1980).  Undoubtedly,  the  knowledge-­‐‑based  expertise  of  
non-­‐‑governmental  actors  like  the  EDF  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  became  a  driving  force  that  
state  actors  had  to  contend  with.  EPA  were  of  the  opinion  that  when  section  6(e)  of  the  
Act  was  being  considered  Congress  was  more  concerned  about  regulating  existing  
contamination  of  PCBs  in  the  environment  and  their  potential  risk  to  humans,  and  not  
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about  regulating  PCBs  from  ambient  sources.  As  a  result  of  this,  EPA  argued  that  the  
cutoff  at  50ppm  rather  than  500ppm,  substantially  increased  health  and  environmental  
protection  (ELR,  1980).  It  is  important  to  note  that  during  this  period,  “Edison  Electric  
Institute  (EEI),  together  with  EPA  worked  hard  to  justify  the  50  ppm  cutoff  as  an  
“administratively”  created  exemption  to  the  Act  (ibid).  Environmental  Defense  Fund  
(EDF)  argued  that  EPA’s  position  on  PCBs  cutoff  was  based  on  the  fact  that,  the  agency  
could  not  determine  the  "ʺregulatory  impact  on  commercial  products"ʺ  for  lower  levels  
(ELR,  1980).  However,  evidence  made  available  to  EPA  made  it  to  believe  that  the  
economic  impact  on  commercial  products  of  defining  lower  levels  of  PCBs  in  the  range  
of  50ppm  and  above  (something  industry  could  easily  comply)  was  less,  hence  the  cutoff  
at  50ppm  (ibid).  From  this  premise,  by  asking  industries  to  comply  below  50ppm  would  
impact  the  economy  with  serious  effects  to  the  organic  chemistry  industry  (ibid).  The  
D.C  Circuit  ruled  that  EPA’s  classification  of  transformers  and  other  electrical  
equipment  as  enclosed  were  inadequate.  The  court  also  ruled  that  EPA  contravened  the  
mandate  of  section  6(e)  by  exposing  humans  and  the  environment  to  “an  unreasonable  
risk  of  injury,”  through  their  regulations  which  permitted  the  continual  manufacture  of  
PCBs  in  concentrations  below  50ppm  (ELR,  1980).  In  the  final  ruling,  the  court  pointed  
out  that;  
The  EPA  regulations  can  hardly  be  viewed  as  a  bold  step  forward  in  the  battle  
against  life  threatening  chemicals.  There  is  no  substantial  evidence  in  the  record  
to  support  certain  of  the  EPA  regulatory  enactments,  and  portions  of  the  
regulations  are  plainly  contrary  to  law.  Thus,  the  effort  by  EPA  has,  in  certain  
respects,  fallen  far  short  of  the  mark  set  by  the  congressional  mandate  found  in  
section  6(e)  of  the  Toxic  Substances  Control  Act  (ELR,  1980,  Transcript).  
Realizing  that  by  ruling  in  this  matter  would  be  a  violation  of  section  6(e)  of  the  TSCA,  
the  court  “agreed  to  stay  its  mandate”  while  allowing  the  parties  to  agree  on  a  new  
rulemaking  by  EPA  to  regulate  PCBs  (Head,  2005,  p.  15).  During  the  stay,  EPA  realized  
that  immediate  ban  on  PCBs  would  definitely  be  disastrous  as  it  would  greatly  impact  
the  economy.  
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While  the  court  hearing  was  ongoing,  the  Edison  Electric  Institute  (EEI),  who  earlier  
defended  the  50ppm  cutoff,  undertook  a  research  with  the  Utility  Solid  Waste  Activity  
Group  (USWAG)  to  substantiate  the  new  rulemaking,  as  requested  by  the  court  (Head,  
2005).  On  February  19,  1982,  the  EEI-­‐‑USWAG  report  was  submitted  to  EPA.  Based  on  
the  report,  EPA  published  a  set  of  rules  for  the  use  of  PCBs  in  electrical  equipment  on  
April  22,  1982  (ibid).  A  number  of  observations  were  made  in  the  EEI-­‐‑USWAG  report.  
One  of  these  observations  was  that,  “the  use  of  electrical  equipment  could  legally  
continue  under  an  authorization  granted  by  the  EPA  using  the  provisions  of  section  
6(e)(2)(B)  of  the  TSCA”16  (also  Head,  2005).  For  authorization  of  use  of  PCBs  under  the  
section,  EPA  was  require  by  the  TSCA  to  complete  an  investigation,  which  will  establish  
that  usage  “will  not  present  an  unreasonable  risk  of  injury  to  health  or  the  environment”  
(Head,  2005).      
On  August  25  1982,  EPA  finally  made  known  the  final  rule  to  “authorize  the  use  
of  all  PCB-­‐‑containing,  mineral  oil-­‐‑filled  electrical  equipment  for  its  remaining  useful  
life,”  pointing  out  that  there  will  be  no  reasonable  risk  of  injury  to  human  health  or  the  
environment17.  On  coming  to  this  conclusion,  EPA  pointed  out  that;  
  
-­‐ Imposing  a  total  ban  would  cost  the  public  and  the  United  States  Industry  
Billions  of  Dollars,  primarily  as  a  result  of  the  disruption  of  the  electrical  service;    
-­‐ The  proposed  inspection  and  maintenance  program  reasonably  reduced  the  
exposure  risks  associated  with  the  use  of  PCBs  in  transformers  and  the  servicing  
conditions  prevent  further  PCB  contamination;  releases  of  PCBs  to  the  
environments  and  exposure  to  humans  and  wildlife  from  transformers  was  
expected  to  be  very  small;    
-­‐ And  finally,  the  costs  associated  with  an  accelerated  phase-­‐‑out  or  requirements  
to  retrofill  or  contain  in-­‐‑service  transformers  were  not  reasonable  when  
compared  to  the  potential  reduction  in  release  of  PCBs  that  such  an  action  would  
achieve18.  
  
Irrespective  of  the  legislative  hurdles,  the  TSCA  bill  has  been  well  lauded  by  
issue  networks  such  as  the  Environmental  Defense  Fund  (Gottlieb,  1995).    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The  U.S.  Government  file  47  Fed.Reg.17,  426	  17	  The  U.S.  Government  file  47  Fed.  Reg.  37,342-­‐‑44	  18	  The  U.S.  Government  file  47  Fed.  Reg.    37,  346-­‐‑47	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Whereas  the  official  passage  of  the  TSCA  bill  and  the  eventual  ban  of  PCBs  were  
initiated  by  government  actors,  it  is  important  to  bring  to  the  fore  that  the  process  
towards  reaching  that  feat  saw  the  active  participation  of  issue  networks  such  as  the  
EDF  and  the  public  through  effective  protest  and  the  court  system.  
The	  Global	  Environmental	  Injustice	  Inspired	  by	  the	  PCBs	  Ban	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  
On  the  flip  side,  the  success  story  of  the  TSCA  bill  ban  policy  on  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  
created  a  new  era  of  environmental  injustice  issues  in  developing  nations.  
The  historical  stringency  that  associated  the  regulations  and  the  high  cost  of  compliance  
compelled  industries  to  find  new  ways  of  keeping  up  with  their  profits  and  fiduciary  
duties  to  stakeholders.  This  opened  up  a  new  dimension  of  exporting  environmentally  
‘costly’  industrial  harm  to  developing  nations,  while  policy  benefits  were  retained  for  
the  good  of  the  U.S.  economy,  environment,  and  people.  The  situation  of  stringent  
environmental  regulations  vis-­‐‑a-­‐‑vis  weak  or  non-­‐‑existent  environmental  regulatory  
enforcement  regimes  coupled  with  ‘poverty  and  indebtedness’  in  developing  nations  
conditioned  a  new  toxic  substance  import-­‐‑export  relationship,  which  flourished  after  the  
passage  of  the  TSCA  bill.  This  economic  relationship  stems  from  the  hegemonic  
ideology  of  the  developed  nations  continuing  to  exploit  weaker  nations  for  their  
increased  economic  and  political  advantage,  as  pointed  out  in  earlier  chapter.  It  is  this  
relationship  that  has  position  Ghana  as  a  recipient  of  toxic  equipment  for  socioeconomic  
development.  
  
THE	  PCBs	  CASE	  IN	  GHANA:	  A	  COST	  OF	  MODERNITY	  
Overview	  
In  this  chapter,  I  will  look  at  the  historical  background  of  Ghana’s  quest  for  
socioeconomic  development  through  its  electric  power  generation  projects,  national  
electrification  projects,  and  the  emergence  of  environmental  injustice  that  ensued  in  the  
process.  The  chapter  reviews  the  dynamics  of  western  hegemony  and  exploitation  
promoted  by  Ghana’s  pursuit  to  industrialize.  It  reviews  the  ambitious  quest  of  Ghana  
to  provide  a  nationwide  access  to  electricity  by  2020,  and  how  this  ambition  set  the  
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grounds  for  an  increase  in  transformer  purchases  which  led  to  burdening  the  nation  
with  PCBs.  The  scientific  evidence  of  PCBs  ubiquity  in  Ghana  is  also  cursorily  reviewed.  
Finally  the  chapter  reviews  the  attempts  being  made  to  eliminate  PCBs  in  Ghana  
through  the  Stockholm  Convention’s  National  Implementation  Plan  (NIP).    
Developing	  Ghana	  through	  Energy:	  The	  Embedded	  Cost	  of	  Industrialization	  
The  genesis  of  Ghana’s  power  generation  begun  in  1914  by  the  colonial  masters  
under  the  Railway  Administration  to  serve  the  interest  of  British  corporations  (Barfour,  
2009).  By  the  time  Ghana  became  independent  in  1957,  electricity,  which  was  primarily  
powered  by  diesel  engines,  had  reached  a  few  major  cities  and  mining  towns  that  were  
of  economic  importance  to  the  British  imperialist  (Clark,  1994;  Barfour,  2009).  By  1960,  it  
was  estimated  that  the  total  national  electricity  access  rate,  which  is  based  on  
communities  connected  to  the  national  grid,  was  not  even  more  than  15%  (Baffour,  
2009).  The  demand  for  electricity  around  this  period  was  primarily  for  domestic  
purposes,  and  the  few  industries  and  mines  that  served  the  interest  of  Britain.  Prior  to  
1957,  the  British  had  done  some  feasibility  studies  on  the  Volta  River  to  ascertain  the  
potential  for  hydroelectric  power  generation.  Their  studies  showed  high  potential;  
however,  the  high  cost  of  dam  construction  deterred  the  colonial  masters  from  pursuing  
any  hydroelectric  project  on  the  river.  After  independence  the  country  quickly  wanted  to  
modernize  through  the  pathway  of  industrialization.  This  implied  it  had  to  expand  its  
available  national  energy  supply  to  support  the  process  of  industrialization.    The  
problem  for  Ghana  as  a  young  nation  at  the  time  was  how  it  was  going  to  raise  money  to  
construct  a  hydroelectric  dam  on  the  Volta  River.  In  July  of  1958,  Kwame  Nkrumah,  the  
first  democratically  elected  president  of  Ghana  visited  the  U.S.  and  had  talks  with  
President  Dwight  Eisenhower  about  the  hydroelectric  project,  and  the  difficulties  the  
country  faced  in  raising  money  towards  the  construction  of  the  dam.    
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Figure	  3:	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  and	  President	  Eisenhower	  during	  the	  visit	  in	  1958.	  (Courtesy	  
http://www.pinterest.com/aokyere/history-­‐love/)  
Kwame  Nkrumah’s  visited  yielded  fruits  as  it  led  to  the  Kaiser  Group  of  Companies  
expressing  interest  in  investing  in  the  hydroelectric  project  (Ghanaweb,  2014;  Baah,  
2003).  The  participation  of  the  Kaiser  Group  of  Companies  in  the  project  was  to  ensure  
that  excess  energy  produced  after  the  construction  of  the  hydroelectric  dam  would  be  
utilized  during  the  first  few  years  after  the  project  (Rahaman  et  al,  2004).  The  Kaiser  
conglomerate  conducted  a  feasibility  study  in  Ghana  and  settled  on  siting  an  aluminum  
smelting  company  (which  is  highly  energy-­‐‑intensive)  to  absorb  the  excess  electric  power  
that  will  be  generated  by  the  dam.    
By  an  Act  of  government  of  Ghana  (the  Volta  River  Development  Act,  1961),  the  
Volta  River  Authority  (VRA)  was  established  as  an  incorporated  entity  to  manage  the  
construction  of  the  dam,  and  the  power  generated  for  the  socioeconomic  development  of  
the  nation.  By1965,  the  Akosombo  hydroelectric  dam  had  been  completed  with  four  
generating  units.  Towards  the  end  of  1972,  two  more  generating  units  were  added  to  
increase  the  dam’s  capacity  to  912MW  (Sim  and  Casely-­‐‑Hayford,  1986).  Besides  Kaiser,  
the  U.S.,  Britain,  World  Bank,  and  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  
Development,  who  partly  financed  the  Akosombo  dam  project,  Ghana  provided  over  
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half  of  the  project  cost  (Rahaman  et  al,  2004;  Tsikata,  1986).  Ironically,  Kaiser  Group  was  
allocated  70%  of  the  power  generated  by  the  dam  for  its  newly  established  aluminum  
smelting  company  in  Ghana-­‐‑  the  Volta  Aluminum  Company  (VALCO)  (Rahaman  et  al,  
2004).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  less  than  30%  of  the  generated  power  from  the  dam  
was  allowed  for  Ghana’s  burgeoning  industries  and  domestic  use  (Ghanaweb,  2014;  
Rahaman  et  al,  2004;  Sim  and  Casely-­‐‑Hayford,  1986).  The  70%  power  allocated  to  
VALCO  was  part  of  the  agreement  for  Kaiser  to  invest  in  the  project  for  an  initial  period  
of  30  years,  which  was  extendable  to  another  20-­‐‑year  period  (Rahaman  et  al,  2004).  It  is  
also  worth  knowing  that  in  the  early  stages  of  VALCO’s  operation,  it  enjoyed  a  ten-­‐‑year  
tax  holiday,  faced  no  restrictions  on  the  import  of  materials,  and  the  repatriation  of  
profits  from  Ghana  (Graham,  1983).  Graham  point  out  that  “[t]he  Akosombo  dam  has  
provided  the  U.S.-­‐‑based  multinational  Kaiser  [Group  of  Companies]  with  cheap  hydro-­‐‑
electric  power,  which  has  made  their  smelter  [in]  Tema  in  Ghana  their  most  profitable  
smelting  operation  world-­‐‑wide”(1983).    
National	  Electrification	  Projects	  and	  PCBs	  in	  Ghana	  
In  1970,  Ghana  initiated  a  rural  electrification  project  to  promote  and  sustain  
rural  economic  activities  (Barfour,  2013).    The  project  did  not  measurably  become  
successful  because  only  a  handful  of  rural  communities  (about  70)  benefited  from  the  
project  (Barfour,  2013;  2009).  In  late  1970s  and  early  1980s,  it  became  obvious  that  the  
national  electrification  access  rate  was  inadequate  as  only  15%  of  the  population  then  
had  access  to  electricity  (Ahiataku-­‐‑Togobo,  2010).  Graham  argues  that  during  this  period  
“Ghana  was  running  dangerously  short  of  [electric]  power  and  was  faced  with  the  
possibility  of  importing  power  from  neighboring  Ivory  Coast”  (1983,  p.  51).  This  was  
due  to  the  increasing  domestic  demand  for  electricity  and  the  overwhelming  power  
usage  by  VALCO  (ibid).  For  instance,  out  of  110  districts  capitals  in  Ghana  during  that  
period,  only  46  were  connected  to  the  national  grid,  with  less  than  5%  rural  access  
(Ahiatku-­‐‑Togobo,  2010).  The  Government  responded  to  this  by  contracting  “various  
multilateral  and  bilateral”  loans  to  expand  electricity  access,  particularly  in  southern  
Ghana  in  the  mid-­‐‑1970s  (Barfour,  2009).  
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To  augment  the  energy  need  of  the  nation  as  a  result  of  increasing  population  
and  burgeoning  industrial  demand,  the  Volta  River  Authority  (VRA)  embarked  on  
another  hydroelectric  project  on  the  Volta  River  at  Kpong,  which  was  completed  in  
1981with  the  capacity  to  generate  160  MW.  This  prepared  the  grounds  for  the  nation  to  
ambitiously  increase  national  access  to  electricity  to  serve  as  the  driver  for  
socioeconomic  development.  
  
Figure  4  Organizational  structure  of  the  electricity  sector  in  Ghana.  “Power  Sector  Reform  and  Regulation  in  
Africa:  Lessons  from  Ghana,  Kenya,  Namibia,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  and  Zambia”  (2013),  by  Kapika  Joseph  
and  Anton  Eberhard.	  
  
In  1985,  the  VRA  initiated  a  $150  million  dollar  Northern  Electrification  and  System  
Reinforcement  Project  (NESRP)  to  provide  a  161  kV  National  Grid  to  the  northern  
regions  of  Ghana.  By  the  end  of  1985,  the  national  electricity  access  rate  had  reached  23%  
(Team,  2012).  Towards  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  access  rate  had  increased  to  28%  (Obeng  
and  Evers,  2009).    
In  1989,  a  National  Electrification  Scheme  (NES)  was  launched  to  capture  the  
broader  national  interest  of  rural-­‐‑urban  universal  access  to  electricity,  as  a  catalyst  for  
socioeconomic  prosperity  and  modernization.  The  government  of  Ghana  together  with  
the  Volta  River  Authority  (VRA)  and  the  Electricity  Company  of  Ghana  (ECG)  borrowed  
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$80  million  from  The  World  Bank  to  promulgate  the  agenda  of  the  NES  (The  World  
Bank,  2001).  Part  of  this  financial  assistance  was  to  be  used  in  expanding  sub-­‐‑stations,  
build  or  replace  major  links  between  sub-­‐‑stations  (ibid).  To  provide  for  a  sustainable  
funding  regime,  a  National  Electrification  Fund  (NEF)  was  instituted  in  1989  to  pull  
local  resources  for  the  project  continuity,  through  tariffs  and  levies  from  customers  
(Barfour,  2013).    With  a  lifespan  of  30  years,  it  is  expected  that  Ghana  will  reach  the  
expected  NES  project  goal  of  universal  access  to  electricity  (Ahiataku-­‐‑Togobo,  2012;  
Barfour,  2009).  The  30-­‐‑year  projection  was  established  through  a  consultative  National  
Electrification  Planning  Study  (NEPS)  conducted  by  Acres  International  Ltd  of  Canada  
and  Asare-­‐‑Tsibu  &  Partners  in  Ghana  (Ahiataku-­‐‑Togobo,  2012).  The  NEPS  successfully  
developed  a  Nation  Electrification  Master  Plan  for  the  NES  in  1988/89,  which  has  
become  the  blueprint  for  the  entire  project  lifespan  (ibid).    
With  the  drive  to  speed  up  the  process  of  universal  access  to  electricity,  the  
government  introduced  the  Self-­‐‑Help  Electrification  Program  (SHEP)  as  a  complement  
to  the  NES,  with  the  aim  of  encouraging  communities  to  be  proactive  by  initiating  their  
own  electrification  projects,  however,  with  assistance  from  the  government.  This  
strategy  catalyzed  a  consistently  accelerative  project  pathway  with  remarkable  success.  
By  1996,  41  more  districts  capitals  have  been  added  to  the  national  grid.    Eventually  the  
remaining  23  of  the  110  districts  at  the  time  were  added  to  the  grid  by  1998  (Ministry  of  
Energy,  2005).  However,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  government  of  Ghana  
expanded  its  local  government  in  the  2000s.  Currently,  there  are  216-­‐‑district  capitals,  
almost  doubling  the  initial  110  district  capitals  (Owusu-­‐‑Mensah,  2014).  This  expansion,  
while  it  aims  to  directly  facilitate  decentralized  governance  and  promote  socioeconomic  
development,  it  also  indirectly  served  as  a  stimulus  to  the  2020  universal  electrification  
access  project.  
In  2000,  with  a  population  of  18,845,265  (2000  Census),  national  electricity  access  
rate  had  reached  43%  with  an  average  Consumption/Capita  of  386kWh  (Ahiataku  –
Togobo,  2012).  In  2005,  the  national  access  rate  was  recorded  as  54%  (Team,  2012).  By  
2010,  the  national  access  to  electricity  has  reached  72%  (Ahiataku  –Togobo,  2012).  
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Around  this  same  period  of  2010,  rural  access  rate  reached  45%,  with  average  
Consumption/Capita  reaching  443.3kWh  (Barfour,  2013).  The  population  data  
corresponding  to  this  relatively  high  access  rate  in  2010  was  24,658,823  (2010  Census).  
This  again  points  to  the  conventional  assumption  that  increasing  population  invariably  
calls  for  increase  demand  for  electricity  access,  which  goes  hand-­‐‑in-­‐‑hand  with  
transformer  importation.  
  
Figure  5:  Population  Density  (people  per  sq.km)  in  Ghana.  Source:    www.tradingeconomics.com    
  
Barfour  in  his  paper  presentation  at  the  13th  Annual  African  Utility  Week  held  in  South  
Africa,  Cape  Town  from  the  14-­‐‑15  May,  2013,  pointed  to  “political  will”  as  one  of  the  
success  drivers  for  the  electrification  project  in  Ghana  (2013).      
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Figure  6:  Electrical  Networks  in  Ghana.  Courtesy  of  Ministry  of  Energy,  2011  
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Figure  7:  National  Electrification  Status  Map.  Courtesy  of  Ministry  of  Energy,  2011  
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Without  a  doubt,  the  national  electrification  project  reveals  the  mutual  relationship  that  
exists  between  government  of  Ghana  and  the  electricity  companies.  
One  of  the  key  objectives  of  the  NES  is  “to  construct  new  and  reinforce  existing  
generation  and  transmission  facilities  to  support  and  sustain  the  scheme”  (Ministry  of  
Energy,  2005).    
It  is  important  to  point  out  that  during  this  period  of  extensive  national  
electrification  project  in  Ghana,  there  was  also  a  frantic  drive  by  corporations  in  the  U.S.  
to  transfer  toxic  harm  (e.g.  PCBs  in  equipment)  to  developing  nations,  as  a  result  of  the  
TSCA  bill  and  the  ban  of  PCBs  in  1979.  Most  electric  transformers  shipped  out  of  the  
U.S.  around  this  period,  and  of  course  from  many  other  manufacturing  nations  were  
potentially  tainted  with  PCBs.  It  is  this  long  process  of  ambitious  electrification  in  Ghana  
which  has  led  to  the  current  PCBs  ubiquitous  presence  in  Ghana.    
Whereas  the  government  of  Ghana  and  the  electricity  companies  have  been  close  
partners  in  the  drive  for  socioeconomic  development,  at  least  as  far  as  national  
electrification  is  concern,  it  is  needful  to  point  out  their  collective  negligence  to  protect  
the  environment  and  human  safety.  This  is  the  case  I  will  seek  to  establish  in  my  analysis  
chapter.  
Evidence	  of	  PCBs	  in	  Ghana	  
Scientific  evidence  of  PCBs  in  Ghana  continue  to  support  the  fact  that  Ghana  has  
extensively  imported  and  used  electric  transformers  that  contained  PCBs  for  a  long  
period  of  time  (Bempah  et  al,  2012;  Buah-­‐‑Kwofie  et  al,  2011;  Yeboah  et  al,  2005).  The  
natinoal  electrification  projects  affirms  this  assertion.  The  Volta  River  Authority  (VRA),  
the  Electricity  Company  of  Ghana  (ECG),  and  quite  recently  the  Ghana  Grid  Company  
(GRIDCO),  which  are  all  parastatals,  have  been  the  main  importers  and  owners  of  
electric  transformers  and  equipment  that  have  been  identified  to  contained  PCBs  in  
Ghana.  A  United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP)  project  document  report  on  
the  elimination  of  PCBs  in  Ghana  established  that  “2-­‐‑3%  of  transformers  [in  use]  
contains  pure  PCBs  [whereas]  a  further  13%  of  transformers  are  PCBs  contaminated  to  a  
level  higher  than  the  threshold  set  in  the  Stockholm  Convention”  (2008,  p.  4).  PCBs  of  
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concentation  less  than  50ppm  are  considered  non  PCBs,  greater  than  50ppm  but  less  
than  500ppm  are  considered  contaminated,  and  when  it  is  more  than  500ppm  it  is  
considered  pure  PCBs  (Mills  and  Rhoads,  1985).  Recent  studies  to  determine  the  levels  
of  PCBs  from  some  selected  electric  transformers  in  parts  of  the  Greater  Acccra  Region  
of  Ghana  revealed  that  the  ECG  and  VRA  may  still  be  importing  or  using  tainted  PCBs  
transformers  (Buah  –Kwofie  et  al,  2011).  A  total  of  94  transformers  were  sampled  with  
the  latest  manufactured  transformer  being  2005  (ibid).  The  authors  concluded  that  there  
is  no  relationship  between  the  year  of  manufacture  and  the  level  of  PCBs  contamination  
as  transformers  as  recent  as  2005  contained  levels  as  high  as  131.86+/-­‐‑14.22  ppm  (ibid).  
The  conclusion  of  Buah-­‐‑Kwofie  et  al,  which  indicated  no  correlation  between  year  of  
transformer  manufacture  and  the  levels  of  PCBs  leaves  room  for  further  research.  This  
could  be  because  some  manufacturers  continue  to  use  PCBs  in  their  products  even  after  
the  global  ban,  provided  the  research  tools  and  techniques  used  by  the  authors  are  not  
flawed.  Analyisis  of  PCBs  in  cow  milk  in  Ghana  showed  concentration  ranging  from  2.5-­‐‑
87ppm  (Asante  et  al,  2010).  Studies  on  human  milk  and  fish  have  also  been  conducted  in  
Ghana.  Forty-­‐‑two  samples  of  human  milk  were  collected  from  primiparous  mothers  in  
2009  from  three  locations  in  Ghana;  Accra  (costal),  Kumasi  (forest),  and  Tamale  
(savannah)  from  both  urban  and  rural  areas  of  each  location  (Asante,  2011).  
Concentration  level  were  recorded  from  15-­‐‑160ppm  (ibid).  In  the  case  of  determining  the  
levels  of  PCBs  in  fish  samples,  40  tilapia  fish  from  some  lakes,  lagoons  and  aquaculture  
pond  were  tested  in  2010  (Ashante,  2013).  Concentration  level  were  recorded  from  1.1-­‐‑
300ppm  (ibid).  In  all  cases,  PCBs  were  detected  indicating  its  ubiquitouness  in  the  
Ghanaian  environment  with  Accra  reccording  the  highest  level  of    PCBs  concentration.  
In  fact,  Gioia  et  al  (2011)  have  reported  that  total  mean  PCBs  level  in  Accra  in  2009  
reached  82ppm,  which  was  statistically  higher  than  what  was  reccorded  in  2004  at  a  
level  of  34ppm.  This  point  to  the  fact  that,  the  PCBs  burden  in  Accra  is  getting  worse.  A  
situation  which  can  be  attibuted  to  the  position  of  Accra  as  the  capital  of  Ghana,  and  the  
extensive  electricity  access  serving  the  overly  populated  communities  and  industries  in  
the  city.  
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Attempt	  to	  Eliminate	  PCBs	  in	  Ghana-­‐The	  National	  Implementation	  Plan	  (NIP)	  
The  government  of  Ghana  through  the  Ghana  Environmental  Protection  Agency  
(EPA)  embarked  on  a  project  under  the  National  Implementation  Plan  (NIP)  to  eliminate  
PCBs  in  Ghana,  with  funding  from  the  Global  Environmental  Facility  (GEF).  Other  
assistive  organizations  collaborating  in  the  project  include;  The  United  Nations  
Development  Program  (UNDP),  United  Nations  Institute  for  Training  and  Research  
(UNITAR),  and  United  Nations  Environmental  Program  (UNEP)  (Ghana  News  Agency,  
2012).  The  NIP  is  a  holistic  plan  that  sets  out  how  nations  will  implement  their  
obligation  to  the  elimination/destruction  of  POPs  under  the  Stockholm  Convention.  In  
Ghana,  the  project  was  to  “ensure  [the  nation]  has  the  capacity  and  capabilities  to  
manage  PCBs  in  a  manner  consistent  and  compatible  with  the  Stockholm’s  Convention’s  
goal  of  PCBs  elimination  from  use  in  equipment  by  2025”  (UNDP,  2008,  p.4).    
During  a  stakeholders  meeting  in  Ghana,  UNITAR  pointed  out  that  the  NIP  project  
aimed  to  “significantly  improve  power  production  and  distribution  and  to  strengthen  
the  management  of  the  [electricity]  sector”  (UNITAR,  2013,  website).  Legislatively,  the  
project  also  seeks  to  “strengthening  [sic]  the  legal  framework  and  the  management  
capacity  both  within  government  institutions  and  among  PCB  holders”  (ibid).  It  further  
pointed  out  that  the  PCBs  elimination  project  in  Ghana  called  for  “increased  project  
visibility  at  the  local  level  and  for  decision  makers”  (ibid).  In  response  to  the  NIP  
deadline  for  elimination  of  PCBs,  the  Environment,  Health  and  Safety  Manager  of  ECG,  
Peter  Asigbee,  pointed  out  that  “it  would  be  difficult  for  the  company  to  change  all  
transformers  with  PCBs  within  the  limited  time”  (Ghana  News  Agency,  2009,  website).  
He  explained  that  “some  of  the  transformers  in  use  by  ECG  have  been  in  service  since  
the  1950s  and  the  company  does  not  even  have  the  capacity  to  test  those  transformers  
for  PCBs”  (ibid).  Philip  Owiredu  Yeboah,  a  lecturer  at  the  Graduate  School  of  Nuclear  
and  Allied  Sciences,  Ghana,  also  pointed  out  “PCBs  were  scattered  in  many  places  
including  hospitals,  schools  and  market  places  thus,  putting  everybody  at  risk”  (Ghana  
News  Agency,  2009,  website).  He  further  stated  “some  entrepreneurs  even  buy  the  PCBs  
oil  from  the  Volta  River  Authority  (VRA)  and  Electricity  Company  of  Ghana  (ECG)  to  be  
used  in  making  hair  pomade  for  women”  (ibid).  According  to  a  news  report  by  Edmund  
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Smith-­‐‑Asante  of  Graphic  corporations,  Ghana,  the  Ghana  EPA  have  pointed  out  that  
“…[transformer  oil]  are  siphoned  by  people  from  both  functioning  and  broken  down  
transformers  and  sold  as  edible  oil”  (Obour,  2013,  Daily  Graphic  Newspaper  Website).  
This  chilling  revelation  showed  a  long-­‐‑standing  lack  of  willingness  on  the  part  of  
government  to  address  the  issue  and  a  willful  oblivion  of  the  electricity  companies  to  
respond  by  taking  preventive  actions  to  protect  people’s  health  and  the  environment.  
During  a  ‘High  Level  Sensitization  on  the  Management  of  PCBs  in  Ghana’  on  
October  3rd  2013,  a  keynote  address  read  on  behalf  of  the  Deputy  Minister  for  
Environment,  Science,  Technology,  and  Innovation  (MESTI)  by  Sylvester  Anemana,  
Chief  Director  of  the  Ministry,  the  Deputy  Minister,  Bernice  Heloo  confirmed  that  
Ghana  did  not  have  any  law  on  PCBs  however,  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  
Act  490,  1994  “had  adequate  provision  for  their  control”  (Obour,  2013,  Daily  Graphic  
Newspaper  Website).  The  Deputy  Minster,  through  the  keynote  address  also  
acknowledged  that,  mainly  the  ECG  and  the  VRA  are  the  major  custodians  of  PCBs  
tainted  equipment,  power  transformers,  and  capacitors  in  Ghana  (ibid).    
A  nationwide  transformer  inventory  conducted  in  2006  as  part  of  the  National  
Implementation  Plan  (NIP),  estimated  that  about  “12,000  transformers  were  to  be  
sampled  and  analyzed  for  PCBs”  (ibid).  According  to  Anemana,  out  of  the  reported  
12,000  units,  about  9,000  had  been  so  far  sampled  and  analyzed  for  PCBs  (ibid).  It  is  
reported  that  the  ECG,  VRA  and  GRIDCO  have  jointly  contributed  about  $1.6  million  in  


































As  part  of  the  measures  to  control  PCBs,  the  ECG  training  school  in  Tema  is  being  used  
to  store  old  PCBs-­‐‑tainted  transformers  for  final  disposal.  According  to  MESTI,  about  116  
contaminated  transformers  and  capacitors  are  in  storage  awaiting  shipment  for  disposal  
(Ghana  News  Agency,  2012).  
  
Figure	  8	  Pictures	  of	  PCBs	  tainted	  transformers	  at	  the	  ECG	  training	  School,	  taken	  during	  fieldtrip	  to	  
the	  site	  in	  February	  2014.	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FIELDWORK	  AND	  ANALYSIS	  
METHODOLOGY	  	  
This  chapter  describes  my  fieldwork,  approach,  justification  for  the  selection  of  
actors  for  interviews  and  administration  of  questionnaires,  and  their  relevance  to  the  
paper.  It  also  points  out  the  limitations  that  may  be  inherent  in  the  research  and  how  
these  limitations  are  mitigated  and  compensated  for  in  the  research.  The  policy  network  
analytical  framework  used  to  establish  my  research  case  is  also  noted  and  justified  in  the  
chapter.    
Data	  Collection	  
I  spent  six  (6)  weeks  in  the  Greater  Accra  Region  of  Ghana  to  interview  and  
administer  questionnaires  to  relevant  actors  contributing  to  the  PCBs  issue  in  Ghana,  or  
facilitating  in  the  development  of  Policy  to  control  PCBs.    
Environmental  policy  documents  such  as  the  existing  Environmental  Protection  Agency  
Act  (490)  1994,  and  a  yet-­‐‑to-­‐‑be  enacted  “Draft  Policy  on  Contaminated  Sites  in  Ghana”  
were  reviewed  and  analyzed,  where  necessary.  I  also  drew  information  from  online  
news  reports,  major  newspapers,  and  declassified  online  court  documents.  Actors  
reports  posted  on  websites  were  also  sourced  and  used.  I  utilized  data  from  conference  
presentations  made  by  government  officials  to  make  my  case.  Typically,  academic  books  
and  peer  reviewed  journal  articles  formed  a  backbone  to  my  paper  and  analysis.      
Research	  Tools	  and	  Techniques	  
Questionnaires	  
Closed  and  open-­‐‑ended  questionnaires  were  submitted  to  actors  identified  for  
this  research.  Open-­‐‑ended  questions  were  given  out  to  corroborate  interview  responses,  
and  also  to  give  respondents  the  flexibility  to  answer  questions  based  on  their  
understanding  of  the  situation  in  their  own  ideas  and/or  experience.  Questionnaires  
were  simply  structured  to  require  minimum  literacy  to  complete.  Questionnaires  were  
handed  to  respondents  in  person.  Respondents  were  given  sufficient  time  to  complete  
the  questionnaire.  Collected  questionnaire  responses  were  put  together  in  groups  
according  to  actors  and  analyzed  as  such.  Questionnaire  responses  for  the  entire  
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fieldwork  were  received  from  three  government  officials  in  different  institutions,  three  
industry  officials  in  different  parastatal  companies,  and  28  community  members  from  
three  different  communities    (see  appendix  4  for  questionnaires  sample).  
Interviews	  
Two  senior  government  officials  in  different  institutions,  and  three  senior  
industry  officials  in  different  companies  were  interviewed.  Interviews  were  arranged  
with  interviewees  through  emails  and  telephone  calls,  to  agree  on  interview  dates  and  
time.  One  interview  was  however  conducted  on  the  spot  without  schedule,  but  upon  
permission.  Some  of  the  interview  questions  asked  were:  What  is  your  perspective  on  
the  PCBs  issue  in  Ghana?  What  is  your  understanding  of  the  policy  process  in  Ghana  
and  how  does  it  function?  What  are  some  of  the  major  challenges  encountered  during  
policymaking  process?  [See  appendix  3:  for  interview  questions].  Interview  time  was  
usually  less  than  thirty-­‐‑minutes.  Interview  responses  were  shorthand  written  in  a  
dedicated  research  book.  The  interview  responses  were  later  typed  in  Microsoft  Office  
2011  Word  document.  Interviewees  were  sent  copies  of  the  typed  responses  via  email  to  
verify  for  correctness  and  accuracy.  Interviewees  corroborated  typed  responses  via  
email  to  confirmed  captured  information  before  analyzing.    
Reason	  for	  Interview	  and	  Questionnaire	  Administration	  
The  purpose  of  interviewing  and  administering  questionnaires  to  relevant  
government  ministry  and  agencies,  corporate  entities,  communities  and  other  actors  
who  were  deemed  relevant  in  this  research  is  to  gain  a  multi-­‐‑level  perspective  on  the  
PCBs  issue  in  Ghana.  The  Interviews  and  administered  questionnaires  are  to  allow  for  
constructive  analysis  and  objective  comparison  of  the  policy  actors,  allowing  for  a  better  
understanding  of  the  policy  process  in  Ghana.  This  provides  a  clearer  understanding  of  
the  policy  dynamics  around  the  PCBs  issue  and  the  environmental  justice  perspectives  
that  emerges.  It  also  provides  a  basis  to  make  meaningful  comparison  to  the  case  in  the  
U.S.      
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Actors	  Consulted	  during	  Fieldwork	  
Ministry	  of	  Environment,	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Innovation	  (MESTI)	  
Established  in  1993,  MESTI  is  the  overseeing  government  ministry  that  is  
responsible  for  environmental  policy  formulation,  implementation  and  enforcement  in  
Ghana.    It  is  mandated  to  “  …ensure  accelerated  socioeconomic  development  through  
the  formulation  of  sound  policies  and  a  regulatory  framework  to  promote  the  use  of  
appropriate  environmentally-­‐‑friendly,  scientific  and  technological  practices  and  
techniques”  (MESTI,  2014,  at  ghana.gov.gh).    
According  to  the  ministry’s  website,  one  of  the  approaches  it  seeks  to  do  this  is  through  
the  “intensification  of  the  application  of  safe  and  sound  environmental  practices”  with  a  
mandate  “to  pursue  the  implementation  of  government  policies…”  (Ibid).    
Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  
EPA,  which  is  under  MESTI,  is  mandated  as  a  policy  and  regulatory  agency  to  
ensure  “sound  environmental  stewardship”  (MESTI,  2014,  ghana.gov.gh).    The  EPA  is  
empowered  to  achieve  this  through;    
  
  …an  integrated  environmental  planning  and  management  system  established  
on  a  broad  base  of  public  participation,  efficient  implementation  of  appropriate  
programs  and  technical  services,  giving  good  counsel  on  environmental  
management  as  well  as  effective  and  consistent  enforcement  of  environmental  
laws  and  regulations  (MESTI,  2014,  ghana.gov.gh).  
  
A  copy  of  an  introductory  letter  from  the  Faculty  of  Environmental  Studies,  York  
University  was  submitted  to  MESTI  and  EPA  in  support  of  emails  and  telephone  calls  
requesting  permission  to  conduct  interviews  and  administer  questionnaires  to  their  
officials.  These  interviews  and  administered  questionnaire  were  aimed  at  understanding  
the  environmental  policy  process  in  Ghana  through  the  eyes  of  the  core  policymakers.  
The  Ghana  Custom  and  Excise  Preventive  Service  (CEPS)  
CEPS  is  one  of  the  oldest  government  institutions  in  Ghana  established  by  the  
British  colonial  masters  in  1839,  to  serve  as  the  policing  agency  at  all  entry  points  in  
Ghana.  The  institution’s  current  mission  is  to;  
	   68	  
…design  and  implement  effective  strategies  and  programmes  to  collect,  account  
and  protect  customs,  excise  and  other  assigned  tax  revenues  at  a  minimum  cost,  
while  facilitating  trade,  investment  and  the  movement  of  people  across  the  
borders  of  Ghana  through  efficient  and  transparent  service  delivery  
(Ghanadistrict.com,  2006).  
  
CEPS  is  a  custodian  of  data  of  every  item  imported  or  exported  out  of  Ghana.    
I  consulted  CEPS  for  data  on  Electric  Transformers  imported  into  Ghana  since  
1979.  A  formal  request  for  data  together  with  a  copy  of  an  introductory  letter  from  the  
Faculty  of  Environmental  Studies,  York  University,  were  submitted  to  The  
Commissioner,  CEPS,  on  January  26,  2013  for  permission  to  retrieve  data  for  research  
purpose.  Excel  data  on  transformers  stored  on  CEPS  database  was  copied  to  my  
dedicated  USB  flash  drive  on  14th  of  February  2014,  for  the  purpose  of  this  research  only.  
Data  was  received  from  the  Monitoring  and  Research  Department  of  CEPS  in  Accra,  
Ghana.  Data  received  from  CEPS  begun  from  2003  to  2013,  as  this  is  the  period  CEPS  
initiated  a  system  of  computerized  record  keeping.  The  data  received  was  filtered  using  
Microsoft  Office  2011  Excel  filter  tool  to  exclude  all  imported  goods  not  specifically  
described  as  transformers.    
Ghana  Energy  Commission  
The  Ghana  Energy  Commission  is  mandated  by  an  Act  of  the  Ghanaian  
Parliament,  the  Energy  Commission  Act,  1997  (Act  541)  to;  
  
…regulate  and  manage  the  development  and  utilization  of  energy  resources  in  
Ghana  as  well  as  to  provide  the  legal,  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework  for  
all  providers  of  energy  in  the  country,  specifically  by  granting  licenses  for  the  
transmission,  wholesale,  supply,  distribution  and  sale  of  electricity  and  natural  
gas  and  related  matters  (Energy  Commission,  2014).    
  
The  mandate  of  the  commission  empowers  it  “to  formulate  national  energy  policy,  
enforce  legislative  instruments,  license  public  utilities  for  the  transmission,  wholesale  
supply,  distribution  and  sale  of  electricity”  (ibid).  
I  submitted  an  open-­‐‑ended  questionnaire  on  Institutional  Perspective  to  the  
Environmental  Department  of  the  Energy  Commission  in  Accra,  together  with  a  copy  of  
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an  introductory  letter  from  the  Faculty  of  Environmental  Studies,  York  University.  The  
Program  Officer  responsible  for  Environment  at  the  Energy  Commission  completed  the  
questionnaire  in  ink,  and  returned  it  to  me  on  the  same  day.  The  perspective  of  the  
Ghana  Energy  Commission  on  the  PCBs  issue  is  deemed  relevant  to  this  research.  This  is  
because,  as  an  independent  government  regulatory  body  on  energy,  the  Commission  
plays  a  key  role  in  streamlining  the  operations  of  the  electricity  companies  who  are  
deemed  to  be  major  importers  of  transformers  into  Ghana.  
Volta  River  Authority  (VRA)  
The  Volta  River  Authority,  established  under  an  act  of  government,  Act  46  of  the  
Volta  River  Development  Act,  Republic  of  Ghana,  has  the  core  business  mandate  “to  
generate  and  supply  electrical  energy  for  industrial,  commercial  and  domestic  use  in  
Ghana”  (VRA,  2013).  VRA  mainly  generates  its  electric  power  from  the  Akosombo  dam,  
and  in  later  years  from  the  Kpong  Dam,  all  in  the  eastern  region  of  Ghana  (as  indicated  
in  earlier  chapter).  It  currently  generates  electric  power  from  thermal  facilities  at  Tema  
and  Aboadze  “to  complement  [the]  hydro  generation”  energy  (ibid).  
Even  though  VRA’s  main  mandate  is  to  generate  electric  power  for  national  use,  it  
functions  as  an  energy  distribution  entity  responsible  for  distributing  electricity  to  the  
Northern  Sector  of  Ghana  through  one  of  its  subsidiary  business  entity,  the  Northern  
Electricity  Department  (NED)  (ibid).  As  a  result  of  the  company’s  mandate  to  generate  
and  supply  electricity  energy,  it  imports  substantial  quantities  of  electric  transformers  
for  its  operational  needs.    As  an  industry  leader,  VRA’s  perspective  is  important  for  a  
better  understanding  of  the  policy  network  and  dynamics  on  the  PCBs  issue  in  Ghana.  
An  open-­‐‑ended  questionnaire  on  industry  perspective  on  the  PCBs  issue  in  
Ghana,  including  a  copy  of  an  introductory  letter  from  the  Faculty  of  Environmental  
Studies,  York  University,  was  submitted  to  VRA’s  Corporate  Head  Office  in  Accra.  
Request  was  sent  to  VRA’s  Office  in  Akosombo  for  response  from  the  VRA  Public  
Relations  office  in  Accra.  Questionnaire  response  was  typed  onto  a  separate  sheet  by  
respondent,  sent  back  to  VRA’s  Corporate  Office  (Public  Relations  Department)  in  
Accra,  and  returned  to  me  in  sealed  envelope.  
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  Electricity  Company  of  Ghana  (ECG)  
The  ECG,  according  to  its  online  homepage  is  a  wholly  owned  company  by  the  
government  of  Ghana,  and  operates  under  the  Ministry  of  Energy  (www.ecgonline.info,  
2013).  It  began  operating  in  1947  under  the  name  Electricity  Department,  which  has  
metamorphosed  under  different  names  to  the  current  Electricity  Company  of  Ghana.  
ECG  is  the  main  and  largest  electricity  distributing  company  in  Ghana.  In  1987  however,  
the  Northern  Electricity  Department  (NED)  of  the  Volta  River  Authority  (VRA)  took  
over  the  distribution  of  electricity  to  the  northern  sector  of  Ghana.  Currently,  ECG  
distributes  electricity  to  the  entire  southern  part  of  Ghana.    As  the  largest  electricity  
distribution  entity  in  Ghana,  ECG  imports  substantial  quantities  of  electric  transformers  
into  Ghana  to  serve  its  operational  needs.  Due  to  this,  ECG’s  perspective  on  the  PCBs  
issue  in  Ghana  is  important  towards  providing  a  better  understanding  of  the  policy  
network  and  its  dynamics  in  Ghana.      
An  open-­‐‑ended  questionnaire  on  industry  perspective  on  the  PCBs  issue  in  
Ghana,  including  an  introductory  letter  from  the  Faculty  of  Environmental  Studies,  York  
University,  was  submitted  to  ECG  Environment,  Health  and  Safety  (EHS)  department  at  
the  ECG  office  in  Circle-­‐‑Accra.    The  Safety  Manager  of  ECG,  Accra  was  also  interviewed  
for  his  views  on  the  PCBs  issue  in  Ghana.  An  Environment  Officer  at  ECG,  Circle-­‐‑Accra,  
completed  the  questionnaire.  
Polyeco  Waste  Management,  Greece  
Polyeco  Waste  Management  is  a  company  based  in  Greece  that  is  specialized  in  
integrated  waste  management.  Polyeco  is  contracted  through  the  NIP  project  in  Ghana  
to  facilitate  the  shipment  of  PCBs  tainted  equipment  to  Greece  for  high  temperature  
incineration  and  disposal.  I  met  Polyeco’s  project  manager  who  offered  to  give  me  a  
perspective  on  the  PCB  issue  in  Ghana,  as  he  understands  it.  My  interview  with  him  was  
extempore,  however,  helpful  to  the  paper.  
Public  Perspective  
Ninety-­‐‑three  (93)  closed-­‐‑ended  questionnaires  were  issued  to  individuals  in  
Ashaiman,  Sakumono  and  Tema  (all  in  the  Greater  Accra  Region),  to  elicit  for  general  
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understanding  of  the  PCBs  issue,  potential  exposure  to  PCBs,  knowledge  of  
environmental  policy  in  Ghana,  and  interest  in  participation  in  environmental  policy-­‐‑
making.  The  communities  selected  are  closely  connected  by  distance  but  set  apart  by  
income  level,  educational  level,  and  social  life.  Ashaiman  is  considered  one  of  the  
economically  deprived  communities  in  Ghana.  Sakumono  and  Tema  have  moderate  
middle-­‐‑income  earners  and  also  tend  to  have  a  higher  percentage  of  literates  than  
Ashaiman.  Tema  is  the  largest  industrial  city  in  Ghana.  The  Tema  harbor  is  the  main  
entrance  point  to  many  goods  that  are  imported  to  Ghana.  Sakumono  is  home  to  many  
Members  of  Parliament  in  Ghana.  Questionnaires  were  issued  and  respondents  were  
given  two  weeks  to  complete  it.  
Research	  Limitation	  
Biases	  
Due  to  the  vast  number  of  individuals  importing  transformers  into  Ghana,  I  
selectively  focused  on  the  two  major  parastatal  electricity  companies  in  Ghana.  This  
inadvertently  places  undue  focus  on  their  activities  rather  than  from  the  perspective  of  a  
wider  scope  of  the  general  importers  of  transformers.  This  bias  is  justified  by  the  
recognition  of  these  companies  by  MESTI,  Ghana  EPA  and  researchers  as  the  major  
importers  of  transformers  into  Ghana.  
Time	  Constraint	  on	  Research	  
There  are  several  actors  both  nationally  and  internationally  involved  in  the  PCBs  
issue  in  Ghana.  Due  to  time  constraint,  only  actors  considered  directly  relevant  and  
readily  available  and  willing  to  participate  in  this  research  were  contacted.  
Government	  
Due  to  the  decentralization  of  MESTI,  policies  on  specific  environmental  issues  
are  managed  by  one  of  its  four  satellite  agencies  with  a  coordinator  at  the  MESTI  being  
responsible  for  liaising  between  the  Ministry  and  its  satellite  agencies.  There  is  the  
likelihood  that  vested  interest  existing  among  the  ministry  and  its  agencies  may  cloud  
objectivity  and  undermine  understanding  of  the  issue,  due  to  individual  or  institutional  
	   72	  
biases.  Asking  more  specific  questions  relevant  to  the  ministry’s  role  in  the  subject  
matter  mitigates  this  bias.  
Industry	  
Due  to  difficulty  in  reaching  the  right  person  to  speak  to  at  GRIDCO,  which  is  
one  of  the  main  electricity  providers  in  Ghana,  only  persons  from  VRA  and  ECG  were  
contacted  for  this  research.  The  industry  perspective  of  VRA  and  ECG  is  considered  
most  important  to  this  research,  as  they  have  been  identified  as  the  main  custodian  of  
most  electric  transformers  in  Ghana.  Even  though  GRIDCO’s  perspective  would  have  
given  a  brighter  overview,  this  may  only  flood  the  views  of  the  two  main  identified  
custodians  of  electric  transformers  in  Ghana.  Besides,  GRIDCO  became  a  limited  liability  
company  under  the  Companies  Code,  Act  179  (1963)  in  2006.  This  excludes  GRIDCO  
from  the  period  of  supposedly  high  importation  of  tainted  PCBs  transformers  in  the  
1970s  to  the  early  2000s.  
Communities	  
More  than  50%  of  the  Community  Perspective  questionnaires  were  not  returned  
due  to  participants’  continual  request  for  time  to  complete  the  questionnaire.  Because  of  
time  constraints,  only  twenty-­‐‑eight  (28)  out  of  a  total  of  ninety-­‐‑three  (93)  questionnaires  
were  collected  for  analysis.  Admittedly,  the  number  of  respondents  from  these  
communities  may  not  sufficiently  represent  the  true  opinion  of  the  communities  and  
Ghana  at  large.  However,  analysis  on  public  perspective  will  be  based  on  the  responses  
from  these  respondents  for  the  sake  of  research  time  constraint.  Corroborating  with  data  
from  research  done  in  this  area  will  compensate  for  this  limitation.  
Analytical	  Approach	  	  
Even  though  still  considered  by  some  scholars  as  metaphoric,  policy  network  
analysis  continues  to  gain  strength  as  a  formalized  tool  for  conceptualizing  the  behavior  
of  independently  but  mutually  interacting  actors  within  the  policy  network.  It  also  
provides  rationale  for  the  policy  decisions  that  are  made  by  these  actors.  
I  will  utilize  policy  network  analytical  model  to  perform  my  analysis.  This  will  offer  a  
better  view  of  the  underlying  behaviors  of  the  actors  and  the  policy  dynamics  in  Ghana  
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and  in  the  U.S.  The  analytical  framework  prescribed  by  Marsh  and  Rhodes  (1992)  will  be  
used  as  the  basis  upon  which  I  will  analyze  the  policy  networks.  This  model  is  expected  
to  highlight  the  behavior  of  the  actors,  how  environmental  issues  have  been  treated,  and  
the  underlying  factors  promoting  actors’  interests  and  behavior.    This  is  expected  to  
shape  the  logic  behind  the  analysis  and  be  able  to  establish  the  differences  and  
similarities  that  underpin  the  situation  in  Ghana  and  that  of  the  U.S.  It  is  this  analytical  
approach  that  is  expected  to  lead  to  the  causes  of  policy  failures  and  the  forces  behind  
these  failures  in  Ghana.  The  Marsh  and  Rhodes  approach  addresses  policy  network  
within  the  confines  of  interest  intermediation,  which  relates  the  policy  dynamics  among  
State,  Corporations,  and  Society.  Marsh  and  Rhodes  perceives  policy  networks  as  a  
“meso-­‐‑level  concept  that  links  micro-­‐‑level  of  analysis”  of  government  interest  in  a  
particular  policy  decision,  and  a  macro-­‐‑level  of  analysis,  which  is  concerned  with  
broader  questions  about  the  distribution  of  power  in  modern  society  (Rhodes,  2006,  p.  4;  
emphasis  on  Marsh  and  Rhodes,  1992).  According  to  Börzel,  this  approach  “embraces  
the  different  types  of  state/interest  relations”(1997).  My  analysis  will  involve  a  critical  
look  at  the  policy  network  in  Ghana,  thus  the  policy  communities  and  the  issue  network.    
As  Rhodes  put  it;  
  
-­‐ Networks  can  vary  along  a  continuum  according  to  the  closeness  of  the  
relationships  in  them.    
-­‐ Policy  communities  are  at  one  end  of  the  continuum  and  involve  close  
relationships,  
-­‐ Issue  networks  are  at  the  other  end  and  involve  loose  relationships  (2006,  p.4).  
  
This  approach  has  been  proven  to  be  effective  by  many  policy  network  analysts,  as  it  
accentuates  actions,  reactions,  and/or  inactions  of  actors  (Börzel,  1998;  Dowding,  1995).  
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ANALYSIS	  
Overview	  
This  chapter  critically  assesses  the  responses  and  data  derived  from  my  
fieldwork.  I  analyze  these  responses  in  conjunction  with  relevant  literature,  institutional  
documents,  newspaper  reports,  and  court  documents  in  the  context  of  the  policy  
network  and  its  dynamics  relating  to  PCBs  issues  in  Ghana  and  the  U.S.  My  analysis  
looks  through  the  interest  proposition  of  actors  and  the  relationship  that  exist  among  
them  and  the  impact  of  their  decisions  on  the  public.  This  is  to  underscore  the  
underlying  motives  and  behaviors  of  the  actors  in  the  policy  networks  relevant  to  the  
PCBs  issue  in  Ghana.  An  environmental  justice  frame  is  derived  from  the  analysis  by  
making  reference  to  the  TSCA  bill,  which  banned  the  production  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  
This  is  performed  through  the  lenses  of  corporate  and  government  intent  to  pursue  
economic  goals  to  the  detriment  of  the  environment  and  human  safety.  The  chapter  also  
throws  light  on  the  environmental  policy  dynamics  in  Ghana  through  the  eyes  of  the  
policy  networks,  and  then  contrasted  with  the  case  in  the  U.S.  
Interest	  Intermediation	  
According  to  the  Ghana  EPA  there  are  currently  an  estimated  12,000  
transformers  in  Ghana,  largely  owned  by  ECG  and  VRA.  Based  on  Microsoft  Excel  data  
received  from  the  Ghana  Custom  and  Excise  Preventive  Services  (CEPS)  on  imported  
transformers  into  Ghana  from  the  period  of  2003  to  2013,  the  12,000  pieces  of  
transformers  estimated  by  the  Ghana  EPA  can  be  considered  as  an  underestimation.  
From  the  Microsoft  Excel  spreadsheet  data,  about  818,420  pieces  of  equipment  
specifically  identified  and  described  by  CEPS  as  transformers  were  imported  into  Ghana  
from  2003  to  2013  (this  data  is  filtered  using  Microsoft  Office  2011  Excel  filter  to  capture  
accurate  imported  product  description).  This  numbers  does  not  include  items  that  were  
classified  as  transformer  parts,  or  Uninterrupted  Power  Supply  (UPS)  equipment.  
According  to  the  data,  thousands  of  individuals,  communities,  government  
organizations,  non-­‐‑government  organizations  (NGOs),  parastatals,  small  and  large-­‐‑scale  
industries  etc.,  were  responsible  for  these  importations.  Some  of  the  countries  these  
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transformers  were  imported  from  included;  the  U.S.,  Britain,  Italy,  Canada,  France,  
Denmark,  India,  China,  United  Arab  Emirate,  Belgium,  Finland,  South  Africa  etc.    
Within  the  period  under  review,  thus  2003-­‐‑2013,  ECG  imported  18,728  
transformers,  VRA  imported  4,421transformers,  while  GRIDCO  imported  857  
transformers,  all  from  various  countries  across  the  globe.  In  total  the  three  electricity  
companies  imported  24,006  transformers,  representing  a  small  fraction  (3%)  of  the  total  
transformer  importation  into  Ghana  from  2003  to  2013.  Whereas  VRA  indicated  in  the  
administered  questionnaire  that  they  purchased  most  of  their  electric  transformers  
between  2004  and  2005,  ECG  failed  to  answer  that  question.  However,  ECG  states  that  it  
replaces  its  transformers  “as  and  when  there  are  transformer  damages  or  load  demand,”  
while  VRA  states  it  replaces  its  transformers  “when  ratings  are  exceeded”  (i.e.  when  the  
generators  are  uprated  during  retrofit  projects).  Undoubtedly,  conventional  correlation  
point  to  the  fact  that,  ceteris  paribus,  the  period  when  Ghana  actually  imported  most  
transformers  was  probably  from1985  to  2010  when  the  nation  embarked  on  aggressive  
national  electrification  projects.    Data  indicates  that  prior  to  the  nationwide  
electrification  project  only  15%  of  the  country  was  covered;  however,  by  2010  the  
national  access  rate  had  jumped  to  72%  with  corresponding  population  growth  
(Ahiataku  –Togobo,  2012).  Also  it  was  around  this  period  that  the  World  Bank  
financially  supported  Ghana  to  facilitate  the  electrification  project  to  reinforce  the  
infrastructural  backbone  of  VRA  and  ECG.  Besides,  the  VRA  undertook  a  number  of  
expansion  projects  such  as  the  Northern  Electrification  and  System  Reinforcement  
Project  (NESRP)  in  1985,  which  of  course  required  a  significant  increase  in  transformer  
importation.  Even  though  the  CEPS  data  was  short  of  providing  information  stretching  
from  the  1970s  through  to  the  1990s,  it  is  evident  that  the  peak  periods  of  the  
electrification  project  (1985-­‐‑2010)  were  also  periods  of  phenomenal  importation  of  
transformers  into  Ghana  by  the  electricity  companies.  
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Figure  9  Quantity  of  transformer  importation  by  the  electricity  companies  in  Ghana  from  2003-­‐‑2013  
  
In  the  “Draft  Policy  on  Contaminated  Sites  in  Ghana”,  section  3.4.1,  the  authors  
pointed  out  that  a  research  conducted  in  2006  on  PCBs  inventory  and  possible  PCBs-­‐‑
containing  equipment  by  the  Ghana  EPA  revealed  that;  
  
-­‐ Majority  of  the  equipment  that  tested  positive  were  those  manufactured  before  1972.  
-­‐ The  quantity  of  PCBs  contaminated  equipment  is,  however,  not  decreasing  after  1985  
as  expected.  This  trend  is  probably  due  to  cross  contamination  through  the  filtration  
process  of  mineral  oil  and  topping  up  with  PCB  contaminated  mineral  oil.  
-­‐ Majority  of  equipment  found  to  contain  pure  PCBs  (concentration  greater  than  
500ppm)  were  those  installed  after  1985.  
-­‐ Most  surprisingly,  equipment  installed  as  recent  as  2003  [was]  found  to  contain  pure  
PCBs.  
-­‐ Some  of  the  equipment  that  tested  positive  for  PCBs  were  located  in  sensitive  areas  
such  as  schools,  water  treatment  works,  markets,  hospitals  and  hotels  with  some  of  
them  unprotected  (pp.  15-­‐‑16).  
  
Building  on  what  is  accessible,  it  is  easy  to  conjecture  that  even  for  the  818,420  
transformers  imported  into  the  country  from  2003  to  2013,  many  of  them  still  contained  
PCBs,  especially  with  evidence  of  pure  PCBs  (greater  than  500ppm)  identified  in  2003  
manufactured  transformers.    
In  interview,  the  EHS  Manager  of  ECG  -­‐‑  Peter  Asigbee  confirmed  that  ECG  
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were  unrestricted  and  were  heavily  being  used  in  electric  transformers  as  dielectric  
fluid.  Asigbee  further  stated  that  “[ECG]  also  changed  the  specifications  [for  its]  
transformers  to  be  less  than  50  ppm”  during  this  period.  Even  though  ECG  claimed  to  
have  halted  the  purchase  of  PCBs  tainted  transformers  as  far  back  as  1972,  the  company  
seems  not  to  be  aware  if  their  imported  electric  transformers  contained  PCBs  or  not  
(Asigbee,  and  his  colleague  who  completed  the  questionnaire  pointed  this  out).  This  
makes  it  difficult  to  believe  the  assertion  made  by  the  ECG  official  regarding  ECG’s  
changing  the  specification  of  its  transformer  oil  to  be  ‘less  than  50ppm’  PCBs.    When  
VRA  was  asked  a  similar  question  if  it  is  always  aware  that  its  imported  electric  
transformers  contain  PCBs  or  not,  Ebo-­‐‑Amoah,  the  VRA  Electricals  Manager,  did  not  say  
yes  or  no.  He  rather  pointed  out  that  he  is  aware  VRA  follow  its  ‘strict  Technical  Service  
Standard  specifications’.  When  Asigbee  was  asked  if  he  is  aware  that  electric  
transformers  produced  before  1979  might  contain  PCBs,  he  answered  in  the  affirmative  
but  said,  ECG  is  more  concerned  about  the  “quality  of  the  transformer  and  not  on  PCBs  
[content].”  On  environmental  and  human  factors  that  are  considered  prior  to  purchasing  
transformers,  ECG  wrote  that  “noise  level  of  transformers”  was  what  it  considers.  For  
the  same  question,  VRA  states  among  other  reasons  that  “PCBs  content  in  new  oil,  
which  by  its  Technical  Service  Standards  has  a  zero  content,”  is  the  criteria  they  use  to  
make  their  purchasing  decisions.  While  ECG  claimed  the  ban  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  had  no  
influence  on  their  purchasing  of  transformers,  VRA  said  the  ban  obviously  had  an  
influence  on  their  purchasing  of  Transformers.  VRA  claimed,  as  a  result  of  the  ban  none  
of  its  transformers  had  PCBs  in  its  oil  effective  since  1995.  Ebo-­‐‑Amoah  stated  that  
through  a  task  force,  the  VRA  “Technical  Services  Department  puts  up  standards  for  
transformer  oil  specification,  [citing]  example  (VOLTESSO  N36  Transformer  oil  has  zero  
PCBs),  [which]  meets  CSA  C  50-­‐‑1976  and  IEC  296  specification  for  all  type  II  oil”).  
According  to  him,  “this  Standard  is  religiously  followed.”  
By  the  responses  of  ECG  and  VRA,  Ghana  should  have  been  relatively  less  burdened  
with  PCBs  contamination,  which  unfortunately  is  not  the  case.    
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It  is  logical  to  conjecture  that  ECG  despite  their  administrative  directives  in  1972  
(ECG),  and  VRA’s  1995  decision  to  stop  buying  PCB-­‐‑tainted  transformers,  these  
companies  continued  to  do  so  unabated.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  identification  of  PCBs  
in  relatively  newer  equipment  as  in  manufacturing  year  2003  (Ghana  EPA,  2006),  and  
2005  (Buah–Kwofie  et  al,  2011).  The  Ghana  Energy  Commission  affirmed  that  the  PCBs  
ban  in  the  U.S.  did  not  have  any  influence  on  how  Ghana  imported  transformers  in  the  
1980s  “because  there  is  no  specific  law  or  regulation  with  regard  to  PCBs  issues  [in]  
Ghana”.  It  is  indeed  this  non-­‐‑existent  policy  on  PCBs  in  Ghana  that  the  electricity  
companies  in  Ghana  exploited  to  willfully  neglect  the  environment  and  human  health  
for  such  an  extended  period.    
Public	  Exposure	  to	  Harm	  and	  the	  Art	  of	  State	  Corporate	  Silence	  
It  is  a  scientifically  proven  fact  that  when  PCBs  burn  they  produce  
polychlorinated  dibenzodioxin  (dioxins),  and  polychlorinated  dibenzofurans  (furans),  
which  have  been  identified  to  be  more  toxic  than  unburned  PCBs  (EPA,  2012;  McKay,  
2002;  Rappe,  1984).  Literatures  on  PCBs  have  shown  that  major  quantities  of  PCBs  
reached  the  environment  through  improper  disposal  and  transformer  fires  (Fiedler  et  al,  
1994).  Respondents  from  the  selected  communities  for  this  research  pointed  out  that  
they  have  witnessed  electric  transformers  catching  fire  in  their  communities.    
Corroboratively,  ECG  and  VRA  have  all  indicated  (in  this  research)  that  there  have  been  
cases  of  their  transformers  catching  fire.  A  recent  transformer  explosion,  which  occurred  
at  an  ECG  substation  in  Achimota,  Accra  on  May  14  2014,  clearly  indicates  the  dangers  
the  public  face  (Dartey,  2014).  In  the  event  these  transformers  contain  PCBs,  furans  and  
Dioxins  which  are  considered  dangerous  by-­‐‑products  of  burnt  PCBs  (also  pointed  out  
by  Panayiotis  Manolopoulos  of  Polyeco  Waste  Management,  during  interview)  will  be  
released;  thus  exposing  the  general  public  and  the  environment  to  extreme  toxic  harm.    
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Figure  10  Public  awareness  of  PCBs    
  
  
Figure  11  Public  exposures  to  PCBs  	  
Bempah  et  al.  (2012),  as  well  as  the  Ghana  EPA  2006  report  have  all  noted  that  
transformers  were  located  in  sensitive  places  like  schools,  markets,  hospitals  etc.,  which  
expose  vulnerable  people  to  potential  PCBs  harm.  My  fieldwork  corroborated  this  
assertion  as  some  few  transformer  sites  I  visited  in  Ashaiman  had  people  sitting  next  to  
installed  equipment  to  sell  food  in  the  open  space.  In  fact,  this  is  a  normal  practice  that  is  
never  questioned  by  anyone,  not  even  the  owners  of  the  equipment  (ECG  in  this  case).  
Equally,  community  respondents  indicated  they  had  children  who  played  around  
electric  transformers,  and  believed  they  might  be  exposed  to  the  risk  of  PCBs.  This  
indeed  is  the  case  considering  the  ubiquity  of  PCBs  in  Ghana.    
In  response  to  the  question  on  how  ECG  and  VRA  store  their  old  transformer  oil  
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them,  while  VRA  stated  that  it  “stored  [them]  in  dirty  oil  tanks  and  dispose  of  them  
through  drums  which  were  forwarded  to  [its]  procurement  department”.  Interestingly,  
ECG  has  claimed  in  this  research  that  it  sells  off  its  old  transformers  as  scrap  to  scrap-­‐‑
dealers.  This  directly  opens  up  a  case  of  deliberate  intent  to  harm.  Scrap  dealers  in  
Ghana  may  not  be  properly  equipped  to  handle  PCBs  tainted  old  transformers  sold  to  
them  by  ECG.  The  mishandling  of  PCBs  tainted  transformers  by  scrap  dealers  
potentially  transfers  harm  to  society.  Panayiotis  Manolopoulos,  Project  Manager  of  
Polyeco  based  in  Greece  was  in  Ghana  to  assist  in  the  shipment  of  stock  piled  of  old  
PCB-­‐‑laden  transformers  and  pure  PCBs  capacitors  for  high  temperature  incineration.  
Manolopoulos  explained  to  me  that  equipment  containing  PCBs  demand  skilled  
handling  to  avoid  potential  harm  to  self  and  the  environment.  It  is  for  that  reason  that  
old  transformers  need  to  be  exported  for  incineration  in  countries  with  the  capacity  to  
do  so,  he  stressed.  
The  UNDP  have  pointed  out  that  it  was  going  to  cost  the  electricity  companies  in  
Ghana  from  US$3-­‐‑15million  to  replace  PCBs  tainted  transformers  and  disposal  (UNDP  
Report,  2008).  The  large  population  of  low-­‐‑income  clients,  however,  makes  it  difficult  for  
the  electricity  companies  to  transfer  additional  cost  to  citizens  (ibid).  For  this  reason  it  
makes  business  sense  for  ECG  and  VRA  to  remain  silent  about  what  they  know  about  
PCBs  (ibid).  According  to  the  Ghana  Energy  Commission  and  EPA,  the  government  of  
Ghana  was  equally  aware  of  PCBs  for  a  long  time.  John  Pwamang  stated  in  the  
administered  questionnaire  that  Ghana  became  aware  of  PCBs  in  electric  transformers  
through  a  collaborative  work  with  the  government  of  Canada  in  the  1980s.    
Socioeconomically,  almost  all  governments  in  Ghana  have  considered  electricity  access  a  
high  priority  on  the  governmental  agenda  (Kemausuor  et  al,  2012).  This  directly  
underscores  the  core  relationship  that  traditionally  exists  between  state  and  corporation  
for  socioeconomic  reasons,  while  relegating  environmental  and  human  health  
consequences.  Carson  point  out  that  this  “intimately  entwined”  relationship  makes  
governments  “subservient  to  corporate  capital”  and  at  the  same  time  empowers  the  
relationship  to  present  a  “united  front  that  [makes  it]  difficult  for  citizens  to  
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confront”(2009,  p.1636;  similar  position  by  Tabb,  2001).  This  at  once  promotes  
unchecked  environmental  injustice  while  it  simultaneously  creates  the  condition  for  the  
defiance  of  national  constitution19.    
ECG  and  VRA  defensively  posit  that  proactive  measures  were  taken  to  stop  the  
importation  of  PCBs  tainted  transformers  even  far  before  the  ban  in  the  U.S.  in  1979,  as  
in  the  case  of  ECG;  and  before  the  Stockholm  Convention  on  POPs  in  2004,  as  in  the  case  
of  VRA.  Yet  research  has  established  that  employees  of  VRA  and  ECG  were  uninformed  
about  the  harmful  effects  of  PCBs  for  a  long  time  (Bempah  et  al,  2012).  Also  ECG  and  
VRA  had  no  available  records  on  the  maintenance  of  transformers  identified  as  PCBs  
contaminated  (ibid).  The  absence  of  records  of  transformer  maintenance  regime  and  
records  of  certificates  indicating  that  imported  transformers  did  not  have  PCBs  is  
disturbingly  evident  of  willful  burdening  of  the  environment  with  PCBs.  The  cases  of  
ECG  and  VRA  staffs  illegally  selling  transformer  oil  to  entrepreneurs  for  making  
pomade  for  women,  and  selling  them  as  edible  oil  by  recalcitrant  citizens  grossly  depicts  
the  level  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  electricity  companies  as  well  as  the  government  
to  act.  While  the  U.S.  case  showed  waste  haulers  sold  PCBs  containing  oils  as  “fuels  in  
low  temperature  boilers”  (Hesse,  1976),  the  example  in  Ghana  is  a  sad  one  that  at  once  
paints  a  picture  of  poverty,  ignorance  and  neglect  by  policy  makers.    
Whether  the  electricity  companies  and  government  were  aware  of  this  or  not,  their  long-­‐‑
standing  silence  depicts  a  case  of  willful  social  and  environmental  negligence.  
Corporate	  Strategy	  to	  Conceal	  Harm:	  Internalized	  Environmental	  Injustice	  Paradigm	  	  
Monsanto  upon  realizing  the  widely  publicized  toxicity  of  PCBs  in  late  1960s  and  
early  1970s  began  taking  steps  by  transferring  risk  to  its  direct  customers  who  were  
made  responsible  for  warning  their  customers  of  the  risk  of  PCBs  exposure  (Francis,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Excerpt  of  the  1992  constitution  of  Ghana  relating  to  the  environment:  Article  36  (9);  The  State  shall  take  
appropriate  measures  needed  to  protect  and  safeguard  the  national  environment  for  posterity;  and  shall  
seek  co-­‐‑operation  with  other  states  and  bodies  for  the  purposes  of  protecting  the  wider  international  
environment  for  mankind;  Article  36  (10):  The  State  shall  safeguard  the  health,  safety  and  welfare  of  all  
persons  in  employment,  and  shall  establish  the  basis  for  the  full  deployment  of  the  creative  potential  of  all  
Ghanaians;  
Article  41  (k):  The  exercise  and  enjoyment  of  rights  and  freedoms  is  inseparable  from  the  performance  of  
duties  and  obligations,  and  accordingly,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  citizen  to  Protect  and  safeguard  the  
environment.  
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1994).  In  a  legal  transcript  between  Owens  v.  Monsanto,  posted  on  the  website  of  
Chemical  Industry  Archives,  Monsanto  reportedly  said;  "ʺ…the  truth  is  that  in  1966  when  
we  found  out  that  PCBs  were  in  the  environment,  we  started  an  investigation  journey  
and  we  tried  to  gather  information  and  we  acted  responsibly.”20  Another  transcript  
reads;  "ʺWhen  Monsanto  learned  that  PCBs  could  possibly  be  in  the  environment,  it  acted  
promptly  and  responsibly  and  continues  to  do  so.”21  
Interestingly,  court  evidence  showed  that  Monsanto  knew  of  PCBs  toxicity  far  
before  Soren  Jansen’s  scientific  finding  in  1966  (Chemical  Industry  Archives,  2009).  In  
the  case  of  Owens  v.  Monsanto,  Plaintiff  Exhibit  No.561,  a  Monsanto  internal  memo  
between  Elmer  P.  Wheeler  and  Don  Otoo,  dated  August  6  1971,  in  which  Wheeler  wrote  
to  Don;  "ʺI  can  say  that  we  have  probably  the  world'ʹs  best  reference  file  on  the  PCB  
situation.  This  includes  reprints  from  the  literature  beginning  in  1936  to  reports  issued  
last  week.”22  The  Monsanto  approach  of  protecting  the  interest  of  the  corporation  is  no  
different  from  what  the  electricity  companies  in  Ghana  have  pursued.    
Even  though  ECG  and  VRA  had  information  about  PCBs  toxicity,  it  did  not  take  
any  proactive  measure  to  educate  its  employees  or  the  general  public  about  the  effects  of  
exposure  until  the  NIP  project  came  in.  As  Pwamang  clearly  puts  it,  “people  and  
institutions  don’t  really  care…”  This  is  actually  the  case  in  Ghana.  In  fact,  the  case  of  
ECG’s  administrative  directive  in  1972  to  stop  the  purchase  of  PCB-­‐‑tainted  transformers  
was  constructively  perched  on  a  well-­‐‑established  public  relations  strategy  adopted  by  
corporations  (as  seen  in  the  case  of  Monsanto).  This  strategy  eliminates  public  fear  and  
builds  “false”  confidence  and  trust  that  the  corporation  is  acting  to  remedy  the  situation,  
when  in  reality  it  is  not  doing  so.    
The  year  1972  was  when  environmental  issues  became  internationalized  through  
the  Stockholm  Conference  on  Human  Environment  and  Development  in  Sweden.  Prior  
to  this  period,  most  countries  did  not  even  have  governmental  ministries  specifically  
responsible  for  the  environment.  The  U.S.  for  instance  had  just  instituted  the  National  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Trial  Transcript,  Owens  v.  Monsanto  CV-­‐‑96-­‐‑J-­‐‑440-­‐‑E,  (N.D.  Alabama  April  4,  2001),  p.  454,  line  6	  21	  Trial  Transcript,  Owens  v.  Monsanto  CV-­‐‑96-­‐‑J-­‐‑440-­‐‑E,  (N.D.  Alabama  April  4,  2001),  p.  455,  line  14  22	  Court  Exhibit  No.  561:  Monsanto  Internal  Memo,  1971	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Environmental  Policy  Act  (NEPA)  of  1969,  which  was  enacted  in  1970.  It  is  also  
important  to  point  out  that  it  was  around  this  same  period  that  the  Environmental  
Protection  Agency  (EPA)  was  established  in  December  1970  by  the  Nixon  
administration.  As  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  chapter,  Ghana  did  not  even  have  any  
governing  framework  that  guided  environmental  issues  such  as  the  release  of  toxic  
substance  like  PCBs  into  the  environment.  The  U.S.  was  even  grappling  with  how  to  
regulate  their  industrial  toxic  release  including  PCBs  specifically.  Looking  through  PCBs  
historical  archives  in  the  early  1970s  we  see  the  environmental  (in)justice  frame  
emerging,  which  challenged  the  very  powerful  polluting  industries  like  Monsanto.  
Because  of  public  outcry  and  high  evidence  of  PCBs  contamination  around  its  Anniston  
plant,  Monsanto  closed  the  plant  in  1971  as  a  way  of  silencing  its  critics  (especially  the  
media),  and  covering  up  for  vast  harm  done  to  the  community.  Ironically,  while  
Monsanto  was  going  through  these  challenges  with  the  public  for  environmental  quality  
and  human  safety,  its  key  customers,  General  Electric  and  Westinghouse,  were  also  
vigorously  trumpeting  that  PCBs  were  safe  to  use.    
Scientific  literatures  on  PCBs  toxicity  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s  were  also  
widely  discussed  in  international  media.  From  these  occurrences,  I  conjecture  that  most  
of  the  nations  that  were  buying  electric  products  such  as  transformers  and  capacitors  
from  General  Electric,  Westinghouse  etc.,  were  informed  of  PCBs  toxicity  and  the  need  
to  take  administrative  measures  to  reduce  risk  to  public  in  order  to  avoid  potential  legal  
implications.  If  this  hypothesis  is  the  case,  then  it  gives  credence  to  why  ECG  had  to  take  
an  administrative  directive  to  “stop  the  purchase  of  PCBs  tainted  transformers”.  The  
polemic  approach  by  ECG  also  fits  into  this  position.  The  environmental  injustice  that  
emerges  out  of  this  is  the  passivity  of  ECG  not  to  act  on  its  administrative  decision.  This  
can  be  attributed  to  its  closely-­‐‑knit  relationship  with  the  government  in  pursuit  of  
socioeconomic  agendas  rather  than  environmental  quality  and  human  safety.    
Distributing	  harm	  through	  policy:	  Externalized	  Environmental	  Injustice	  Paradigm	  
The  PCBs  ban  policy  under  the  TSCA  bill  in  the  U.S.  permitted  the  import  and  
export  of  PCBs  waste  through  an  open-­‐‑border  policy  (National  Service  Center  for  
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Environmental  Publications,  1980).  The  PCBs  ban  policy  also  permitted  PCBs  usage  in  
totally  enclosed  equipment  such  as  transformers.    The  open-­‐‑border  policy  and  the  totally  
enclosed  permit  directly  gave  the  U.S.  government  and  its  corporate  enterprises  the  
leeway  to  detoxify  their  natural  environment  by  transferring  PCBs  burden  of  harm  to  
other  nations.  This  allowed  transformers  that  were  manufactured  before  the  ban  to  be  
shipped  to  other  parts  of  the  world  with  ease.    
     The  period  of  the  PCBs  ban  in  1979  was  a  period  when  most  developing  nations  
were  vigorously  pulling  out  of  colonialism,  and  many  more  nations  were  experiencing  
corrupt  military  regimes  after  their  independence  from  colonial  rule.  As  already  pointed  
out,  Ghana  experienced  a  couple  of  coup  d’etats  around  this  period.  The  complex  
mixture  of  poverty  and  poor  governance,  and  the  quest  for  industrialization  through  
electrification  projects  created  a  perfect  atmosphere  for  an  era  of  what  I  called  
‘legitimately  concealed  transfer  of  harm.’  With  the  stringent  PCBs  ban  Policy  under  the  
TSCA  bill  in  force  in  1979,  corporations  in  the  U.S.  began  looking  for  markets  for  their  
stockpile  in  developing  countries.  Because  many  more  developed  nations  around  this  
period  had  instituted  stringent  policy  to  check  PCBs,  exporting  PCBs  tainted  equipment  
to  these  nations  was  more  costly  and  unattractive  considering  the  time  consuming  
bureaucratic  process  involved.  The  trading  relationship  that  emerged  between  
corporations  in  the  developed  nations  and  government  and  their  parastatals  in  the  
developing  nations  indirectly  shifted  harm  to  the  developing  nations.    
In  the  case  of  Ghana,  the  construction  of  the  Akosombo  hydroelectric  dam  fostered  a  
strong  relationship  between  Ghana  and  the  U.S.  This  relationship  served  as  a  bridge  for  
bilateral  business  relationships,  which  again  created  the  conduit  for  exploitation,  as  in  
the  case  of  VALCO.  Noticeably,  when  Ghana  first  initiated  its  rural  electrification  project  
in  1970,  the  project  could  not  achieve  any  substantial  success,  with  a  poor  national  access  
rate  of  just  15%.  However,  in  the  mid-­‐‑1980s  VRA  was  able  to  connect  all  three  northern  
regions  to  the  national  grid.  By  2010  the  national  access  rate  had  jumped  to  72%,  by  far  
one  of  the  most  enviable  achievements  in  the  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  region.  Even  though  this  feat  
is  remarkable,  it  is  important  to  pause  and  define  the  underlying  factors  to  the  cause  of  
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the  relapse  up  until  1970  (15%  access);  and  the  significant  progress  from  1985  to  2010  
(72%).  I  hypothesize  that  the  strong  relationship  between  the  U.S.  and  Ghana  as  a  result  
of  the  Akosombo  dam  deal  and  VALCO,  positioned  Ghana  to  be  a  dumping  ground  for  
the  U.S.  products,  particularly  electrical  equipment  that  were  branded  as  development  
inputs  during  the  1980s.  It  is  possible  PCBs  tainted  transformers  were  priced  down  to  
make  them  affordable  for  Ghana  and  other  developing  nations  to  purchase,  particularly  
after  the  ban  in  1979.  I  surmise  that  the  expansive  electrification  project,  which  took  root  
in  the  mid-­‐‑1980s,  was  a  direct  by-­‐‑product  of  the  PCBs  ban  policy  in  the  U.S.  This  
transferred  PCBs  toxic  burden  that  the  U.S.  citizens  protested  against  to  developing  
nations  in  the  guise  of  international  marketization.  In  essence,  the  policy  created  a  
geographically  stretched  environmental  injustice  by  concentrating  benefits  to  the  U.S.  
environment,  and  distributing  harm  to  poor  and  vulnerable  nations  in  the  name  of  
trade.  I  surmise  that  the  environmental  injustice  that  emerged  out  of  this  process  is  
pitched  on  exploitation.  A  process  that  continues  to  widen  the  chasm  of  social,  
economic,  and  environmental  quality  between  developed  nations  like  the  U.S.  and  
developing  nations  like  Ghana.  
Internationalism:	  Role-­‐playing	  in	  Environmental	  (In)Justice	  in	  Ghana	  
PCBs  have  been  found  to  travel  long  range  crossing  oceans  apart.  Research  has  
shown  that,  PCBs  have  been  detected  in  places  far  from  where  they  were  manufactured  
or  have  been  heavily  exposed  (Breivik  et  al,  2002,  Larsson,  1984).  This  implies,  by  
eliminating  PCBs  in  Ghana  through  the  NIP  project,  Ghana  indirectly  works  towards  the  
elimination  of  PCBs  in  other  countries.  For  this  reason,  it  is  worth  the  investment  by  
international  conventions,  organizations  and  their  supporting  developed  nations  like  the  
U.S.  to  assist  in  projects  that  aim  to  eliminate  PCBs  in  places  that  have  been  identified  as  
hotspots.  
In  my  interview  with  Peter  Dery,  the  National  Coordinator,  Clean  Development  
Mechanism  (CDM),  of  MESTI,  he  pointed  out  that  in  many  cases  African  leaders  
(emphasis  on  Ghana)  sign  on  to  many  international  conventions,  which  does  not  
necessarily  merit  the  nation’s  immediate  environmental  concerns  but  only  helps  to  
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resolve  the  environmental  concerns  of  other  nations.  Hens  and  Boon  have  similarly  
stated  that  “[f]or  many  years  Ghana  has  been  a  very  reliable  partner  in  international  
conventions”  (1999).  In  fact  Hens  and  Boon  pointed  out  that  “prior  to  the  Stockholm  
Conference,  [Ghana]  had  participated  in  sign[ing]  at  least  15  international  conventions  
and  treaties  on  environmental  issues”  alone  (1999,  p.  27).  While  not  downplaying  the  
NIP  project  to  eliminate  PCBs,  Dery  mentioned  e-­‐‑waste  dumping  (some  of  which  
contain  PCBs  in  small  quantities)  as  one  of  the  pressing  local  environmental  concerns  in  
Ghana,  which  should  receive  equivalent  international  attention  as  PCBs.    
According  to  Pwamang,  during  a  stakeholder’s  meeting  to  develop  a  draft  policy  
for  e-­‐‑waste  in  Ghana  for  instance,  international  actors  such  as  Hewlett  Packard  and  Dell  
Computers,  and  other  giant  electronic  companies  that  were  present,  pushed  for  “Ghana  
to  continue  being  a  dumping  ground.”  While  the  position  of  these  international  actors  
calls  for  resistance  from  local  actors,  Pwamang  points  to  the  passivity  of  local  
institutions  to  act  against  such  proposition  of  dumping  e-­‐‑waste  in  Ghana.  The  lukewarm  
attitude  portrayed  by  government  institutions  in  stopping  international  actors  from  
dumping  their  waste  in  Ghana  introduces  a  hegemonic  order  of  neo-­‐‑colonization  within  
the  framework  of  globalization  and  market  liberalization.  This  kind  of  hegemony  
compels  weaker  nations  to  consistently  respond  to  the  demands  of  stronger  nations,  
thereby  provoking  the  dependency  theory  with  its  remnants  of  injustices  (social,  
economic,  and  environmental).  
Current	  Control	  Mechanisms	  and	  Challenges	  
On  how  PCBs  can  be  controlled  in  Ghana,  Ebo-­‐‑Amoah  (VRA)  and  Peter  Asigbee  
(ECG)  respectively  point  out  that  compliance  with  regulations,  and  sampling  of  
imported  transformers  by  CEPS  at  the  port  of  entries  through  the  use  of  newly  
purchased  PCB  analyzers  called  “L-­‐‑2000”  can  control  PCBs  in  Ghana.  These  
propositions  risk  being  ineffective  because  the  EPA  by  its  current  state  is  poorly  
resourced,  as  pointed  out  by  John  Pwamang  during  my  interview  with  him.  Read  
equally  pointed  this  out  that  the  EPA  has  a  little  over  150  staff  (2007).  What  delimits  the  
use  of  the  L-­‐‑2000  by  CEPS  at  the  port  of  entry  is  that,  it  removes  focus  on  the  myriads  of  
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transformers  already  imported  into  the  country  that  have  not  (may  never)  been  checked  
for  PCBs.  Wynne  argues  that  “even  between  rich,  technically  advanced  countries,  
customs  officials  have  neither  the  expertise,  time  nor  resources  to  check  even  a  small  
proportion  of  the  consignments  of  wastes,  or  wastes  recorded  as  goods  or  resources…”  
(1989,  p.  128).    
During  a  stakeholders  meeting  held  on  March  20,  2009  in  Accra,  on  
‘Strengthening  Chemical  Information  Exchange  Network  (CIEN)  in  Ghana,  the  EPA  
listed  twenty-­‐‑three  constraints  undermining  its  operations  (Ghana  EPA,  2009).  Some  of  
the  constraints  mentioned  were  “poor  enforcement  of  import  returns,  improper  labeling  
of  imports/products,  lack  of  facilities  for  quality  control  analysis  of  chemical/  
products…”(ibid).  All  of  these  provide  support  to  the  fact  that  checking  for  PCBs  with  
the  current  idea  of  a  PCB  analyzer  at  the  port  of  entry  may  not  effectively  solve  the  
problem  of  importing  PCBs  tainted  transformers.  More  subtly,  the  process  will  increase  
the  concealment  of  tainted  equipment  as  some  other  goods  to  avoid  regulatory  checks.  
Compliance  of  regulations  can  prove  effective;  however,  this  will  be  dependent  on  
institutional  reinforcement  and  unobstructed  powers  through  autonomous  operation.  
With  the  current  powers  vested  in  the  EPA,  it  lacks  the  autonomy  to  fully  and  effectively  
enforce  certain  environmental  laws,  as  it  rightly  states  poor  enforcement  regime  as  one  
of  the  constraints  to  its  operation.  For  these  reasons,  a  more  innovative  approach  is  
required  which  must  incorporate  the  public  and  other  civil  groups  with  the  ability  to  
influence  policy  and  its  enforcement  regime.    
The	  PCBs	  Policy	  Network	  in	  Ghana	  
Pwamang  directed  me  to  the  NIP  report  for  the  full  list  of  all  the  stakeholders  in  
the  PCBs  case  in  Ghana  (see  appendix  2,  or  the  Ghana  EPA  NIP  Report,  2007,  pp.36-­‐‑37).  
Out  of  over  forty  active  institutions  that  formed  the  policy  network,  eighteen  were  
directly  governmental,  which  included  the  ECG,  VRA,  Ghana  EPA,  CEPS,  and  MESTI.  
Eight  of  these  stakeholders  were  classified  as  academic  and  research  institutions,  which  
in  fact  are  all  governmental  in  nature.  Media  classification  comprised  the  Ghana  
Broadcasting  Corporation  (GBC)  and  “other  public  and  private  media”,  as  stated  in  the  
	   88	  
list.  Another  eight  were  regional  and  international  organizations,  which  include  The  
World  Bank,  UNIDO,  WHO,  UNEP  and  ECOWAS.  Representatives  from  these  
organizations  usually  have  direct  influence  over  the  policy  network  because  of  a  
traditional  recognition  of  them  by  local  actors  as  subject  matter  experts.  This  role  
critically  disables  the  ability  of  issue  networks  to  question  proceedings.  It  is  interesting  
to  note  that  in  the  list  of  non-­‐‑governmental  groups  (NGOs),  only  three  environmental  
groups  (Green  Earth,  Friends  of  the  Earth-­‐‑Ghana,  Green  Club  of  Ghana)  were  
mentioned.  The  Ghana  Chemical  Society  (GCS)  is  also  the  only  group  identified  as  a  
“public  interest  group”  in  the  list.  While  the  list  mentions  “Women  and  Children  
Activists”,  it  did  not  point  to  any  specific  group  or  organization.  The  list  mentions  the  
Petroleum  and  Chemicals  Workers  Union  of  the  Trade  Union  Congress  (TUC).  The  
remaining  actors  classified  as  NGOs  are  all  industry  associations,  such  as  Pesticide  
Industry  Associations  (PIA),  Association  of  Ghana  Industries  (AGI),  and  Ghana  National  
Association  of  Farmers  and  Fishermen  (GNAFF).  This  kind  of  policy  network  at  once  
points  to  a  swayed  dynamics  of  the  policy  process.  Evidently  there  is  no  power  balance  
since  there  are  largely  government  and  international  institutions  forming  the  network.  
The  only  institution  considered  as  representing  the  interest  of  the  public,  the  Ghana  
Chemical  Society  (GCS),  by  its  elitist  nature  (comprising  of  professorial  technocrats)  is  
passive  and  excessively  bureaucratic  in  operation.  As  a  former  national  editor-­‐‑in-­‐‑chief  of  
the  Ghana  Students’  Chemical  Society  (GSCS),  my  interactions  with  the  GCS  confirm  
these  characteristics.  While  the  three  environmental  groups  possess  some  social  powers  
to  mobilize  the  public,  they  are  handicapped  politically  to  change  the  dynamics  of  the  
policy  process.  Their  influence  is  better  felt  outside  the  policy  network  rather  than  inside  
due  to  their  weak  political  position.  Even  though  the  Trade  Union  Congress  (TUC)  is  
unquestionably  the  most  formidable  workers  organization  in  Ghana,  its  primary  interest  
has  been  economic  rather  than  environmental.  The  TUC  is  less  active  in  environmental  
policymaking  process  in  Ghana.  The  TUC  fight  for  workers  health  and  safety  concerns  
usually  occur  after  an  event  has  happen  and  there  is  significant  evidence  others  could  be  
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at  risk.  As  a  result  of  these  the  TUC  lacks  the  drive  to  effectively  influence  
environmental  policy.    
The  large  number  of  government  and  international  actors  overshadows  the  non-­‐‑
governmental  groups  and  thus  relegates  the  latter  as  mere  observing  participants.    This  
is  especially  so  when  these  international  actors  effectively  participate  as  experts  in  the  
policy  process.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  members  of  the  issue  network  (taken  to  be  
the  non-­‐‑governmental  organizations)  are  in  themselves  weak  from  different  angles  with  
divergent  interest.  This  also  makes  it  almost  impossible  for  them  to  mobilize  their  
respective  resources  to  gain  influence  in  the  policymaking  process.  It  is  this  weakness  of  
the  issue  network  that  legitimates  and  reinforces  the  traditional  relationship  between  
government  and  its  allies  to  make  policy,  which  have  mostly  failed  to  adequately  
address  specific  environmental  concerns  such  as  PCBs  in  Ghana.  
The	  Process	  towards	  the	  Drafting	  of	  the	  Policy	  to	  Regulate	  POPs	  (PCBs)	  
In  developing  the  Draft  Policy  as  a  “retool”  of  the  existing  environmental  policy  
in  Ghana,  the  authors  acknowledged  the  development  of  the  policy  through  a  
participatory  process  involving  all  stakeholders  including  ‘civil  society’.  
According  to  Pwamang,  the  foundational  policy  frameworks  used  to  develop  the  Draft  
Policy  were  those  prescribed  by  the  Stockholm  Convention,  the  Rotterdam  Convention,  
the  Basel  Convention,  and  the  Oslo-­‐‑Paris  Accord.  Because  Ghana  is  a  signatory  to  all  
these  conventions,  beside  the  Oslo-­‐‑Paris  Accord,  it  is  obligated  under  the  principle  of  
pacta  sunt  servanda,  to  abide  by  the  conventions  to  ensure  the  core  objectives  of  these  
conventions  are  achieved  domestically.    
Despite  the  fact  that  the  Draft  Policy  promises  to  be  the  legal  framework  to  manage  
PCBs  and  other  POPs  in  Ghana,  it  is  still  not  enforceable  because  it  has  not  yet  been  
accepted  by  parliament.  Pwamang  pointed  out  that  even  the  “parliament  wants  to  be  
paid  to  enact  laws.”  According  to  Pwamang,  whereas  it  is  the  normal  way  to  have  a  
policy  on  an  issue  before  the  law,  the  converse  is  true  in  the  case  of  Ghana.  This  
revelation  point  to  the  fact  that  environmental  policies  do  not  necessarily  matter  a  lot  to  
the  government  as  far  as  it  can  easily  pass  laws  it  finds  fitting  for  any  environmental  
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situation  at  any  material  need  or  emergency.  Whereas  environmental  policies  linger  on  
the  governmental  backburner,  socioeconomic  policies  consistently  receive  prompt  
government  attention.  In  the  case  of  the  national  electrification  project  for  instance,  
“political  will”  on  the  part  of  government  was  pointed  out  as  a  factor  to  its  success  
(Barfour,  2013).  On  the  other  hand,  the  EPA  state  “lack  of  political  commitment  and  
backing”  as  one  of  the  hindrances  to  its  operational  effectiveness  (CIEN  Report:  Ghana  
EPA,  2009,  p.  6).  
As  the  lead  author  of  the  Draft  Policy,  Pwamang  outlined  what  I  term  the  
‘bureaucratic’  policy  process  that  the  document  had  to  undergo  to  become  a  legal  
instrument  in  Ghana.  He  pointed  out  to  me  that  as  a  starting  point,  a  technical  team  
from  the  policy  network  developed  a  framework  by  drawing  from  conventions.  The  
team  also  utilized  pockets  of  institutional  frameworks  in  the  country,  which  provided  
some  basis  for  the  management  of  POPs,  and  also  materials  from  UNITAR’s  Chemical  
and  Waste  Management  Program.  After  the  development  of  the  framework  with  all  the  
required  information  and  recommendations,  a  sub-­‐‑committee  is  instituted  to  work  on  
the  framework  to  develop  a  Draft  Policy.  The  Draft  Policy  is  first  submitted  to  the  
Attorney  General’s  office  for  review,  changes  and  recommendations.  From  the  Attorney  
General’s  office,  a  stakeholder’s  workshop  is  held  to  review  and  amend  the  draft  base  on  
the  attorney  general’s  recommendations.  The  Attorney  General’s  office  finally  approves  
the  Draft  Policy,  which  goes  to  Cabinet  for  adoption.  The  Draft  Policy  then  goes  to  
parliament  for  deliberation,  where  it  is  eventually  passed  into  law  after  acceptance  by  
parliament23.  
Clearly,  the  dynamics  of  this  bureaucratic  policymaking  process  is  unfriendly  to  
public  participation.  The  only  time  the  public  is  privileged  to  see  into  the  process  is  
during  stakeholders’  workshops,  where  the  media  is  invited  to  cover  proceeding  for  
news  headlines.  This  is  what  Rowe  and  Frewer  (2005)  describes  as  “public  
communication.”  The  process  whereby  information  flow  is  “one-­‐‑way”  and  public  
opinion  is  not  necessarily  required  as  a  feedback,  making  the  public  “passive  recipients  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  As  at  the  time  of  conducting  this  research  in  February  2014,  the  Draft  Policy  was  still  awaiting  parliament  
review  and  acceptance,  even  though  Cabinet  adopted  it  in  May  2013.    
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of  information  from  regulators  or  governing  bodies”  (ibid).  As  pointed  out  by  Mostert,  
“the  lowest  level  of  [public  engagement]  is  information  supply”  (2003,  p.  182).  Similarly  
Fishkin  argues  that  passive  citizenry  are  conducive  channels  through  which  the  public  is  
manipulated  by  policy  proponents,  through  “misinformation”  or  the  consideration  of  
superficial  aspects  of  an  issue  (2009).    According  to  Fishkin,  in  such  a  process  it  is  
evident  large  group  of  the  public  will  be  uninformed  about  the  policy  process  leading  to  
poor  opinion  about  specific  policy  issues  (ibid).  This  can  be  clearly  pointed  out  in  the  
Ghana  case,  where  even  the  few  civil  and  non-­‐‑governmental  organizations  that  are  
allowed  to  participate  in  the  process  are  cherry  picked  thereby  weakening  their  strength  
to  stage  an  effective  presence  in  the  policy  process.  Their  selective  inclusion  by  
government  is  to  ensure  the  policy  network  is  not  destabilized.  A  process  that  fosters  
uninformed  passive  issue  networks  and  discourages  effective  public  participation  in  the  
policymaking  process.  
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Reviewing	  the	  Policy	  Process	  in	  Ghana	  
The  environmental  policy  networks  and  drivers  in  Ghana,  like  in  many  others  
developing  nations,  have  narrow  views  and  most  times  deeply  entrenched  monopolized  
interest  groups.  This  is  because  the  policy  networks  are  predominantly  fraught  with  
government  institutions,  international  organizations,  and  often  times,  ‘government  
funded’  non-­‐‑governmental  organizations  (NGOs).  These  institutions  in  many  cases  have  
equal  political  powers,  and  depending  on  the  policy  agenda,  they  build  effective  alliance  
through  consensus  or  wield  their  political  powers  in  situations  that  impact  their  
operational  or  resource  base.  As  R.A.W  Rhodes  relates,  “behavior  in  [the]  policy  
networks  is  game-­‐‑like…”  (2006).  The  manifestation  of  higher  political  powers  
controlling  the  policy  process  undermines  the  policy  outcomes.  Hens  and  Boon  who  
have  done  substantial  policy  evaluation  work  in  Ghana  have  pointed  out  that  “the  main  
drivers  of  environmental  policy  in  [Ghana]  are  the  government,  international  
organizations,  and  non-­‐‑governmental  organizations  (NGOs)”  (1999,  p.  21).  Interestingly,  
these  actors  formulate  policies  to  affect  the  public,  yet  the  public  have  always  either  
directly  or  indirectly  been  cut  off  from  the  policy  network.      
In  my  interview  with  Pwamang,  he  pointed  to  the  issue  of  vested  interest  by  
policy  actors  interfering  with  policy  goals.  Pwamang  asserts  this  creates  delays  and  
short-­‐‑circuits  the  true  purpose  of  policy  agenda.  The  marginalization  of  the  public  in  the  
policy  process  invariably  contributes  to  policy  failure.  This  is  because  those  who  are  
affected  by  the  policy  may  not  value  the  potency  of  the  policy  to  effect  a  change,  
especially  when  the  incentives  of  doing  so  are  not  rewarding  in  anyway  or  there  is  no  
clarity  in  the  policy.    
The  presence  of  transnational  actors  in  the  NIP  project  meant  the  electricity  
companies  have  little  choice  but  to  support  the  project.  This  is  especially  so  because  of  
the  international  dimension  of  the  project  and  the  potential  implication  to  the  image  of  
the  nation  as  a  signatory  to  the  Stockholm  Convention.    It  is  interesting  to  know  that  
ECG,  VRA  and  GRIDCO  together  “contributed  about  $1.6  million  in  kind  towards  the  
success  of  the  PCB  [elimination]  project”  (Obour,  2013).  
	   94	  
Whereas  these  industrial  giants  possess  the  financial  wherewithal  and  political  powers  
to  influence  policy  decisions,  these  assets  are  used  to  relegate  and/or  repress  potential  
peripheral  actors  like  environmental  groups  and  the  public  from  the  policy  network.  For  
instance,  because  the  electricity  companies  financially  contributed  to  support  the  NIP  
project,  that  gesture  is  used  as  a  tool  to  manipulate  political  powers  and  authorities  in  
influencing  policy  formulations.  This  indirectly  reduces  the  influence  of  issue  groups  to  
effectively  change  the  dynamics  of  the  policy  network.  The  power  dynamics  that  
underpin  this  process  shifts  policy  benefits  to  the  advantage  of  those  with  the  resources  
and  political  power.  Such  localized  industry  network  shifts  blame  to  neutrality  and  
creates  the  impression  that  causation  is  “natural”  rather  than  a  willful  or  systematic  
failure  to  act.  The  money  donated  to  the  project  could  have  been  used  for  training  staff  
or  educating  the  public  far  earlier  before  the  NIP  project  was  initiated.  This  could  have  
been  credited  as  environmental  and  social  responsiveness  of  the  electricity  companies.  
Indeed,  acts  of  magnanimity  exhibited  by  corporations  after  causality  of  harm  is  
established  and  room  for  escaping  responsibility  is  closed  exposes  hypocrisy  within  the  
policy  network.    
With  the  clear  absence  of  the  public  in  the  policy  process  and  stable  passive  issue  
networks  within  the  Ghanaian  environmental  policy  network,  I  surmise  that  the  policy  
network  in  Ghana  is  not  well  formed  to  accommodate  issues  of  environmental  justice,  
hence  providing  grounds  for  failure.  The  policy  network  is  bureaucratically  clouded  
with  what  R.A.W  Rhodes  (2006)  refers  to  as  “monopolistic”  policy  community,  which  
promotes  policy  failure  when  substantive  issues  are  relegated  to  the  backburner  to  make  
way  for  vested  interest  of  actors.  The  current  Draft  Policy,  which  is  yet  to  be  reviewed  
by  parliament,  thrives  on  traditional  consensus  developed  by  an  already  established  
policy  community,  who  are  all  nearly  governmental  actors  in  nature.    
From  my  fieldwork  findings,  it  is  evident  that  Ghanaians  want  to  be  given  the  
opportunity  to  be  part  of  the  policy  process  to  contribute  their  quota  to  the  development  
of  environmental  policies  that  affects  their  lives.  Opening  the  policy  network  to  include  
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the  public  has  the  potential  of  strengthening  the  process  with  innovative  ideas,  and  
offering  a  more  democratic  regime  of  policy  development.    
Making	  Public	  participation	  Count	  in	  the	  Policy	  Network	  
My  fieldwork  community  survey  showed  that  the  public  believe  in  their  ability  
to  add  value  to  the  environmental  decision  making  processes  that  affect  them.  As  a  
result,  they  seek  to  be  part  of  the  policy  network.  There  is  clear  indication  from  the  
survey  that  the  public  have  lost  faith  in  the  government  when  it  comes  to  its  ability  to  
make  stringent  environmental  laws  and  enforce  them.  It  is  this  lack  of  faith  in  the  
government  that  calls  for  public  participation.    
  
Figure  13  Public  responses  on  policy  and  participation  
While  it  is  important  to  seek  the  views  of  the  public  through  public  participation  in  the  
policy  process,  it  is  equally  important  to  acknowledge  the  challenges  that  the  
bureaucratic  nature  of  the  policy  process  will  present.  It  is  this  bureaucratic  process  that  
has  led  to  an  explicitly  passive  society,  but  inherently  active  and  passionate  citizens  who  
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Whereas  governments  and  their  parastatal  institutions  have  in  most  cases  
succeeded  in  keeping  vital  information  from  the  public  and  preventing  the  public  from  
actively  participating  in  matters  that  affect  their  lives  through  the  policy  process,  
Blumler  et  al.  ask  the  following  questions:  “whose  failure  is  it?  Are  the  citizens  at  fault  
for  being  uninterested,  lazy,  stupid  or  negligent  in  the  pursuit  of  their  citizenship  duty  
to  be  politically  informed  (1995,  p.  4)?”  To  answer  these  questions,  they  point  to  the  root  
of  the  crisis  as  “systemic”-­‐‑  that  is,  “inher[ent]  in  the  very  structures  and  functioning  of  
present-­‐‑day  political  communication  systems”  (ibid).  
Even  though  it  lacked  adequate  enforcement  mechanisms,  The  Aarhus  Convention  On  
Access  To  Information,  Public  Participation  In  Decision-­‐‑Making  and  Access  To  Justice  In  
Environmental  Matters  recognizes  the  importance  of  giving  citizens  the  right  to  
participate  in  environmental  decisions  that  affect  their  health,  wellbeing  and  their  
environment  (UNECE,  2013).  To  this  end,  it  is  equally  worth  pointing  to  the  principle10  
of  the  1992  United  Nations  Rio  Declaration  on  Environment  and  Development,  which  
states;    
  
  Environmental  issues  are  best  handled  with  the  participation  of  all  concerned  
citizens,  at  the  relevant  level.  At  the  national  level,  each  individual  shall  have  
appropriate  access  to  information  concerning  the  environment  that  is  held  by  
public  authorities,  including  information  on  hazardous  materials  and  activities  in  
their  communities,  and  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  decision-­‐‑making  
processes.  States  shall  facilitate  and  encourage  public  awareness  and  
participation  by  making  information  widely  available.  Effective  access  to  judicial  
and  administrative  proceedings,  including  redress  and  remedy,  shall  be  
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CONCLUSION	  
Overview	  	  
This  Chapter  provides  a  summary  of  my  research  and  makes  recommendations  
that  I  deem  relevant  in  moving  towards  an  effective  environmental  policy  in  Ghana.  I  
first  of  all  point  to  the  issue  of  poverty  and  its  role  in  the  current  state  of  environmental  
injustice  and  policy  failure  in  Ghana.  Even  though  Ghana’s  poverty  rate  is  currently  
sitting  at  28.5%,  rural  poverty  rates  are  far  higher  than  the  national  rate.  I  point  to  the  
relevance  of  issue  networks  towards  achieving  successful  policy.  I  conclude  with  my  
recommendations,  which  becomes  part  of  my  small  contribution  to  the  broad  sea  of  
knowledge  in  the  environmental  policy  field.    
Towards	  an	  Effective	  Policymaking	  
In  contrast  to  Ghana,  the  U.S.  environmental  policy  network  is  well  formed  with  
active  issue  networks.  This  is  because  the  fundamental  needs  of  life  are  fairly  met,  hence  
mobilizing  for  environmental  quality  becomes  a  given.  Historically  governments  have  
worked  closely  with  corporations  in  the  policymaking  processes  to  promote  
socioeconomic  agendas.  For  instance,  in  the  U.S.  policymaking  process,  during  the  
difficult  economic  times  Congress  did  not  find  it  appropriate  to  deliberate  on  the  
recommendations  of  CEQ’s  TSCA  report.  Congress  feared  that  by  adhering  to  the  
recommendations  of  CEQ  to  pass  the  TSCA  bill,  it  would  be  worsening  the  already  bad  
economic  situation  the  nation  was  facing  at  the  time.  Despite  this  decision  taken  by  
Congress,  increased  public  pressure  however  forced  the  TSCA  bill  to  be  passed  leading  
to  the  eventual  PCBs  ban  in  1979.  The  effective  role  of  the  public  in  the  construction  of  
products  of  harm  by  industries,  and  reliable  legislative  apparatus,  served  as  the  bedrock  
upon  which  Congress  acted  to  pass  the  TSCA  bill.  Whereas  the  public,  environmental  
groups,  scientist  and  the  media  became  key  actors  in  bringing  to  the  fore  environmental  
issues  in  the  U.S.,  and  press  towards  the  passage  of  policies  that  ensured  environmental  
quality  and  human  health,  it  is  hard  to  point  out  that  stream  in  the  Ghanaian  
environmental  policy  narrative.  This  has  led  to  many  silent  years  of  environmental  
injustices.  A  situation  that  has  been  directly  promoted  by  government  and  corporate  
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silence  on  important  information  and  indirectly  by  the  passage  of  the  ban  on  PCBs  in  
1979  in  the  U.S.,  which  led  to  the  marketization  of  PCBs  tainted  transformers  to  
developing  nations.    There  is  therefore  the  need  for  solidarity  among  Ghanaian  scientist,  
media,  and  civil  organizations  such  as  environmental  groups  to  work  closely  together  in  
order  to  form  a  strong  knowledge  base  issue  network  that  can  challenge  and  break  
through  the  dominant  policy  network.        
I  surmised  that  the  environmental  policy  dynamics  between  the  U.S.  and  Ghana  
is  not  just  a  matter  of  policy  processes  and  outcomes.  I  am  of  the  view  that  
environmental  policy  effectively  progress  towards  success  when  basic  human  needs  are  
met.    
We  can  say  that  the  environmental  policy  process  leading  to  the  PCBs  ban  in  the  U.S.  
progressed  successfully  because  basic  necessities  of  life  are  consistently  met.  This  
provides  the  energy  for  the  society  to  problematize  environmental  needs  by  framing  
them  as  “justice”  issues.  In  his  consideration  to  this,  Clarence  Davis  reveals  that  
environmental  issues  receive  attention  in  the  U.S.  because  of  affluence  (1971).    In  a  recent  
rating  of  157  nations  for  population  living  below  the  poverty  line,  Ghana  came  78th  at  a  
rate  of  28.5  %(The  World  Bank,  2014).  Even  though  this  placed  the  nation  in  a  ‘lower  
middle-­‐‑income’  status,  the  situation  is  different  in  terms  of  regional  demography.  For  
instance,  rural  poverty  around  this  same  period  was  39.2%,  while  the  poverty  rate  in  the  
northern  regions  of  the  country  was  60%  (USAID,  2012).  Even  though  there  is  indication  
poverty  is  marginally  reduced  nationally,  the  situation  in  rural  and  the  northern  regions  
means  many  people  are  still  battling  with  survival  issues  and  would  give  little  attention  
to  environmental  injustices  that  are  meted  out  by  external  sources,  or  their  own  actions.  
This  can  be  seen  in  the  cases  of  people  selling  transformer  oil  as  edible  oil  and  for  
making  pomade  for  women  in  Ghana.  Clearly,  a  majority  of  the  citizens  of  Ghana  who  
live  below  the  poverty  line  will  continue  to  show  lukewarm  desire  to  address  
environmental  injustices,  until  their  basic  needs  are  met  adequately.  By  this  I  point  out  
that  poverty  is  blind  to  environmental  policy,  deaf  to  environmental  injustice,  and  
insensitive  to  environmental  consciousness.  It  is  this  proposition  that  calls  for  issue  
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networks  to  arise  and  represent  the  needs  and  interest  of  the  public.  The  absence  of  
active  issue  networks  is  a  boon  to  government  and  corporations  to  make  and  manipulate  
policy.  Stringency  of  environmental  laws  and  policy  can  only  be  effective  when  issue  
networks  become  consistently  active  and  can  frame  environmental  quality  as  an  
opportunity  or  “game  changer”  for  socioeconomic  prosperity,  or  actively  frame  
environmental  issues  as  justice  issues,  while  pressuring  governments  and  corporations  
to  act  responsively  and  responsibly  through  the  policy  networks  or  the  court  systems,  as  
in  the  case  of  the  U.S.  In  Ghana,  the  absence  of  strong  issue  networks  has  directly  
legitimated  environmental  decision-­‐‑making  by  government  and  its  allies;  thus,  the  
parastatals  and  international  bodies  that  finance  socioeconomic  projects  in  Ghana.  This  
underlies  the  subtlety  of  environmental  injustice  in  the  country.  The  knowledge  of  PCBs  
toxicity  by  both  government  and  the  electricity  companies  and  their  collective  silence  
about  it  by  itself  was  a  policy  formed  and  failed  at  once.  Dye  argues  that  “whatever  
government  chooses  to  do  or  not  to  do,”  thus  action  and  inaction  on  the  part  of  
government  constitutes  public  policy  (Dye,  1995,  p.4).  This  policy  failure  has  prevailed  
for  an  extended  period  because  the  policy  network  has  been  too  stable  due  to  the  
absence  of  issue  networks  to  contest  non-­‐‑existent  policy  on  substantive  environmental  
issues.    
By  the  generality  of  the  Environmental  Protection  Act  490  (1994),  instead  of  
specificity,  failure  is  built  into  the  Act.  The  Act  provides  enough  room  for  legal  and  
regulatory  exploitation,  leading  to  environmental  injustice  perpetuated  by  corporations,  
government  and  in  fact,  citizens  alike.  In  reemphasizing  Peter  Dery’s  point  on  Ghana  
signing  on  to  many  international  conventions  that  do  not  really  matter  to  the  country’s  
most  pressing  environmental  concerns,  it  is  important  that  governments  officials  
prioritize  environmental  issues  and  properly  align  them  to  the  international  conventions  
they  commit  to.  The  U.S.  for  instance  has  refused  to  ratify  the  Basel  Convention  because  
it  puts  its  national  economy  and  indeed  environmental  interest  first.  By  signing  on  to  the  
Basel  Convention,  the  U.S.  losses  the  opportunity  of  exporting  toxic  substance  to  poor  
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nations  like  Ghana.  Its  core  environmental  interest  of  flushing  its  territory  of  toxic  waste  
will  be  challenged  should  it  sign  to  such  convention.  As  a  result  it  decided  not  to.    
Finally,  I  point  to  the  leadership  of  Ghana  to  look  through  the  nation  with  the  
eyes  that  sees  into  the  future  of  generations  yet  unborn.  Good  policies  makes  good  
politics,  good  politics  builds  a  sustainable  nation.  It  is  the  policy  decisions  of  today  that  
will  define  the  future  polity  of  the  nation  with  the  ability  to  solve  socioeconomic  issues.    
To  this  end,  I  put  it  out  that  Ghana’s  environmental  policy  network  should  be  effectively  
integrative  from  the  most  powerful  to  the  least  powerful,  opening  up  substantive  
national  environmental  issues  in  a  manner  that  allows  for  the  permeation  of  innovative  
alternative  solutions  to  problems  from  diverse  avenues.  This  process  builds  
responsiveness  and  help  to  foster  an  active  environmental  policy  network  with  healthy  
public  participation,  which  can  prove  novel  within  the  policy  paradigms.  This  also  has  
the  potential  of  breaking  the  traditional  process  of  policy  bureaucratization  that  is  
visibly  characterized  in  the  Ghanaian  policy  process.  
Recommendations	  
• From  this  research  paper  it  can  be  shown  that  whereas  state-­‐‑corporate  
relationships  and  state-­‐‑society  relationships  can  be  easily  formed,  the  
relationships  between  corporation  and  society  are  weak  in  the  U.S.  case,  and  
virtually  absent  in  the  Ghana  case.  Understanding  corporation-­‐‑society  
relationships  especially  in  the  case  of  Ghana  can  potentially  give  a  better  
perspective  of  actor  behavior  within  the  policy  networks  in  Ghana.  I  recommend  
that  researchers  look  into  this  area  to  identify  how  this  relationship  can  lead  to  
environmental  justice.    
• The  U.S.  policy  process  is  effective  because  of  highly  effective  issue  networks  
within  the  policy  network.  Whereas  it  is  evident  the  Ghanaian  government  will  
be  hesitant  to  allow  active  issue  groups  into  the  policy  process,  there  are  
opportunities  for  technological  innovations:  
o Government  can  be  creative  by  using  technological  tools  such  as  the  
Internet  to  encourage  the  public  to  review  and  comment  on  policies  
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online.  This  online  portal  can  provide  avenue  for  policy  
recommendations,  report  issues  of  violation  and  environmental  injustices  
and  assist  with  implementation  of  policy.    
o With  Internet  accessible  to  a  majority  of  people  in  Ghana  today,  public  
participation  in  the  policy  process  should  be  a  possible  thing,  provided  
inputs  will  not  be  maligned.  Online  forums  should  give  people  a  voice  in  
the  policy  that  affects  their  lives,  in  a  fair  and  transparent  manner  that  
incorporates  citizen  opinions,  ideas,  beliefs  and  concerns.  
• Government  must  be  willing  to  make  information  readily  available,  and  make  it  
criminal  offence  when  information  is  willfully  kept  secret  from  the  public  by  
corporations,  groups,  or  individuals  who  are  in  the  position  to  influence  society  
with  their  actions  or  inactions.  
• Further  research  should  be  done  to  establish  environmental  justice  in  Ghana  
within  the  government  institutions  and  their  continual  relationship  with  
international  organizations,  bilateral  and  multilateral  treaties.    
• In  order  to  give  the  Ghana  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  the  powers  it  
deserves  to  do  its  work  more  effectively,  I  add  my  voice  to  empowering  the  
agency  with  autonomous  capabilities  to  strengthen  its  stakes.  In  the  case  of  the  
U.S.,  the  Advisory  Council  on  Executive  Organization,  led  by  Roy  Ash,  realized  
that  in  order  to  have  a  stronger  regime  of  environmental  policy  regulation  in  the  
U.S.,  it  was  important  to  bring  environmental  regulatory  powers  under  one  
agency.  That  enabled  the  agency  to  operate  without  conflicting  with  other  
government  departments  which  may  possess  similar  regulatory  powers.  
• I  surmised  that  poor  societies  tend  to  be  passive  towards  environmental  quality  
hence  have  high  tolerance  for  environmental  injustice.  As  indicated  in  the  Rio  
Summit,  effective  environmental  management  can  lead  to  wealth  creation.  As  a  
result  of  this  proposition,  Ghana  should  focus  on  environmental  quality  as  a  
catalyst  for  its  socioeconomic  growth.  This  will  strategically  build  sustainability  
in  its  socioeconomic  and  political  ethos.  
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APPENDICES	  
  
Appendix	  1.	  The	  Policy	  Cycle,	  Problem	  Solving;	  Howlett	  and	  Ramesh,	  1995.	  
Five  stages  of  the  policy  cycle  and  their  relationship  to  applied  problem  solving  
Stages  in  policy  cycle   Phases  of  applied  problem  
solving  
Description  and  comments  
Agenda  setting   Problem  recognition   How  an  issue  comes  to  the  attention  of  policy  
makers.  The  process  is  not  always  rational,  and  it  
can  often  be  difficult  to  see  why  some  issues  rise  
to  the  top  of  political  agendas  while  other,  
seemingly  more  important  issues,  remain  
unaddressed  
Policy  formulation   Proposal  of  solution   Decision-­‐‑makers  (governments,  health  regions,  
hospitals,  care  teams  etc.)  formulate  policy  
options.  Government  policy-­‐‑making  usually  
occurs  behind  the  scenes  and  is  carried  out  by  
professional  policy  analysts  
Decision-­‐‑making   Choice  of  solution   How  decision-­‐‑makers  decide  what  to  do  or  not  
do  about  an  issue  
Policy  implementation   Putting  solution  into  effect   Putting  the  decisions  into  effect.  Not  as  simple  as  
it  sounds,  as  it  usually  entails  changing  habits  
and  ingrained  ways  of  doing  things  
Policy  evaluation.   Monitoring  results   (all  too  often  neglected)  Examining  
implementation  and  outcomes  to  check  if  the  
policy  has  been  properly  implemented  and  if  the  
desired  outcomes  were  achieved  
Appendix	  2.	  Stakeholder	  Institutions	  involved	  in	  the	  PCBs	  issue	  in	  Ghana.	  
Government  Ministries  and  Agencies:  
i)  Ministry  of  Environment  and  Science  (MES)  
ii)  Environmental  Protection  Agency.  
iii)  Ministry  of  Food  Agriculture  (MOFA)  (Plant  
Protection  and  Regulatory  Services  Directorate,  
Veterinary  Services  Department),  
iv)  Customs,  Excise  and  Preventive  Service  (CEPS)  
v)  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  Planning  
vi)  Ministry  of  Health  (Ghana  Health  Service,  Food  
and  Drugs  Board)  
vii)  Ministry  of  Trade,  Industry  and  Presidential  
Special  Initiative  
Academic  and  Research  Institutions  
i)  Council  for  Scientific  and  Industrial  Research  
ii)  Ghana  Atomic  Energy  Commission  
iii)  University  of  Ghana  (Chemistry  Department,  
Biochemistry  Department)  
iv)  Kwame  Nkrumah  University  of  Science  and  
Technology  (Chemistry  Department,  Electrical  
Engineering)  
v)  University  of  Cape  Coast  (Chemistry  Department)  
vi)  Water  Resources  Commission  
vii)  Cocoa  Research  Institute  of  Ghana  
viii)  Water  Research  Institute  
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viii)  Ghana  Standards  Board  
ix)  Ministry  of  Employment  and  Manpower  
Development  (Factories  Inspectorate  Department)  
x)  Ministry  of  Roads  and  Transport  
xi)  Ministry  of  Education,  Youth  and  Sports  
xii)  Ministry  of  Justice  (Attorney  Generals  
Department)  
xiii)  Ministry  of  Local  Government  and  Rural  
Development  
xiv)  Ministry  of  Women  and  Children’s  Affairs  
xv)  Ministry  of  Works  and  Housing  (Ghana  Water  
Company  Limited)  
xvi)  Ministry  of  Interior  (Ghana  Police  Service)  
xvii)  Electricity  Company  of  Ghana  
xviii)  Volta  River  Authority  
  





i)  United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization  
(UNIDO)  
ii)  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  
iii)  United  National  Environment  Programme  (UNEP)  
iv)  World  Bank  
v)  Food  and  Agricultural  Organization  of  the  United  
Nations  (FAO)  
vi)  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  
  
Non-­‐‑Governmental  Organizations  
i)  Environmental  Interest  Groups  (Green  Earth,  
Friends  of  the  Earth-­‐‑Ghana,  Green  Club  of  
Ghana)  
ii)  Pesticide  Industry  Associations  
iii)  Industrial  Chemicals  Associations  
iv)  Trades  Union  Congress  (Petroleum  and  
chemicals  workers  union)  
v)  Public  Interest  Groups  (Ghana  Chemical  Society)  
vi)  Ghana  National  Association  of  Farmers  and  
Fishermen  
vii)  Association  of  Ghana  Industries  
viii)  Women  and  Children  Activists.  
Media  (Electronic  and  Print)  
i)  Ghana  Broadcasting  Corporation  
ii)  Other  public  and  private  media  
  
(Culled  from  Ghana  EPA  Report,  “National  Implementation  Plan  Of  The  Stockholm  Convention  On  Persistent  
Organic  Pollutants”,  2007,  pp.36-­‐‑37)  
Appendix	  3:	  Interviews	  
Some of the questions asked: 
1. What is your perspective on the PCBs situation in Ghana?  
2. Are you aware some old transformers made before 1979 may be tainted with PCBs? 
3. Are there policies in place to check PCBs in Ghana? 
4. Are current environmental policies stringent enough to manage PCBs contamination in Ghana?    
5. What  is  your  understanding  of  the  policy  process  in  Ghana  and  how  does  it  function?  What  are  
some  of  the  major  challenges  encountered  during  policymaking  process? 
6. Who are the main policy actors related to the PCBs issue in Ghana? 
Appendix	  4:	  Questionnaires	  	  
Appendix	  4a.	  Industry	  Perspective	  On	  PCBs	  In	  Ghana	  
Questions     Response    
1. What  factors  influences  your  company’s  purchase  of  electric  transformers  for  
national  usage?     
2. Which  period  did  your  company  purchase  most  of  its  electric  transformers  for  
national  usage?       
3. How  often  do  you  replace  old  transformers?     
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4. How  do  you  store  or  dispose  of  transformer  oil?     
5. What  do  you  do  with  your  old  unusable  transformers?     




7. At  the  time  of  purchasing,  are  components  and  material  toxicity  of  transformers  
explained  in  product  manuals,  or  to  your  outfit  in  some  other  form?     
8. Are  you  always  aware  if  your  imported  electric  transformers  contained  PCBs  or  
not?       
9. What  are  some  of  the  environmental  and  human  factors  your  company  considers  
before  purchasing  transformers?     
10. Are  there  regulations  on  PCBs  in  Ghana  that  affects  your  use  of  electric  
transformers  or  operations?     
Appendix	  4b:	  Institutional	  Perspective	  On	  PCBs	  In	  Ghana	  
Questions   Response    
1. Researchers  in  Ghana  have  shown  that,  many  electric  transformers  in  the  country  
contain  PCBs.    Have  you  chance  upon  such  knowledge?      
  
  
2. In  1979,  the  U.S.  ban  the  use,  distribution,  trade  in  commerce  and  disposal  of  PCBs  
nationally.  Do  you  think  the  ban  of  PCBs  in  the  U.S.  have  any  influence  on  how  
Ghana  imported  transformers  for  its  electricity  needs  especially  in  the  1980s?  
[Elaborate  on  response]  
  
3. PCBs  were  globally  ban  in  2001  under  the  Stockholm  Convention  on  Persistent  
Organic  Pollutant.  Did  this  ban  have  any  influence  on  how  Ghana  imported  
transformers  for  its  electricity  needs  within  the  last  couple  of  years?  [Elaborate  on  
response  please]  
  
4. Do  you  think  the  government  knew  prior  to  the  PCB  ban  in  the  U.S.  that  Electric  
transformers  might  contain  PCBs?  
  
5. Do  you  think  the  Electricity  industry  were  aware  of  PCBs  in  transformers  before  
or  after  the  ban  in  1979  in  the  U.S.?  
  
6. Did  government  take  pro-­‐‑active  measure  to  deal  with  the  PCBs  issue?  If  Yes,  at  
what  time  and  what  action  was  taken?  
  
7. In  your  opinion,  do  you  think  the  PCB  issue  in  Ghana  may  have  socio-­‐‑economic  
and  environmental  consequences  on  the  nation?  [Elaborate  on  response  please]  
  
8. Are  current  environmental  laws  and  regulations  sufficient  enough  to  deal  with  the  
PCB  crisis  in  Ghana?  [Elaborate  on  response  please]  
    
9. Can  you  elaborate  on  some  of  the  key  consideration  made  in  formulating  
environmental  policy  in  Ghana?  
  
10. Who  are  some  of  the  major  stakeholders  traditionally  involved  in  the  
environmental  policy  process  in  Ghana?  
  
11. Does  academic  findings  in  anyway  have  influence  on  public  policy  decision  in  
Ghana?  
  
Appendix	  4c:	  Public/Community	  Perspective	  on	  PCBs	  in	  Ghana	  
Questions:  
1. Name  (optional)/  Code:    
2. Sex:  M/F  
3. Age  range:  [18-­‐‑24],  [25-­‐‑35],  [36-­‐‑45],  [46-­‐‑up]  
4. Education  level  completed:    
• Primary  
• Secondary  
• Tertiary  [vocational,  technical,  
• Self  employed  
• Management    




7. How  long  have  you  lived  here  (in  years)?  
• Less  than  1  year  
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polytechnic,  university]  
5. Employment:    
• Employed  full  time  
• Employed  part  time  


















Community	  Environmental	  Justice	  and	  Participatory	  	  





9. Do	  you	  know	  about	  the	  toxic	  chemical	  Polychlorinated	  Biphenyls	  
(PCBs)?	   	   	   	   	  
10. Do	  you	  know	  that	  transformer	  oil	  may	  contains	  a	  dangerous	  
chemical	  call	  Polychlorinated	  Biphenyls	  (PCBs)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
11. Do	  you	  know	  that	  PCBs	  are	  ban	  but	  can	  be	  found	  in	  most	  
transformers	  in	  Ghana	   	   	   	   	  
12. Do	  you	  know	  that	  transformer	  oil	  may	  leach	  into	  the	  ground	  and	  
reach	  the	  environmental	  and	  biological	  medium	  through	  food	  
chain?	   	   	   	   	  
13. Do	  you	  know	  PCBs	  are	  harmful	  to	  human	  health	  and	  the	  
environment?	   	   	   	   	  
14. Are	  the	  electric	  transformers	  in	  your	  community	  self-­‐contained?	   	   	   	   	  
15. Have	  you	  ever	  witness	  an	  electric	  transformer	  burn	  in	  you	  
community?	   	   	   	   	  
16. Has	  the	  government	  or	  the	  electricity	  company	  educated	  your	  
community	  on	  the	  dangers	  of	  PCBS	  in	  their	  transformers?	   	   	   	   	  
17. Is	  your	  house	  close	  to	  an	  electric	  transformer	  site?	  [Less	  than	  1KM	  
is	  considered	  close]	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
18. Do	  you	  have	  children	  who	  play	  close	  to	  electricity	  transformer	  
sites	  in	  your	  community?	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
19. Do	  you	  think	  your	  community	  may	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  PCB	  exposure	  
because	  of	  transformers	  that	  may	  contain	  PCBs?	   	   	   	   	  
20. Are	  you	  aware	  of	  any	  environmental	  policy	  in	  Ghana	  that	  protects	  
people	  from	  harmful	  toxic	  Chemicals	  like	  PCBs?	   	   	   	   	  
21. Do	  you	  think	  existing	  environmental	  regulations	  in	  Ghana	  are	  
stringent	  enough	  to	  protect	  people	  and	  the	  environment?	   	   	   	   	  
22. Are	  environmental	  laws	  easy	  to	  implement/enforce	  in	  Ghana?	   	   	   	   	  
23. Do	  you	  think	  you	  can	  offer	  some	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  protect	  human	  
health	  and	  the	  environment?	   	   	   	   	  
24. Should	  the	  government	  allow	  local	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  
decisions	  that	  affect	  their	  life	  and	  the	  environment?	   	   	   	   	  
25. Should	  Government	  penalize	  those	  who	  continue	  to	  use	  PCB-­‐
contaminated	  transformers	  like	  ECG	  and	  VRA?	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
